Ananta Insights | EU-Central Asia Relations: A Rapidly Expanding Partnership by Ambassador Ashok Sajjanhar | May 2025

Introduction

Over the past decades, EU engagement with Central Asia has slowly but steadily developed from limited engagement to a vibrant partnership. This is true particularly in the fields of trade, energy, investment, and development aid. The EU is now one of the most important partners for Central Asian countries in these and some other sectors. The EU has taken several significant steps to reach this juncture. Whereas in the early 1990s, Central Asia was not amongst the key priorities of the EU, this relation has deepened over the last three decades.

Evolution of EU-Central Asia Relations

A brief timeline of key developments and turning points in the EU engagement with Central Asia since 1991 is given below:

In its 1995 document entitled “The EU’s Relations with the Newly Independent States of Central Asia’’, the EU kick-started this process by sharing its “geopolitical and economic” interests for the region, in particular towards Central Asia’s energy sector. In a related memo, the EU expressed its “serious political concerns over human rights and democracy throughout the region.” It also assessed the economic conditions of the region, EU’s interest and investments, as well as the role of Russia, the US, Türkiye, and China as significant players in the region.

The first turning point in EU – Central Asian relations came in 2001 with the US War on Terror and the invasion of Afghanistan. Western military personnel within the NATO coalition were allowed to use the facilities in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan to fight the Taliban, while the interest of the Central Asian countries was to secure their borders.

This was also the time when Austria initiated the Border Management Programme in Central Asia (BOMCA), which was later made into an EU programme with the goal of securing the region’s external borders. The Central Asia Drug Action Programme (CADAP) was also launched to assist Central Asia in its fight against the drug demand. A year later, in 2002, the first Strategy Paper for Central Asia was published. The EU focused on the provision of technical assistance, such as humanitarian assistance, macro-financial grants, and loans, by allocating fifty million euros a year for a five-year period. In 2005, the first EU special representative for Central Asia was appointed.

The second key moment in the EU-Central Asian relationship came in 2005, following the Andijan massacre in Uzbekistan. Armed men released 23 local businessmen, accused of extremism, from prison, occupied government buildings, and took police officers hostage. The government’s assault on the several thousand protestors resulted in a massacre, with 173 people killed, according to the Uzbek government, and up to 500 according to eyewitnesses. In reaction, the EU and US distanced themselves from Uzbekistan and cut military funding. Former President Karimov likewise turned his back on the West, and ties remained strained until sanctions were lifted step-by-step from 2009.

This tragedy in Andijan and the subsequent response was indicative of the tensions between human rights and the rule of law on the one hand, and geopolitical and economic interests on the other. There are several similar examples in recent years that played a significant role in shaping bilateral relations between EU and Central Asia.

The third and most significant turning point in the relations between Central Asia and the EU came in 2007 when the EU launched its first strategy for the region, entitled “The EU and Central Asia: Strategy for a New Partnership.’’ This document presented an “interest in the security and stability” and “adherence to human rights” as the most important interests of the EU in the region. From this point onwards, the essential EU cooperation turned into a more structured and enhanced engagement with the countries of the region.

Later on, in 2019 the EU-Central Asia strategy was updated. Although this has been described as “the old EU Central Asia strategy in a fresh PDF” by some, as it regrouped the EU priorities for the region into new categories, it is in fact a different document. While the 2007 strategy was developed under a German initiative, the new strategy was based on EU-wide consultations and deliberations among member states, several rounds of talks between the EU and the countries of Central Asia, conversations with civil society in the region, and discussions with academia and think tanks in Europe. And compared to the earlier strategy, it was also more specifically aimed at the realities and requirements of individual Central Asian states.

In its latest strategy, the overall aim of the EU in Central Asia was “to forge a stronger and non-exclusive partnership with Central Asian states so that the region develops as a more resilient, prosperous, and closely interconnected economic and political space”. In practice, a third additional and overlapping EU priority for Central Asia was regional cooperation.

After the COVID-19 pandemic and Russian aggression against Ukraine, there have been discussions in Brussels to replace the 2019 strategy. So far the consensus has been that the standing priorities and themes are still valid. The EU did, however, develop a roadmap in 2023 as a sort of annex or to-do list to the 2019 strategy. From its defined strategy, the EU picks and chooses, currently stressing the environment and renewable energy in its resilience priority, and connectivity in the prosperity priority.

The EU Priorities in its Central Asia strategy

February 2022 marked the latest turning point in this relationship. Due to the Russian full-scale invasion of Ukraine, Central Asian countries once again came into the EU spotlight as potential alternative energy suppliers instead of Russia, similar to the situation in 2006-2009 when President Putin started threatening to stop gas deliveries to Ukraine and the EU. Since 2022, the EU is also increasingly looking towards Central Asia as an alternative transport route, and as a region where the EU could step up its engagement to help countries decrease their dependence on Russia.

Since then, high-level meetings between the European Council President and European Commission President with the Central Asian heads of state have taken place, as well as a steep increase in national European visits to the region. 

However, beyond such meetings and renewed attention for energy and transport connectivity with Central Asia, a more fundamental change in EU policy towards the region has not consolidated as overall attention and funding are still modest. And despite the progress made since 1991, EU engagement with Central Asia is not perceived as consistent by the actors in the region. Sentiment in Central Asia about the interest of the West in Central Asia can be summarised as follows: “After the Cold War ended, the West was suddenly interested in Central Asia. This faded away, but from 2001 onwards, when the US invaded Afghanistan, this interest returned – only to fade away yet again. And now that you have problems with Russia, you are once again interested in Central Asia. Will you leave again afterwards? Others, like Russia, China, and Türkiye, have always been here.’’

Moreover, there is still little awareness among the population in all five Central Asian countries about the EU and its initiatives. Only after the 2007 Central Asia Strategy did the EU start to become more visible in the region. The EU is aware of this and has aimed to raise its profile in the region through a “more dynamic and better-targeted communication strategy, presenting the rationale behind its engagement and underlining the opportunities, which the EU-Central Asia partnership can bring to the region and to its citizens.”

The foreign policy of most Central Asian countries invites working with as many countries as possible – except for Turkmenistan’s neutrality policy. The five Central Asian states are expanding their partnerships with third countries to create better conditions for trade and investment. Both governments and businesses understand the need to diversify their partners, and Europe in particular is an attractive partner as it could offer an alternative path for economic diversification and provide certain technologies and know-how which Central Asians cannot receive from Russia or China.

Bilaterally, the EU is developing Enhanced Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (EPCAs) with the countries of Central Asia to replace the older Partnership and Cooperation Agreements (PCAs) that previously defined the relationships. These agreements arrange for cooperation in various fields, ranging from investments to energy, transport, education, and more. The EPCA with Kazakhstan (2020) has been ratified and with Kyrgyzstan (2024) signed. With Uzbekistan an EPCA is currently being prepared for signature, with Tajikistan negotiations are still ongoing, and with Turkmenistan there is only an interim trade agreement.

The EU has argued it wants to become more geopolitical in its dealings worldwide since Ursula von der Leyen became President of the European Commission in 2019. If the EU wishes to achieve this goal, its policy should be backed up by tangible and deeper engagement that goes beyond energy and trade, for instance by seriously including education, connectivity, and other elements.

The Samarkand Summit (4 April, 2025)

For the last few years, the Central Asian countries have been drawing closer to each other. The credit for this can be attributed in large measure to the Uzbek President Shavkat Mirziyoyev who launched the initiative of an Informal meeting between the leaders of the five countries called the “Consultative Meeting of Heads of State of Central Asia’’ soon after he came to power in 2017. The last such Consultative Meeting took place in Astana, Kazakhstan in October, 2024.

President Mirziyoyev took several far-reaching decisions after he assumed the Presidency of the country which sought to radically transform the political, security, strategic and economic architecture of the region. Just a few months ago, he was credited for being instrumental in the signing of a historic trilateral agreement between Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Uzbekistan mutually recognising their respective borders. The accord, signed in the Tajik city of Khujand on March 31, witnessed a diplomatic breakthrough three-decades in the making, and one that symbolized the region’s growing appetite for resolving its own problems, on its own terms.

Set against this backdrop of expanding regional coordination, the First EU-Central Asia Summit was held in the Uzbek historic city of Samarkand on 4^th April, 2025. With Europe’s own regional order being rocked both by Moscow and Washington, and Central Asian states exploring ways to reduce their reliance on Russia and China, the timing could not have been better.

In her Opening Address, EU Commission President Ursula von der Leyen delivered a sharp rebuke to the new U.S. tariffs announced by the Trump administration on 2^nd April, policies that she warned would have “dire consequences” for millions. Yet, these wider geopolitical currents have, in many ways, hastened Europe’s outreach to Central Asia. Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, coupled with a more transactional U.S. foreign policy, has forced Europe to rethink its energy and transport dependencies. The global turmoil starting with the Covid-19 pandemic and the unexpected continuation of the Russia-Ukraine conflict over the last more than three years has forced a rethink on the part of Central Asia to reach out to a broader segment of the global constituency and moderate their dependence on Russia and China. 

“It seems the EU is now racing to catch up after years of under-engagement, recognizing Central Asia’s strategic role in emerging global supply chains and connectivity,” said Oybek Shaykhov, secretary-general of the Europe-Uzbekistan Association for Economic Cooperation. “As the world shifts from globalization to regionalization, the strengthening of EU–Central Asia cooperation is a welcome and timely development for both regions.”

Von der Leyen was keen to stress that Europe saw the five Central Asian states as “proud, sovereign nations,” perhaps seeing in the region a glimmer of the EU’s self-image.

At the Summit, EU and Central Asia agreed to upgrade their relationship to the level of a Strategic Partnership. Details of the strategy were thin, but the headline was a 12 billion euro European investment package focusing on four key areas: transport; critical raw materials; water-energy-climate; and digital connectivity.

Three billion euros were earmarked for new transport infrastructure. There are high hopes for the Middle Corridor, a trade route that bypasses Russia, as an alternative for moving goods between Europe and Asia. Trade along the eye-of-a-needle route is growing, but fraught with bureaucratic hurdles as it passes through multiple borders and is often brought to a halt by high winds on the Caspian Sea. 

The plan is to develop the Middle Corridor so that it can handle 10 million tons of goods a year by 2029. This figure sounds impressive, but it is decidedly modest compared to the 858 million tons of goods that arrived in European ports in the second quarter of 2024 alone. The northern land route, via Kazakh, Russian, and Belarusian railways (all united by the EAEU customs zone), also remains faster and more reliable, if politically fraught. 

As for trade, Mirziyoyev’s address noted that overall trade volume between Central Asia and Europe has reached 54 billion euros ($60 billion). This compares unfavorably with China ($94.8 billion in 2024), and similarly to Russia ($44 billion in 2023, plus an estimated $15 billion in remittances). Moscow also retains immense soft power influence in the region, evidenced by the fact that every Central Asian leader addressed the summit in Russian.

Europe’s offer was not to replace either of these countries. Instead, Europe presented itself as a “reliable partner” to give Central Asia options, while also helping them develop jobs locally. In return, Europe sought increased access to the region’s critical raw materials – resources vital for 21st century technologies such as renewable energy and AI – which Central Asia reportedly possesses in abundance. 

“These raw materials are the lifeblood of the future global economy,” said von der Leyen. “Yet they are also a honeypot for global players. Some are only interested in exploiting and extracting. Europe’s offer is different. We also want to be your partners in developing your local industries. The added value has to be local.”

For Central Asian leaders, the summit was an opportunity to present a menu of national priorities. Kazakhstan, with its oil wealth and established European links, remains the regional leader in EU engagement, accounting for over 80 percent of trade turnover with Europe. Uzbekistan, however, has plans to rival them. “Kazakhstan may have led in the past, but Uzbekistan is working hard to catch up,” said Shaykhov. This was demonstrated by Mirziyoyev’s visit to Paris in mid-March, which secured 6.5 billion euros in investment. 

Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan combined make up 76 percent of Central Asia’s GDP, 81 percent of its area, and 69 percent of its population. If Central Asia were to act as a region, then there are shades of the EU’s Franco-German motor in the set up. In Samarkand, the regional hierarchy was evident. Tokayev was the first Central Asian leader to speak after Mirziyoyev, and Kazakh and Uzbek media were the only ones selected to pose questions to the European leaders at the post-summit press conference.

But the other regional leaders were given the opportunity to make their own pitches. The mountainous states of Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan both advocated their green energy potential, particularly in hydropower, while the Turkmen President Serdar Berdimuhamedov pledged to make the country’s Caspian port of Turkmenbashi available for the transport of goods to Europe.

Awkward issues such as human rights and Central Asia’s role in Russian sanctions evasion were not broached, at least in public. The EU, shaped by the urgencies of a fractured world, adopted a more practical tone. The leaders agreed to meet again in two years’ time. 

Since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and escalated conflict in the Red Sea, which disrupted supply chains, Central Asia’s geostrategic relevance to the EU has increased. Meanwhile, countries like Uzbekistan and Kazakhstan are increasingly looking to Europe for trade and investment, especially through enhanced connectivity via the Trans-Caspian Corridor. At the Summit, Central Asian leaders made clear that future cooperation must focus on tangible outcomes, particularly in connectivity and trade, energy, and investment in critical raw materials supply chains. As the EU steps up high-level engagement, consistency and delivery will be critical to defining its role in Central Asia.

Conclusion

By elevating its relationship with Central Asia to a strategic partnership and pledging €12 billion through the Global Gateway Initiative, the EU aims to strengthen engagement with the region. At the Summit, President Ursula von der Leyen described Central Asia as a ‘partner of choice’ for Europe and in turn positioned the EU as a ‘reliable partner’ for the region emphasising multilateralism and sustainable cooperation.

Despite this renewed interest, it remains to be seen whether the momentum will hold in the months and years ahead. As the war in Ukraine continues to strain the EU’s diplomatic bandwidth and resources, and it faces transatlantic tensions and potential economic fallout from cascading shocks of Trump 2.0 economic policies, there is a risk Central Asia may again fall down the EU’s priority list.

That would be short-sighted. Strategic gains in areas like critical raw materials, value-added production, and transport connectivity will hinge on the EU’s sustained commitment. Consistency of political and economic engagement will be key if the EU hopes to maintain credibility in a region watching closely how Europe navigates its own geopolitical balancing act. The EU is seeking to differentiate its partnership model from those of Moscow and Beijing. Commission President Ursula von der Leyen described the EU’s ‘offer’ as anchored in multilateralism, sustainability, and openness. 

The EU is well-placed to position itself as a credible long-term partner, not only through financing, but also by sharing expertise in regulatory frameworks, environmental standards, and responsible supply chain development. Still, questions remain over whether promised EU financing will deliver at scale and attract private financing across the value chain from the bloc to the region.

The previous issues of China-Central Asia Relations: An Expanding Partnership (Central Asia Digest) are available here: LINK