US DoD Arctic strategy misses the mark on Russian capabilities and China alliance
The US Department of Defence (DoD) released its Arctic Strategy document on July 22, 2024. The document says the Russian and Chinese presence and capabilities in the Arctic region would be the primary threat to the US and its allies. The report specially touches upon the emerging co-operation between China and Russia in the region.
The strategy document also acknowledges the disagreements between Russia and China but does not elaborate on the possibility of these divisions becoming wedges between Moscow and Beijing, nor on the US’ plan of action in such a scenario. It makes no mention of the alliance between Russia and China being based only on tentatively converging interests, particularly against the US.
The report, which is of strategic importance, does not take stock of the state and difficulties in upkeep of Russian infrastructure in the region, mostly built during the Cold War era. The DoD also fails to take into account the Russian icebreaker fleet, the field in which Russia remains the global technological leader.
Melting Permafrost
The permafrost in the region also raises questions on Russia’s land-based infrastructure in the long-term. The Kremlin is forced to sink hundreds of millions of dollars into the upkeep and monitoring of land-based infrastructure, including buildings and housing structures in its Far Eastern and Arctic territory. As global temperatures rise due to climate change, the Soviet era infrastructure — built without taking into account future thaw in the ice — will become unusable and prone to disaster. According to an estimate by the Russian Academy of Sciences, up to $250 billion worth of Russian physical infrastructure will be at risk due to thawing permafrost. The US government’s 2022 National Strategy for the Arctic region document does address the threat to its own infrastructure in Alaska from melting permafrost. But a similar long-term threat is not taken into account by the DoD in the 2024 strategy document despite the questions it raises against Russia’s edge in Arctic infrastructure.
Russia’s global lead in long range icebreakers
The strategy raised concerns about Russia’s “maritime infrastructure” which could be used “to enforce excessive and illegal maritime claims along the Northern Sea Route (NSR)”, but did not mention Russia’s unmatched nuclear powered icebreaker fleet. Moscow’s nuclear icebreakers are owned and operated by a subsidiary of its state-owned nuclear conglomerate Rosatom. The subsidiary aptly named ‘Rosatomflot’ has seven active ships, and has no competitors in long endurance icebreaker shipping as no other nation or entity possesses comparable vessels at present.
However, China is said to be developing a nuclear-powered icebreaker which is in line with its plans for the so-called “polar silk road”, but progress on the project remains uncertain. China which called itself a ‘’near Arctic state’’ in a 2018 white paper has an even chance of developing the vessel with its enormous ship-building industry and ambitions of rivalling Moscow’s fleet.
China’s possible entry into long range piloting services, especially along the NSR with its own nuclear icebreakers, will be a cause for concern for the Kremlin and may create friction points between the two nations.
Diminished Russian ballistic missile submarine fleet
The state of Russia’s ballistic missile submarine fleet and availability is also much diminished than the document reflects. The fleet as of August 2024 includes seven newer Borei-class submarines and six older Delta IV-class submarines. However, according to an August 2023 article in Riddle by Dr Pavel Luzin, only six of the newer Borei class submarines and two of the Delta IV class are considered operational, with the rest either past their useful lifespan or repairs. The newest Borei class boat is also under sea trials and unlikely to be fully operational soon. The submarines are equipped with Multiple Independent Re-entry Vehicle (MIRV)-capable submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBM)s, which likely number “no more than 128” instead of the 192 claimed on paper. The Kremlin and the Russian navy appear to be overstating the number of active submarines and their missiles to portray parity with their American counterparts who project their ballistic missile submarine fleet strength on paper to be 14 and with 20 missiles onboard each accounting for 280 MIRV SLBMs.
Despite Moscow’s continued construction of the newer Borei-class submarines, the overall readiness and capabilities of its ballistic missile submarine fleet are declining due to the Delta-IV class boats being on their last legs. Even in the best case scenario, the fleet is unlikely to swell beyond 12 even by 2031.
Chinese not a threat yet
While the strategy document doesn’t mention the Chinese submarines using Arctic waters, the possibility was flagged in the 2019 Pentagon report to the US Congress. While Russia and China conducted a joint exercise with strategic bombers near Alaska as well as naval warships near the Gulf of Finland in July 2024, there is no known instance of them conducting a similar exercise involving submarines in the broader Arctic region. Although China has made significant strides in developing nuclear-powered submarines, such as the Type 094 ‘Jin-class’ ballistic missile submarines, they are handicapped by the relatively noisy engines as compared to their American and Russian counterparts. This noisiness increases the risk of detection, undermining their stealth and strategic effectiveness. Moreover, the Type 093 ‘Shang-class’ submarines, which form the backbone of China’s attack submarine fleet, are also limited in their capabilities compared to more advanced Western and Russian submarines. However, despite the limitations and lack of public acknowledgement or sightings, the probability of submerged and passively operating Chinese and Russian boats being present together at joint exercises can’t be written off.
Sanctions rust Russian capabilities
The biggest impact on Russian capability has been the Western sanctions, especially on its high-tech dual-use military hardware to space-based earth observation assets. Due to the controls on high-tech export, particularly those pertaining to semiconductors, the availability of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAV)s and satellites that Moscow can deploy to surveillance and provide navigation assistance along the Northern Sea Route has been badly affected. The sanctions imposed by European Union in February 2023 against Rosatomflot, and the resultant squeeze on funding and inability to import components has also led to Russia lowering the scope of its future Project 10510 icebreakers. The one vessel now planned to be constructed under Project 10510 will also be much smaller and less capable than the originally planned “at least five vessels” under Russia’s 2020 Arctic strategy document.
In conclusion, as the DoD paints Russia and China and their cooperation as adversarial, both Moscow and Beijing reject the way the US frames its approach to the Arctic. The mutual distrust between the three powers is likely to lead to the Arctic region increasingly becoming a zone for competition rather than cooperation.
