China and Central Asia organized the second bilateral Summit (the first having been held in Xian, China on 18-19 May, 2023) in Astana, the capital of Kazakhstan on June 17. The leaders of China and the five Central Asian States reaffirmed their shared commitment to a long-term strategic partnership. This was formalized through the signing of the Treaty on Eternal Good-Neighborliness, Friendship and Cooperation.
This summit signaled China’s growing preference for a regional format of interaction with Central Asia and its rising integration, not only with the economies of Central Asia but also with the common people and their lives in the Central Asia region. This regional model is becoming increasingly more important than other external engagement mechanisms, such as the C5+ formats, and it now rests on a more robust institutional foundation.
The case of Kazakhstan is illustrative on how it perceives the parallel and simultaneous development of its bilateral ties and regional cooperation.
Although the regional dimension of China–Central Asia relations is gaining strength, the bilateral channel remains the cornerstone of practical engagement. A day before the summit, on June 16, Kazakhstan’s President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev held a meeting with Chinese leader President Xi Jinping. That meeting led to the signing of 24 intergovernmental and interdepartmental agreements covering a broad spectrum of cooperation areas, from infrastructure and industry to agriculture and innovation.
Tokayev described the current state of Kazakhstan–China relations as a “golden period,” highlighting their strategic nature and the substantial benefits they deliver to both economies. In his speech at the summit, Tokayev provided a detailed account of the progress made through bilateral economic cooperation. He reported that Kazakhstan’s trade turnover with China had reached $44 billion, Chinese investments have surpassed $26 billion, and approximately 5,000 enterprises with Chinese capital are operating in Kazakhstan.
Cargo transit volumes from China are steadily rising. In 2024, the total number of containers transported through Kazakhstan exceeded 211,000. Prime Minister Olzhas Bektenov also held a working meeting on the implementation of Kazakh–Chinese agreements, underscoring China’s central role in helping Kazakhstan meet its strategic investment target: attracting at least $150 billion in foreign investment by 2029. Bektenov highlighted that Chinese investors are currently involved in 224 industrial projects worth $66.4 billion, which are expected to generate around 50,000 new jobs.
Throughout the summit, numerous proposals were made to deepen cooperation between Central Asia and China.
Not surprisingly, the leaders of Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan presented the greatest number of initiatives. These proposals suggest that China is emerging as a key partner in addressing pressing challenges related to industrialization and technological development. However, it was also acknowledged that such development is impossible without a sufficient pool of highly skilled professionals.
To respond to a lack of human capital, Kazakhstan expressed its intent to establish “academies of engineers” and launch joint research laboratories with Chinese partners. These institutions are envisioned as hubs for training a new generation of technical specialists, who will be vital for the region’s economic modernization. These initiatives are also positioned as central pillars within the proposed long-term strategy for the Central Asia–China format for 2026–2030 – a strategy Kazakhstan put forward for regional adoption.
Uzbekistan is equally ambitious in its plans to transform its economy through deepened engagement with China.
The country sees strategic value not only in accessing Chinese markets, but also in attracting Chinese investment, advanced technology, and logistical integration. At the summit, President Shavkat Mirziyoyev articulated several far-reaching proposals aimed at expanding cooperation in trade, industry, technology, and infrastructure.
Among the most significant of Tashkent’s initiatives were proposals to develop a long-term strategy titled Industrial and Infrastructure Belt Central Asia–China; establish a Central Asia–China Development Fund; and create an Interregional Council on Trade and Investment. The Uzbek side also proposed the creation of a regional center for industrial standardization and certification, to be based in Tashkent, which would facilitate alignment with Chinese regulatory frameworks and technical specifications.
Mirziyoyev paid particular attention to the concept of interconnected industrial clusters built with Chinese capital, technology, and scientific input. These clusters are envisioned as engines of economic diversification and regional connectivity. Additionally, the Uzbek leader stressed the importance of developing alternative corridors to ensure resilience in transit and logistics. On the sidelines of the Astana summit, Xi and Mirziyoyev held a bilateral meeting. Xi emphasized the need for both countries to undertake more aggressive steps to liberalize and simplify trade procedures. He also highlighted the importance of accelerating construction of the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, a project he described as essential for deepening comprehensive cooperation.
From the perspective of Uzbek experts, one of the critical problems currently facing regional transit is the imbalance in goods transportation to Europe. Kazakhstan currently accounts for more than 93% of total transit volume, while Uzbekistan’s share remains at a modest 2.3%. This imbalance underscores the urgency of diversifying transit infrastructure.
Projects such as the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway and the Termez–Mazar-i-Sharif–Kabul–Peshawar railway corridor are therefore seen as essential for strengthening Uzbekistan’s position as a regional transit hub. Supporting this ambition, Uzbekistan has already successfully conducted its first pilot freight shipment along the Uzbekistan–Kyrgyzstan–China–Mongolia road route. The Uzbek national carrier covered the 4,500-kilometer route in just eight days, showcasing the country’s growing logistical capabilities.
While the summit generated a host of economic initiatives, China’s underlying priorities remain firmly rooted in its own and regional security. In light of ongoing instability in South Asia and the Middle East, China places a high premium on ensuring political stability in Central Asia. That is a precondition for the reliable operation of the transit corridors it is investing in.
Energy security also remains central to China’s regional agenda. Despite international focus on the green transition, China continues to pursue strategic cooperation in oil and gas with Central Asian countries, given the growing volatility in other energy-exporting regions. In Astana, Xi also met with Turkmen President Serdar Berdymukhamedov to discuss expanding cooperation in natural gas. Berdymukhamedov confirmed Turkmenistan’s willingness to increase exports.
Meanwhile, Kazakhstan’s Energy Ministry, its national oil company KazMunayGas, and China’s CNOOC signed an agreement for exploration and production within the Zhylyoi project, located in the northeastern Caspian Sea, a strategic transit zone. Such developments make it clear that conventional energy cooperation will continue to serve as a foundation of China–Central Asia relations.
Another strategic priority for Beijing is the development of Xinjiang as a gateway to Central Asia, a trade and technology hub that can underpin China’s western-facing economic agenda. This underscores the importance China places on liberalizing mutual trade, a point Xi reiterated in meetings with his Central Asian counterparts.
Yet, structural challenges persist for the broader China–Central Asia partnership to flourish.
In more recent developments, at the recent 25th SCO Summit in Tianjin on 31st August – 1st September, and the military parade in Beijing on 3rd September to mark the 80th anniversary of victory over Japan in the Second World war, Chinese officials and businesses inked billions of dollars’ worth of new infrastructure and technology deals with Central Asian governments and companies while announcing new agreements to lessen the barriers for Chinese businesses to operate across the region.
Experts claim that China is now completely integrated into Central Asia. Its overwhelming presence in Central Asia is a fact.
This reality is most apparent in Central Asia’s two biggest economies: Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. At the SCO summit and at events on the sidelines around the military parade, Kazakh President Tokayev signed more than 70 new commercial deals worth $15 billion that included investments in oil and gas projects, petrochemicals, transport corridors, logistics hubs, and digital technologies.
Uzbek President Mirziyoyev also left China with new investments in construction, nuclear energy, higher education, and the automotive industry, as well as formal backing at the SCO for a long-discussed multibillion-dollar railway project connecting Uzbekistan to China through Kyrgyzstan that has been championed by Tashkent.
Experts suggest that relations between China and Central Asia are way beyond just big infrastructure projects. China has become a part of everyday life now.
China’s growing footprint is seen in data from Uzbekistan’s national statistics agency, which showed the number of Chinese companies operating in the country overtook the number of Russian firms in 2024 and continues to grow. In 2025, the figures show that more than 1,000 new Chinese companies were launched in the country compared to the previous year.
China represents a vital source of capital for Central Asia. Kazakhstan, the largest regional economy, also views it as a model for its own development priorities as it eyes diversifying away from the oil and gas sectors that have dominated its economy since it became independent in 1991.
Astana and other governments are looking for Chinese expertise and investment in renewable energy, a sector where China has become a world leader. Among the recent deals signed in Beijing were agreements to procure wind turbines, build electric vehicles, and set up steel factories with Chinese partners.
Kazakhstan also concluded an additional $1.5 billion worth of investment into oil and gas projects with Chinese companies during the week of high-level meetings in China.
That included a $1 billion deal with the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) to build a gas chemical complex in the Aktobe region and another agreement with the China Development Bank to finance the construction of main pipelines for transporting ethane and propane in the Atyrau Region, valued at roughly $500 million.
Nuclear energy cooperation, a sector where China is looking to expand globally, also became a focal point, with Mirziyoyev meeting with Shen Yanfeng, chairman of China’s National Nuclear Corporation (CNNC), on September 2. Their talks focused on expanding cooperation and came as Uzbek Mining and Geology Minister Bobir Islamov announced 13 new mining-related deals, including for uranium, with a reported value of $5 billion.
Uzbekistan had signed a deal with Russia’s state-owned nuclear energy monopoly Rosatom in June to conduct a feasibility study to build four reactors in the country, but international sanctions have clouded the Russian atomic company’s future and Tashkent could be looking to China as an alternative.
A similar chain of events played out in Kazakhstan this year when CNNC was awarded the contract to build Kazakhstan’s second nuclear power plant. In July, Kazakh Deputy Prime Minister Roman Sklyar announced the Chinese company would build Kazakhstan’s third nuclear power plant.
The flurry of activity in China highlights the steady and predictable engagement Beijing has followed with Central Asia in recent years that has seen it become an increasingly important economic, and now political, player.
And while governments are eager to court investment and welcome new Chinese companies, they are also wary about overdependence on China. All Central Asian countries are comfortable in continuing their multivector foreign policy. This consists of actively seeking to diversify partners and has seen Central Asian governments welcome a larger European presence and also look to retain strong ties with the United States.
In April, Uzbekistan hosted a landmark summit with Central Asian leaders and the EU to discuss energy, mineral, and transit deals.
Bilateral trade between Central Asia and China, its largest individual trade partner, has been rising steadily in recent years, hitting a record high of $94.8 billion in 2024, but with its 27 member states the EU is Central Asia’s biggest foreign investor.
Mirziyoyev spoke to US President Donald Trump on September 5 after returning from China and extended an invitation for him to visit Uzbekistan “at a convenient time,” according to a readout released by the Uzbek president’s office.
Based on the agreements signed and the initiatives announced at the Astana summit in July, at the SCO Summit in September, and during the Military Parade, it is evident that the strategic partnership between Central Asia and China is not only expanding in scope but also deepening in ambition.
But several complex challenges remain to be addressed for this partnership to be truly transformative.
It appears the technological partnership between China and Central Asia is just beginning. There are positive signs: China has already transferred a supercomputer to Kazakhstan, and plans are underway to establish 25 ICT centers across the country in cooperation with Huawei. Uzbekistan recently opened its Digital Technology Center in Shanghai, in partnership with Shanghai Oriental Credits, with the goal of promoting Uzbek IT exports and expanding technological cooperation. The Eximbank of China has pledged $500 million for the development of Uzbekistan’s IT sector. Still, innovation financing across the region remains limited. For the region to attract top-tier Chinese companies and foster meaningful tech partnerships, it must dramatically increase its own investment in R&D and innovation ecosystems.
Crucially, the outcome of such cooperation should be more than just inward technology transfer. It should result in the development of indigenous innovation and long-term technological sovereignty for Central Asia.
The recent summits revealed a lack of large-scale regional projects that involve all five Central Asian countries. Current flagship initiatives, such as the Middle Corridor or the China–Kyrgyzstan–Uzbekistan railway, are mostly country-specific. To fully unlock the potential of regional cooperation with China, Central Asia will need to identify and develop joint projects that enhance shared prosperity. Doing so would also reduce the risk of countries competing against each other for Chinese investment, which could lead to regional fragmentation rather than integration.
There is a pressing need to shift focus from traditional resource-based cooperation to green energy and technology. Central Asian need to drive their own energy transition, create new regional markets, and secure a position within global supply chains for renewables and clean tech.
Central Asia needs to channelize significant investments in human capital development, entrepreneurial capacity, and innovation ecosystems. Enhancing the competitiveness of Central Asia’s workforce and private sector is essential to ensuring that the benefits of cooperation are shared and sustainable.
The Central Asian countries should focus not only to attract investment but in using that engagement to improve competitiveness, foster regional integration, and build a foundation for long-term resilience and prosperity.
The previous issues of EU-Central Asia Relations: A Rapidly Expanding Partnership (Central Asia Digest) are available here: LINK
