On October 31 2025, the United Nations Security Council adopted a US-sponsored resolution on the Western Sahara, creating a pathway based on Morocco’s autonomy initiative of 2007 to begin negotiations for a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution to this half-century-old decolonisation dispute. It was passed with 11 votes in favour, Russia, China and Pakistan abstained, and Algeria did not vote. The resolution (text enclosed below) also renewed for one year the mandate of the UN peacekeeping force in Western Sahara, known as the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO).
2. Geography: The Western Sahara (See Map below) is a swathe of territory in the western part of the Arab world, the area of which is 266,000 sq kms[i] (slightly larger than Uttar Pradesh) with a population estimated at 565,000. It borders Morocco, Algeria and Mauritania. It has an Atlantic shoreline of 1110 kms, rich in fish and is deemed to have sizable offshore oil deposits. Most of the territory is the Saharan desert with rich rock phosphate reserves. Its sparse population is largely centred at the coast with fishing as the main occupation.
3. History:
3.1 Spanish Colonial Period (1884-1975): The area was claimed by Spain in 1884 as its colony. However, raids and rebellions by the indigenous Sahrawi population kept the Spanish forces out of much of the Spanish-claimed territory for a long time. The rebellious territory was finally subdued in 1934, after a joint military operation by Spanish and French forces, and Madrid was able to proclaim it as a province named Spanish Sahara. However, unrest lingered among the region’s population in part mirroring the independence movements against French colonial rule in Morocco and Algeria. After its independence in 1957, Morocco laid claim to the territory, citing historical links. In 1965, the UN called for decolonisation of the territory, and a UN mission in June 1975 declared that there was “overwhelming consensus” in support of Sahrawi independence and that the Polisario Front[ii] was the most powerful political force in the country. However, in response to a two-part reference by the UN General Assembly, the International Court of Justice[iii] provided an ambiguous advisory opinion in October 1975. In Spain a left-leaning government succeeded long-term dictator Francisco Franco in 1973, and decided to decolonise its overseas territories, including Western Sahara. However, the territorial succession issue became controversial as Morocco and Mauritania jointly laid claim to the territory, while the Polisario Front demanded full independence. On November 7 1975, King Hassan II of Morocco announced a “Green March” – a strategic mass demonstration coordinated by the Moroccan government and military – to force Spain to hand over the disputed province of Spanish Sahara to Morocco. The March comprised over 350,000 persons, a number far greater than the then native population of the territory. With an unsteady political transition underway in Spain, Madrid buckled under Moroccan pressure and signed the Madrid Accord on November 14, 2025, agreeing to cede the possession of the colony to Morocco and Mauritania, under the condition, expressed in point 3 of the Trilateral Agreement, that the views of the Saharan population had to be respected. Relevant to note that Morocco had hustled Spain to exclude all representatives of the native population during the negotiations for these accords, dividing Spanish Sahara between Mauritania and Morocco. Under the Madrid Accord, Spain decided to withdraw and cede the territory to Morocco and Mauritania.
3.2 Post Colonial Era (1976-Till Date): Following the Madrid Accords, Spain formally relinquished control of the territory on February 26, 1976. On the same day, Polisario declared the formation of the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR), claiming full sovereignty over the territory. Under these circumstances, the two sides launched all-out politico-military campaign to redeem their respective claims over Western Sahara. Soon armed hostilities ensued between Moroccan and Mauritanian forces, on one side and Polisario Front guerrillas on the other. These resulted in Mauritania renouncing its claim on southern Western Sahara in 1979 and Rabat claiming the entire territory. The bitter and bloody conflict continued till 1991 when a UN-brokered ceasefire took hold, which has largely to date. Morocco has built a 2700 km-long sand berm, peppered with up to 10 million landmines, parallel to the territory’s eastern border to prevent attacks by Polisario fighters. While Morocco currently controls approximately 70% of the territory, the rest, in the east, is with the SADR. The war resulted in up to 21,000 casualties between both sides. Some 40,000–80,000 Sahrawi refugees were displaced due to the conflict – most are still residing in various Sahrawi refugee camps throughout the Tindouf province of Algeria, their numbers having swelled many-fold in the past fifty years. Reports also indicate Moroccan attempts to populate the Western Sahara with its citizens, mine and export its rock phosphate and sign agreements to fish in its territorial waters. There have also been reports about sporadic anti-Moroccan mass protests by resident Sahrawis.
4. Geopolitics: While the Western Sahara issue has largely been localised, it has impacted the regional and continental geopolitics. Algeria has maintained that the issue is exclusively between Morocco and the Polisario Front, and Algiers has a role only as an “Observer”, it has been the main backer of the Western Sahara’s independence. Though the details are sketchy, there is circumstantial evidence to suggest that Algeria has not only provided refuge to Sahrawis but has also rendered low-key, but comprehensive military assistance to their cause. The dispute has given a sharper edge to the longstanding rivalry between Rabat and Algiers, with their markedly different political, economic and diplomatic orientations. While Morocco is an Islamic monarchy and a largely tourism-based economy, Algeria is essentially a left-of-centre, secular one-party state with a hydrocarbon-based economy. Morocco has cordial ties with right-wing Arab regimes and the Western world, while Algeria has an opposite clientele and friends. Their opposing positions on the Sahrawi dispute have stymied regional integration under the Arab Maghreb Union.
4.1 SADR’s membership in the African Union has been a persistently thorny issue bedevilling Morocco’s relations with the continental intergovernmental body. A significant majority of African states regard the Western Sahara as essentially a decolonisation issue and are naturally sympathetic towards the Polisario Front. This is because these states gained their independence from Western colonial rule. Further, the African Union also consider the colonial-era borders to be inviolable. Moreover, Algeria gained independence from France through an epic armed struggle, and its post-independence government supported several African liberation movements, giving it an inside track to the current regimes. All this has provided SADR an edge at the African stage. No such tilt is seen in the Arab League, where SADR is not admitted as a member state.
4.2 The European Union, particularly Spain and France, have walked a delicate line, being home to millions of migrants from both Morocco and Algeria. They have substantial economic and tourism ties with Morocco but also depend on Algeria for oil and gas. Relevant to note that none of the five permanent members, including Russia and China, recognised SADR. While P-5 also did not recognise Moroccan claims of having sovereignty over the territory, the situation has shifted dramatically in the past five years. The breakthrough came in December 2020 when President Donald Trump announced that the United States would officially recognise Morocco’s claims over Western Sahara, in exchange for Rabat agreeing to normalise relations with Israel and join the Abraham Accords. He also reaffirmed its support for Morocco’s autonomy proposal as the only basis for a just and lasting solution to the Western Sahara dispute. The US further stated that it believes that an independent Sahrawi State is not a realistic option for resolving the conflict and that a genuine autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty is the only feasible solution. While Mr Trump was succeeded a month later by President Joe Biden, his administration did not rescind the decision, only froze its implementation. Following Washington’s cue, major Western powers such as France, Britain and Spain also shifted their respective positions on this dispute, finally leading to the adoption of a US-sponsored resolution by the UN Security Council on October 31, 2025. The passage of UNSCR 2797 was officially hailed by Morocco as a victory.
5. Dispute Resolution Diplomacy: The stubborn “winner takes it all” approach by the two main stakeholders, viz Morocco and Polisario Front/Algeria, has thwarted multiple diplomatic initiatives, mostly under the United Nations’ aegis, to resolve this dispute. An additional complication was ambivalence by the outside parties and their shifting positions. The UN mediation bids followed the 1991 ceasefire and were essentially geared towards the technical issues centred around holding the referendum. But it got bogged down for over three decades with issues such as eligibility criteria for the voters’ list becoming unresolvable – largely due to Moroccan obstructions. Spain and France, the two main outside parties, also kept the dispute alive for their respective tactical advantages with Morocco and Algeria.
5.1 Despite the Western Sahara being subject to 33 resolutions by the UN Security Council since 1975, 26 of them were largely related to extending the mandate of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) initially established in 1991 – a task that got mired in complications and has yet to be completed. In 2003, the Security Council approved resolution 1495 supporting the peace plan proposed by James Baker, former US Secretary of State as “an optimum solution on the basis of agreement between the parties”. However, this plan also got nowhere. In 2007, Morocco proposed an “initiative for negotiating an autonomy statute for the Sahara region”, which, 18 years later, finds an endorsement as a basis for a solution to this 50-year-old dispute. It has the following basic features:
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The plan would see some administrative, legislative and judicial powers transferred to residents, who would “themselves run their affairs democratically”.
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The “Sahara Autonomous Region” would have its own government and a parliament made up of both representatives of local tribes and directly elected members.
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It would have its own courts, which would issue rulings “in the name of the king”. “Laws, regulations and court rulings issued by the bodies of the Sahara autonomous Region (would) be consistent with the Region’s autonomy Statute and with the Kingdom’s Constitution,” the text says.
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The regional government would also raise local taxes and control its own budget.
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But the territory would retain the Moroccan flag and currency, while its foreign relations, security and defence would be under the purview of Rabat.
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The kingdom says “concerned populations” would be allowed a referendum on such a solution and that it would declare an amnesty for Polisario fighters once they are disarmed and demobilised.
Morocco says the plan is not a definitive formula but rather aimed at pushing negotiations forward to find “a mutually acceptable political solution”.
6. Conclusion: Recognition of Moroccan sovereignty over Western Sahara by three of the P5 countries and passage of UNSCR 2797 have injected a new dynamic that may lead to a denouement of this long-simmering dispute[iv]. However, finding a fair and longstanding solution of this problem would still call for intensive negotiations requiring considerable accommodation and political sagacity by the concerned stakeholders, particularly by Morocco. Rabat may have won a diplomatic victory culminating in the passage of the UNSCR 2797, but it only paves the way towards a negotiated settlement before the words can be converted into facts on the ground.
7. India’s Position: As a historic footnote, one needs to mention that India’s current position on this issue is aligned with the concerned UNSCRs. Earlier, India decided to recognise SADR in October 1985 after assessing that Rabat had no intention of holding a proper referendum in Western Sahara. For a while, SADR had an embassy in New Delhi, and the Indian ambassador in Algiers was concurrently accredited to SADR. While Morocco broke off relations with India to protest this move, Algerians appreciated it, which made India the most important country to recognise SADR. However, the issue was not central to the Indian foreign policy and reflected more the uneasy relations between Rabat and New Delhi and our penchant to back the regional consensus on such issues. Eventually, in 2000, India decided to withdraw its recognition of SADR without citing any specific reasons.
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ANNEXURE
TEXT OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL RESOLUTION NO. 2797 OF OCT 31 2025
The Security Council,
Recalling and reaffirming all its previous resolutions concerning Western Sahara,
Expressing its full support for the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy, Staffan de Mistura, in their efforts to implement Security Council resolutions and advance the political process, including through ongoing consultations between the Personal Envoy, Morocco, the Polisario Front, Algeria, and Mauritania, to build upon progress achieved,
Reaffirming its commitment to assisting the parties in achieving a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution based on compromise, consistent with the principles and purposes of the UN Charter, including the principle of self-determination, and recognizing the roles and responsibilities of the parties,
Emphasizing the urgent need for the parties to resolve this dispute, recognizing the momentum and urgency, and commending the important role of MINURSO in supporting the Personal Envoy’s efforts to achieve a mutually acceptable political solution,
Taking note of the support expressed by many Member States for the Moroccan Autonomy Initiative, presented to the Secretary-General on 11 April 2007, as a basis for a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable solution,
Affirming that genuine autonomy under Moroccan sovereignty constitutes the most realistic and feasible solution,
Welcoming the Council members’ commitment to facilitate progress,
Commending the Personal Envoy’s initiative to hold meetings among the parties to build upon current momentum and seize this historic opportunity for lasting peace,
Encouraging full and genuine participation in negotiations,
Expressing appreciation to the United States for its willingness to host negotiations in support of the Personal Envoy’s mission to achieve a solution to the Western Sahara question and for the wider region,
Stressing the importance of respecting the ceasefire and avoiding any actions that could undermine the political process,
Expressing deep concern over the funding shortfall for Sahrawi refugees and urging donors to provide additional contributions, while reiterating the call for refugee registration,
Having considered the report of the Secretary-General dated 30 September 2025 (S/2025/612),
Decides as follows:
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Extends the mandate of MINURSO until 31 October 2026;
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Expresses full support for the Secretary-General and his Personal Envoy to lead negotiations based on Morocco’s Autonomy Initiative as a pathway toward a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution, consistent with the UN Charter, and welcomes any constructive proposals by the parties;
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Calls on the parties to engage in these discussions without preconditions, taking the Moroccan Autonomy Initiative as the basis, to reach a final and lasting political solution ensuring realistic self-determination for the people of Western Sahara, recognising that genuine autonomy represents the most viable outcome, and encouraging the submission of ideas to support a final agreement;
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Calls on Member States to provide support and assistance for these negotiations and the efforts of the Personal Envoy;
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Requests the Secretary-General to provide regular briefings to the Council and, within six months, to present a strategic review on the future of MINURSO, taking into account the results of the negotiations;
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Decides to remain seized of the matter.
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i In comparison, Western Sahara’s area is 57% of the area of Morocco (467,000 sq kms), without this territory being included. However, population of Western Sahara is only 1.5% of Morocco’s 38.1 million.
ii Polisario Front (Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro) was founded in 1973 and was engaged in armed struggle to liberate Western Sahara from Spanish rule. Following departure of Spain from Western Sahara, it has fought against Moroccan rule of the territory. It was supported by Algeria (where it is still headquartered in Tindouf in west of the country) and Morocco. In February 1976, Polisario Front declared the establishment of the Saharawi Arab Democratic Republic (SADR). While SADR doesnot have a membership of either the United Nations or Arab League, it is a full member of the African Union and is recognised by a majority of African states.
iii On 13 December 1974, the UN General Assembly requested an advisory opinion on the following questions : “I. Was Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) at the time of colonization by Spain a territory belonging to no one (terra nullius) ?” If the answer to the first question is in the negative, “II. What were the legal ties between this territory and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritanian entity ?” In its Advisory Opinion, delivered on 16 October 1975, the Court replied to Question I in the negative. In reply to Question II, it expressed the opinion that the materials and information presented to it showed the existence, at the time of Spanish colonization, of legal ties of allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and some of the tribes living in the territory of Western Sahara. They equally showed the existence of rights, including some rights relating to the land, which constituted legal ties between the Mauritanian entity, as understood by the Court, and the territory of Western Sahara. On the other hand, the Court’s conclusion was that the materials and information presented to it did not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. Thus the Court did not find any legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of the General Assembly’s 1960 resolution 1514 (XV) — containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples — in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the territory.
iv It would be noted that the UNSCR 2797 does not present a carte blanche to Morocco on this dispute and the text is hedged by various caveats such as “realistic self-determination for the people of Western Sahara”, “recognising that genuine autonomy represents the most viable outcome”, “encouraging the submission of ideas to support a final agreement” which is described as “a just, lasting, and mutually acceptable political solution”, “consistent with the UN Charter.” More importantly, the resolution welcomes “any constructive proposals by the parties.”
The previous issue of GAZA: Waiting for the Other Shoe to Fall are available here: LINK
