Charting a Path to Peace: Trump, Iran, and the Geopolitical Shifts of West Asia
At his historic second-term inauguration on January 20, President Trump declared, “My proudest legacy will be that of a peacemaker and unifier.” His ambitions, however, will be shaped by the profound geopolitical shifts that have occurred during the four-year interlude between his presidencies. If managed well, these changes present Trump with a historic opportunity.
The most pressing challenge remains the enduring regional fissures and fluid dynamics in West Asia, with Iran at the forefront. Trump’s invitation to Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu as the first head of state to visit the White House (on February 4) and his key cabinet appointments signal that West Asia—and Iran in particular—will be among his administration’s top foreign policy priorities.
As the saying goes, personnel is policy, Trump’s selections present a mixed bag. The State Department is dominated by hawkish figures with staunchly pro-Israel and anti-Iran positions, while the Pentagon is staffed with pragmatists advocating for a reduced U.S. military footprint and an end to prolonged regional conflicts.
Among the hardliners are Secretary of State Marco Rubio, U.S. Ambassador to Israel, Mike Huckabee, U.N. Representative Elise Stefanik, and National Security Advisor Mike Waltz. On the pragmatic side are Elbridge Colby and Michael DiMino. Straddling both camps is Middle East Envoy, Steve Witkoff, who has already scored an early diplomatic win by securing a Gaza ceasefire and the release of Israeli hostages just days before Trump’s inauguration.
Notably, key anti-Iran hawks from Trump’s first term, such as Brian Hook and Mike Pompeo, have been unceremoniously sidelined. Also absent is the once-dominant phrase “maximum pressure.”
A confluence of factors is driving fundamental shifts across West Asia and the Levant, particularly in the Islamic Republic of Iran. As a result, a rare window of opportunity has opened for all major players to seize and build upon.
The year 2024 saw Iran suffer significant setbacks, most notably the erosion of its forward defense strategy via its Axis of Resistance. Its ambitious Shia Arch Crescent policy, decades in the making and built at immense cost in blood and treasure, now lies in tatters—a reality well-documented and extensively analyzed.
What has, however, not garnered sufficient attention is the ongoing game of chairs among competing factions within Iran, which took another turn last year. From an external perspective, Iran’s political system remains opaque. Yet beneath the surface lies a complex web of divisions among elite factions, all vying for influence over the country’s future direction. Since 2021, hardliners have come to dominate policy, stifling internal dissent while embracing a more risk-tolerant approach externally. This was particularly evident in the aftermath of the October 7th incidents in Israel, where pro-Iranian militias played a role and missile delivery systems and armaments were destabilizingly transferred.
Internally, however, concerns have been mounting over the increasing influence of hardliners and the securitization of political and national security institutions, including foreign policy. These developments have had clear negative consequences. One example is Iran’s involvement in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, where it has supplied armed drones and weaponry to Russia, straining its relations with the West. The motivations behind this move may never be fully understood. One possible rationale could have been to modernize Iran’s conventional capabilities through the eventual transfer of advanced weapons and aviation systems, such as fighter jets, from Russia. Another factor could have been the unprecedented direct attacks on Israel.
Both have yielded few gains and come at significant cost. Russia is facing a shortage of armaments, while Israel’s retaliatory strikes have exposed Iran’s conventional vulnerabilities, leaving it more susceptible to future attacks.
On the nuclear issue, the hardliners have successfully stalled discussions with the E3, US, and IAEA while pushing for ever-higher levels of uranium enrichment. In fact, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei is reported to have overruled attempts to limit enrichment to 90% (source: Clingendael).
The hardliners created yet another source of unwanted tension. Social issues, though seemingly insignificant, typically receive a relatively benign response from the authorities as long as they are not overtly disruptive. However, these issues unexpectedly took centre stage during the brief tenure of President Ebrahim Raisi. Public resentment toward the establishment grew, fuelled by the harsh enforcement of repressive social measures, particularly regarding hijab compliance and the vague morality laws.
The issue of what constitutes appropriate public appearance—such as women wearing the hijab or men wearing neckties—has been a source of controversy for the Islamic Republic since the 1979 revolution. In 1983, the mandatory wearing of the hijab was introduced for women, sparking massive nationwide protests. To this day, the authorities’ restrictions on appropriate dress, framed under vague religious edicts, remain a highly sensitive issue.
The enforcement of this requirement was delegated to the much-despised paramilitary moral policing force, Gasht-e-Ershad (or Guidance Patrol). Formally established in 2006, the Gasht falls under Iran’s judiciary and is empowered to issue warnings, detain individuals, and take any measures it deems necessary to ensure compliance with Islamic dress codes.
The arbitrary actions of the Gasht have become a polarizing force within Iranian society. Some lawmakers, particularly among the moderates, advocate for leaving dress choices to individual discretion. However, the enforcement of these measures varies according to political cycles—more leniently observed under moderates and strictly enforced under conservative hardliners.
In late 2022, a young Azeri woman, Mahsa Amini, died in Tehran while in the custody of Gasht-e-Ershad. Detained for improper dress, she was reportedly brutally beaten. Her death unleashed a long-suppressed fury among the people, sparking an unprecedented, weeks-long nationwide protest. The depth of the anger was evident in the presence of women who, though in favor of the hijab, saw it as a personal choice rather than a mandate. The protests, which spread across both urban and rural areas, were amplified by social media platforms like Instagram and Facebook, which served as equalizers. The protests quickly transformed into the now iconic “zan-zindagi-azadi” (“women, life, freedom”) movement.
While the movement was violently suppressed, it once again exposed the regime’s vulnerability to a latent social threat that, with the smallest provocation, can bring down even the most entrenched systems. Over its four decades in power, the clerical regime has become acutely aware of this ever-present and unpredictable societal danger.
It is noteworthy that the nationwide demonstrations of 2022 were not sparked by typical economic concerns, such as crippling inflation or unemployment. Rather, they were driven by anger over the perceived breach of what many consider to be a delicate social line—a fragile understanding between the authorities and the people, an unstated pact that neither side would push the other too far. This compact, however, was severely frayed.
Thus, developments since Trump’s break with the Iran nuclear deal and during his second term could prove serendipitous. Two key developments merit particular attention.
First, there is the resurgence of the pragmatist moderate faction in Iran. The moderates were sidelined after Trump’s 2018 decision to withdraw the U.S. from the nuclear deal and reimpose harsh sanctions. That move, along with the “maximum pressure” strategy, allowed hardliners to regain control, particularly over the Majlis and the Executive.
The sudden demise of President Ebrahim Raisi and Foreign Minister Amir Abdollahian in a helicopter crash in May last year provided Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei with an opportunity to course-correct. The limitations of the hardliners and the fraying of the nation’s social fabric posed a potential existential threat to Khamenei’s core priority of preserving the 1979 Islamic Revolution. As seen with the 2019 and 2022 protests, the most significant threats to the regime come from within—and they cannot be imposed externally.
With his typical political skill, Khamenei engineered the return of the moderate faction by backing the election of President Masoud Pezeshkian last July. Many moderates have returned to the fold, including Javad Zarif, who now serves as Vice President for Strategic Affairs, and Abbas Araghchi, appointed Foreign Minister. Both have been consistent advocates for reengaging with the West. More notably, Zarif, who has a history of alienating powerful domestic forces, supports reducing Iran’s regional footprint.
Second, relations between Iran and the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) have stabilized, contributing to a reduction in tensions across the Hormuz Strait. Diplomatic relations between Iran and the GCC have returned to a semblance of normalcy after years of antagonism, which were exacerbated by the 2016 attack on the Saudi mission in Tehran and Iran’s assertive regional posture.
Since 2022, Iran-GCC ties have steadily improved, marked by high-level ministerial and official engagements. The high point came in March 2023, with the restoration of diplomatic relations between Iran and Saudi Arabia, accompanied by mutual respect for each other’s sovereignty and a commitment to non-interference in internal affairs.
Each side has its own motivations for this rapprochement. For Iran, normalization stems from Raisi’s “neighborhood-first” policy, designed and executed by the late Foreign Minister Hossein Amir-Abdollahian, an expert in Arab affairs. This policy was accompanied by a “look East” strategy aimed at distancing from the West while strengthening ties with rising powers to the east, including India.
For the GCC, particularly Saudi Arabia, one motivator was their silent disappointment over Trump’s tacit approval of Iran’s drone strikes on Saudi Aramco oil facilities in Abqaiq-Khurais in 2019. The lack of a U.S. response appears to have convinced the GCC, especially the Saudis, of the need to safeguard their own security. Another factor is Saudi Arabia’s quest for a way out of its protracted conflict with the Houthis in Yemen, where Iran plays a key role.
While full rapprochement between Iran and the GCC is still some way off, current trends are positive. Long-standing issues, such as territorial disputes over the strategic Abu Musa and Tunb islands, have been put on the backburner. The GCC’s leverage lies in its ability to meet Iran’s need for capital infusion, especially for infrastructure reconstruction.
As always, the resolution depends on the choices of Washington, D.C. and Tehran. Moving forward, Trump, as a dealmaker, may find likeminded partners in the Iranian “bazaari” mindset. Beneath the typical bluster and aggressive rhetoric, the Iranians are recalibrating tactically to manage and mitigate their recent strategic losses. A resolution to Iran’s nuclear issue will be crucial for ensuring regional stability. Closely tied to this is Iran’s consistent demand for sanctions relief, with both issues deeply interconnected.
Successive U.S. administrations have made it clear that Iran will “never” be allowed to acquire a nuclear weapon. Early signals from the Trump administration suggest a focus on finding solutions. The recent diplomatic signals are aimed at setting the stage for future engagement. While the historic U.S.-Iran divide cannot be resolved immediately, tensions can be reduced by breaking the deadlock on the nuclear issue.
In October this year, the 2015 UN resolution 2231, which adopted the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA), will expire, and the UN Security Council will close Iran’s nuclear file, including ending the provision for snapback sanctions. The U.S.-E3 can no longer threaten Iran with the snapback of sanctions. The nine-month window ahead provides an opportunity for all sides to come back to the table. The E3 (the UK, France, and Germany) has already held three rounds of talks with Iran, with the latest taking place in Geneva in mid-January. Kazem Gharibabadi, Iran’s Deputy Foreign Minister and former Permanent Representative to the IAEA, called the talks “serious, frank, and constructive,” stating that “we discussed and examined ideas in two critical areas: sanctions relief and nuclear issues, which are essential to reaching an agreement.”
Despite this, Iran’s tendency toward maximalist demands and its pursuit of leverage remains a factor. While the Iran-E3 talks were ongoing in Geneva, Mohammad Eslami, head of Iran’s Atomic Energy Organization (AEOI), declared plans to ramp up Iran’s nuclear energy program. On the other hand, there has been a noticeable reduction in recent months in the rhetoric from those calling for Iran to exercise its nuclear option. Leading figures, such as former Foreign Minister Kamal Kharrazi, who has long claimed that Iran has attained threshold nuclear status, have toned down their language. These claims, often timed to coincide with politically strategic moments—such as the tit-for-tat Iran-Israel strikes—indicate a desire to leverage a latent capability for political gain. Pro-establishment figures have also called for invoking Article 10, which would allow Iran to withdraw from the NPT. However, the JCPOA does not grant this right to any party, including the United States.
In contrast, Foreign Minister Araghchi has adopted a more measured approach, urging discussions to resolve “all” issues, including Iran’s rights to sanctions relief under UN Security Council Resolution 2231. However, he notes that the facts on the ground have changed, but that the JCPOA framework still offers a path for fresh negotiations. He also reminds interlocutors of the preambular paragraph (iii) of the JCPOA, which states that “Iran reaffirms that under no circumstances will Iran ever seek, develop, or acquire any nuclear weapons.”
Araghchi, who served as Zarif’s deputy and Iran’s chief nuclear negotiator during the JCPOA’s negotiation, enjoys significant influence, having worked closely with Kharrazi and other key figures. His recent statements have bolstered the possibility of progress on Iran’s nuclear file.
Thus, the groundwork for Trump to advance discussions is being laid. Oman has once again expressed its willingness to mediate. Two factors will be critical: First, there can be no “black or white” approach to dealing with Iran. The strategy of escalating to leverage is an ingrained cultural trait. Second, Trump’s persona will be crucial—whether he will have the patience to pursue what will surely be tough and lengthy negotiations. After all, the JCPOA itself took two years of difficult discussions.
