West Asia & North Africa Digest by Ambassador Mahesh Sachdev | June 2023

HIGHLIGHTS

• Political Developments
• Economic Developments
• Bilateral Developments

IA) Political Developments: Pan-Regional and Global Issues

Regional and International Developments

• The Arab League held its 32nd ordinary Summit on May 19 in Jeddah. It was conspicuous for two developments: firstly, it readmitted Syria to the Arab fold after over 11 years and President Bashar Al-Assad attended the Summit. Qatar was the only member state that objected to Syria’s readmission but decided to lump it in the interest of Arab unity. Secondly, Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy addressed the Summit as a special invitee. (Further Reading: “A ‘middle kingdom’ dawns on India’s west” by Mahesh Sachdev, The Hindu, May 25.)
• The Saudi-Iran détente led to de-escalation of the regional tensions albeit in a gradual, but uneven manner. Tangible progress was achieved in the Yemeni conflict with direct talks between Saudis and al-Houthis leading to the informal ceasefire being consolidated and the exchange of prisoners. It also led to the expectance of greater politico-economic stability in Lebanon and Syria. Qatar and Oman felt a bit outflanked as their role as a go-between in various contentious parties stood reduced. (For a semi-contrarian view, please see: “Iran’s proxies in the Middle East remain a powerful force”, The Economist, May 18.)
• G7 Summit in Hiroshima concluded on May 20 with a final communique which had seven paras on the WANA issues. The following is the relevant extract:

“57. We express our grave concern regarding Iran’s continued destabilizing activities, including the transfer of missiles, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) and related technologies to state and non-state actors and proxy groups, in breach of UNSCRs including 2231 and 2216. Iran must stop supporting Russia’s war of aggression against Ukraine. In particular, we call upon Iran to cease transferring armed UAVs, which have been used to attack Ukraine’s critical infrastructure and kill Ukrainian civilians. We welcome initiatives to improve bilateral relations and de-escalate tensions in the region, including Iran and Saudi Arabia’s recent agreement to restore ties. We emphasize the importance of ensuring maritime security in the Middle East’s waterways and call on Iran not to interfere with the lawful exercise of navigational rights and freedoms by all vessels.

“58. We call on Israelis and Palestinians to take steps to build trust toward the realization of a two-state solution. To this end, all parties must refrain from unilateral actions, including settlement activities and incitement to violence. We reiterate our support for the historic status quo in Jerusalem. We welcome the recent meetings between Egypt, Israel, Jordan, the Palestinian Authority, and the United States and hope their commitments will be fulfilled in good faith. We will continue our support for Palestinian economic self-reliance and the UN Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East.

“59. We remain firmly committed to an inclusive, UN-facilitated political process consistent with UNSCR 2254 in Syria. We reaffirm that the international community should only consider normalization and reconstruction assistance once there is authentic and enduring progress towards a political solution. We express our continued support for the work of the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) and are committed to accountability for those responsible for the use of chemical weapons and violations of international law, including international humanitarian law and international human rights law, as applicable. We call for full and unhindered humanitarian access to all Syrians in need, particularly through UN cross-border aid for which there is no alternative in scope or scale. We remain committed to the enduring defeat of ISIS, including durable solutions for ISIS detainees and displaced persons remaining in Northeast Syria.

“60. We further express our support to preserve stability and prosperity in other parts of the Middle East and North Africa. Regarding Yemen, we call on all parties to secure a durable ceasefire and work towards a comprehensive, durable, and inclusive Yemeni-led political process under UN auspices. We encourage the Tunisian government to meet the democratic aspiration of its people, to address its economic situation and to reach an agreement with the IMF. We also support efforts to achieve stability and unity in Libya under the auspice of the UN in coordination with the African Union and the Arab League. We urge all Libyan stakeholders to work constructively on the political process in order to hold free, fair, and inclusive presidential and parliamentary elections by the end of 2023.

“61. We further express our support to preserve stability and prosperity in other parts of the Middle East and North Africa. Regarding Yemen, we call on all parties to secure a durable ceasefire and work towards a comprehensive, durable, and inclusive Yemeni-led political process under UN auspices. We encourage the Tunisian government to meet the democratic aspiration of its people, to address its economic situation and to reach an agreement with the IMF. We also support efforts to achieve stability and unity in Libya under the auspice of the UN in coordination with the African Union and the Arab League. We urge all Libyan stakeholders to work constructively on the political process in order to hold free, fair, and inclusive presidential and parliamentary elections by the end of 2023.

“62. We reiterate our clear determination that Iran must never develop a nuclear weapon. We remain deeply concerned about Iran’s unabated escalation of its nuclear program, which has no credible civilian justification and brings it dangerously close to actual weapon-related activities. A diplomatic solution remains the best way to resolve this issue. In that context, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action continues to provide a useful reference. We call on Iran to take prompt and concrete actions to fulfil its legal obligations and political commitments, including nuclear non-proliferation and safeguards obligations. We reiterate our profound concern over Iran’s systemic human rights violations and abuses, including its repression of popular feminist protest as well as the targeting of individuals, including women, girls, minority groups, and journalists, in and outside of Iran. We call on Iran’s leadership to end all unjust and arbitrary detentions.

“63. We strongly condemn the ongoing fighting between the Sudanese Armed Forces and the Rapid Support Forces. This threatens the security and safety of civilians, undermines efforts to restore Sudan’s democratic transition, and could affect the stability of the region. We urge the parties to end hostilities immediately without pre-conditions and return to civilian-led democratic government. We call on all actors to renounce violence and take active steps to reduce tensions and ensure the safety of all civilians, including humanitarian personnel. The parties to the conflict must uphold their obligations under international humanitarian law, ensure the safety of all civilians, including humanitarian personnel, and not impede or restrict the delivery of life-saving aid. We commend the bravery and fortitude of humanitarian agencies working in Sudan. We acknowledge the generosity of Sudan’s neighbors who, despite facing significant humanitarian challenges of their own, host a growing number of Sudanese refugees. We commit to supporting response operations in Sudan and across East and North Africa and the Sahel region for refugees and returnees.  We also call for international support for the Somali President’s reform priorities and the fight against al-Shabaab.” (Further Reading: G7 Hiroshima Leaders’ Communiqué May 20.)

WANA and Ukraine Conflict:

• Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskiy addressed a summit of the Arab League in Saudi Arabia on May 19 to canvas support for his people and seek the Arab countries to support Ukraine’s formula for peace. He particularly thanked Riyadh for its role in mediating a prisoner release last year and brought in references to Ukraine’s small Muslim community. In his opening speech, Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman (MbS) said, “We reaffirm the kingdom’s readiness to continue mediating efforts between Russia and Ukraine, and to support all international efforts aimed at resolving the crisis politically in a way that contributes to achieving security.” (Comment: the address to the Arab Summit by President Zelenskiy, who stopped over in Jeddah en route to G7 Summit at Hiroshima, appears to have been a formal event unlikely to change the position of Arab leaders who have mostly retained a neutral stance on the conflict and been reluctant to isolate Russia economically. The gesture towards him can also be seen as a balancing act to the decision to readmit Syria to the Arab fold and underline MbS’ global status. On the other side, the Summit also had a message from Russian President Vladimir Putin. Summit’s Final Declaration did not refer to any non-Arab issue including President Zelenskiy’s address or the Ukraine conflict. From the Ukrainian perspective, however, it was their President’s first foray outside the NATO comfort zone since the beginning of the conflict.)  
• On May 17, the last day before its expiry, Russia agreed to extend a deal that has allowed Ukraine to ship grain through the Black Sea for 60 days. The decision followed talks in Istanbul among senior officials of Russia, Ukraine, Turkey and the UN. Ukraine has so far exported about 30.3 mn tons of grain under this deal.
• On May 17 presidents of Russia and Iran oversaw, via video-link, the signing of a deal to finance and build a 162 km “Rasht-Astara” railway line along the Caspian Sea coast aimed at consolidating the bilateral connectivity and giving Russian trade access to the Gulf and Indian Ocean, thus circumventing the Western economic sanctions over the Ukraine conflict.  (Further Reading: “Russia and Iran are upgrading their transport links” The Economist May 4;)

WANA Regional Security and Terrorism

• On May 4 Reuters reported that Israel had seized around 190 crypto accounts at crypto exchange Binance since 2021, including two it said were linked to Islamic State and dozens of others it said were owned by Palestinian firms connected to the Islamist Hamas group. While there were some contextual elaborations, the report provided scant details about the operation.
• On May 7, Israel on Sunday handed over to Jordan a member of the Jordanian parliament held on suspicion of trying to smuggle weapons into the occupied West Bank.
• On May 20, the Lebanese army arrested a prominent terrorist, identified only as “T.M.” in the northeast of Tripoli. Army said that he was one of the most prominent leaders of Al-Qaeda, founder of its cells in Lebanon as well as playing a key role in establishing the Fatah al-Islam organisation.
• On May 3, Belgian police arrested an unnamed Iraqi suspect on suspicion of having taken part in a series of bombings in Baghdad in 2009-10 as part of an al Qaeda cell. He is believed to be partly responsible for several bombings in the Green Zone of Baghdad, which killed at least 376 people and injured more than 2,300. (Further Reading: “Leaders of Islamic State have a short life-expectancy” The Economist May 4.)

Pakistan and WANA Region:

• On May 18, Prime Minister of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan Shahbaz Sharif received the visiting Saudi Deputy Minister of Interior. The meeting saw the signing of a bilateral cooperation agreement regarding the arrival of pilgrims and Umrah performers.

Afghanistan and WANA Region:

• Nearly 20 countries participated in a UN-sponsored 2-day international conference on Afghanistan held in Doha on May 1-2, albeit without the Taliban government of that country. UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres said “The meeting was about developing a common international approach, not about recognition of the de facto Taliban authorities,” He also said it was not the right time for him to directly engage with the Afghan rulers. The conference was intended to engage the relevant international players on issues facing Afghanistan such as the humanitarian crisis, women’s rights and counterterrorism. Taliban criticised their exclusion from the conference as “discriminatory and unjustified.”
• In an exclusive report on May 31, Reuters disclosed that Qatari Prime Minister Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman al-Thani secretly met Haibatullah Akhunzada, the supreme leader of the Taliban, in Kandahar on May 12. This was the first time that the reclusive Taliban leader is known to have met a foreign dignitary since the Taliban take over. While nothing was publicly known about the outcome of the meeting, it is speculated to have concerned about a roadmap for the reintegration of the Taliban-led Afghanistan with the world community. Sheikh Mohammed, who continues as Qatari foreign minister also met with Mullah Hassan Akhund, Afghan PM on the same day. (Comment: Qatari PM’s meeting with Taliban’s reclusive supreme leader seemed to have produced neither heat nor light. There are no reports of any change in Taliban policies, including those towards women and the LGBTQ community and narcotics cultivation. Apart from conveying the Western terms for the acceptance of the Taliban-led Afghan government, Qatar must also have tried to monetise its decade-long status as the only country, Pakistan included, which officially allowed the Taliban to have an office. Since the Taliban takeover, it has been dismayed by the Taliban favouring the UAE for civil aviation links etc.)
• Aljazeera reported on May 30 about the clashes along the Iran-Afghan border near the Hirmand region between Taliban forces and Iranian Guards in the previous week that left two Iranians and Afghan dead. Both sides made statements about their peaceable intentions and the need to resolve the dispute through diplomacy. The shooting seemed to have been provoked by a dispute over sharing of the waters of the Helmand River that flows from Afghanistan (where it has been dammed) to Iran. President Ebrahim Raisi earlier this month accused Afghanistan’s Taliban rulers of restricting the flow of water to Iran’s eastern regions in violation of the 1973 treaty. “We will not allow the rights of our people to be violated,” Raisi warned on May 18. (Comment: Despite some ideological similarities, there is not much love lost between the Shia rulers of Iran and the Sunni fundamentalist orientation of the Taliban. Moreover, the Helmand River Water Sharing Treaty was signed in 1973 when both countries were kingdoms. With both of them under various international economic sanctions and suffering serious draught, water scarcity is an acute problem. Thus, the sporadic bilateral tensions are likely to continue.)    

IB) Political Developments

Turkey: 

The presidential and parliamentary elections were held in Turkey on May 14 with an 87% voter turnout. The election had originally been scheduled to take place on June 18, but the government moved them forward by a month for scheduling reasons. These were for a five-year mandate.

The Presidential vote was keenly contested between incumbent Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, in power for 20 years, represented the People’s Alliance and Kemal Kılıçdaroğlu, candidate for the National Alliance, a coalition of 6 opposition parties. There were two other candidates. The presidential election held on May 14 resulted in Erdogan getting 49.5% and Kilicdaroglu getting 44.9%. As none of the candidates got more than 50% of the votes polled, there was a run-off held on May 28 among the two leading candidates. It was for the first time in the country’s history. In the runoff, Erdogan emerged as the winner with 52.18% of the votes polled vis a vis Kılıçdaroğlu’s 47.82%.

The elections for Turkey’s 600-member Grand National Assembly were a relatively tamer affair even as 24 parties were in the fray.  The Peoples’ Alliance led by President Erdogan’s AK party and its three allies won a comfortable majority with 323 seats, although it was 21 seats lower than their strength in the outgoing House. Leading opposition coalition National Alliance won 212 seats, 23 more than before. Labour and Freedom Alliance were placed third with 65 seats. (Comment: (i) For several reasons, the Turkish Presidential election invoked widespread interest domestically as well as regionally and internationally. For Turkey’s electorate, the two leading candidates presented sharply contrasting manifestos. Erdogan, already the longest-ruling PM/President in the country’s modern history, wanted to make his legacy of Islamic Nationalism indelible and irreversible. On the other hand, Kılıçdaroğlu sought to restore the Kemalist values, esp. secularism, strengthening the public institutions, more inclusive polity and a return to parliamentary democracy, instead of a monolithic and omnipotent presidency. He also accused president Erdogan’s administration of mismanaging the earthquake relief, nepotism and corruption. The feisty and no-holds-barred electioneering involving fake news, docile electoral commission, servile media and the incumbent launching projects and doling out popular sops till the last minute made the atmospherics the mix of a Byzantine court and western democracy. The dice was strongly loaded in favour of the incumbency. With the regional low reference point of authoritarianism and the elections perennially yielding 99% outcome, the Turkish elections can be considered “free and fair”, but…  On a granular level, Erdogan managed to hold on to his popular base in the rural and semi-urbane areas despite deep economic angst and difficult conditions of earthquake victims while the opposition gained support in Istanbul, Ankara and other major cities.

(ii) In retrospect, Erdogan ran his tenacious campaign with a populist agenda. On the other hand, Kılıçdaroğlu’s campaign was mostly reactive, incoherent and lacking in both Charisma and a well-defined strategy. He was also handicapped by his coalition not shaping up in time. At one point, he had to appoint four vice presidents. Erdogan’s re-election was counter-intuitive as several pre-election polls gave Kılıçdaroğlu a clear majority giving his camp a sense of complacency. In the end, however, trenchant Islamic nationalism and rhetorical dexterity succeeded in dazzling the electorate who decided to give Erdogan a roll-of-the-dice despite serious socio-economic policy failures and foreign policy flipflops. (iii) There are early signs that the third decade of Erdogan at the helms could be different. Firstly, the economy reacted negatively to his victory with both the stock market and Lira falling precipitously. He has albeit half abandoned his ruinous voodoo monetary policy of low interest rates despite ultra-high inflation. Secondly, the attention shifted to the next March elections of the urban local bodies where nearly a third of the country’s population lives and where the AK party has been on the defensive. Erdogan, himself cut his political teeth three decades ago as mayor of Istanbul, with a fifth of Turkey’s population. Thirdly, after long suspended animation, he would be under watch for action on foreign policy issues. The stakeholders are holding their breath as to if he continues with his regional reconciliation or goes back to ultra-nationalism and Sunni Islam. His policy choices would impact such issues as reconciliation with Syria which could mean withdrawal of forces and sending back refugees; avoiding being the odd man out on Sweden’s entry into NATO; balancing ties with major players such as the EU, the US, Russia-Ukraine imbroglio, China and WANA operators such as Israel, Iran, Iraq and Kurds. Further Reading: “Recep Tayyip Erdogan is re-elected as Turkey’s president” The Economist 28/5)

Sudan:

By the end of the month under review, the civil war in Sudan entered its seventh week with no early end on the horizon. The hostilities had led to at least 1,800 people being killed since the battles began on April 15 and more than 1.6 mn people have been displaced either within the country or to bordering countries such as Egypt, Chad and South Sudan. Several attempts to broker a cease-fire between Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) led by Gen Abdel Fattah al-Burhan and Rapid Support Forces (RSF) under Gen Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (also called Hemedti, or “my protector”) during the month were made. Of these, Jeddah talks between representatives of the two combatant sides, sponsored by the United States and Saudi Arabia held from May 6, had some traction. By May 11 the two sides had agreed to allow urgently needed humanitarian aid to reach war-struck areas, committing “to ensuring the protection of civilians” but, again, it had limited impact on the ground. A new one-week ceasefire came into force on May 22 but was also repeatedly breached. On May 27, Gen al-Burhan demanded the dismissal of the UN envoy to Sudan, Volker Perthes, who was later declared persona non-grata. On May 31, the SAF suspended its participation in the ceasefire talks, accusing the RSF of failing to respect its truce commitments.

Although the hostilities remained confined to the domestic domain and there were no credible reports of any of Sudan’s eight neighbours joining the fray, the US alleged on May 25 that the Wagner Group, a Russian freelancer active in several global hotspots, had supplied surface to air missiles to RSF. (Comment: After 45 days of no-holds-barred fighting, the conflict appears nowhere near a decisive outcome. Neither side showed exhaustion or running out of resources. This showed that either the two sides had used the lead time to amass weapons and ammunition, or each of them have quietly been receiving supplies from their respective foreign backers. On May 5, the UN envoy had underlined SAF’s accusation that mercenaries from Mali, Chad and Niger were joining the RSF fighters, lured by money and gold. If this trend coagulates, the second 45-day period may perhaps make the first appear a walk in the park as entities such as al-Shabab, Al-Qaeda in Sub-Sahara, Wagner Group, Boko Haram, Gen Haftar’s LNA, and countries such as Egypt, Ethiopia, Eritrea and the UAE, etc may jump into the melee. Moreover, the current fighting has overlayed Sudan’s long history of inter-ethnic strife spearheaded by various factions of the erstwhile Sudan Peoples’ Liberation Movement.  All this makes it easy to forget that it was a democracy-seeking popular uprising that toppled long-term dictator Gen al-Bashir in 2019 triggering this cascade of events of which the hapless Sudanese civilians have themselves become the snared victims. Reminds of the verity of the French adage “like Saturn, the Revolution devours its children.” Further Reading: “Sudan’s war is home-grown, but risks drawing in outsiders” The Economist, May 3.)

Iran:

President Ebrahim Raisi paid an official visit to Indonesia on May 23 during which a bilateral preferential trade agreement (PTA) was signed. Trade between Indonesia and Iran dropped from $715.5 mn to $141.6 mn in 2019 after the United States imposed sanctions on Iran. Under the PTA, Iran would give Indonesia greater access to products like processed food and pharmaceuticals, textile, palm oil, coffee and tea, while Indonesia will lower tariffs for Iran’s oil and chemical products, metals and some dairy products. (Comment: Some of the items under the PTA would compete with our traditional exports to Iran.)

Oman’s Sultan Haitham bin Tarik visited Iran on May 28-29 during which he was received by the Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, who told him that Iran wanted better relations with Egypt. He also met President Ebrahim Raisi. At least four bilateral agreements in the fields of economy, investment and energy were signed during the visit.

According to some media reports in the second half of the month, IAEA has resolved two of the three past incidents of highly enriched uranium samples detected at undeclared Iranian nuclear facilities. However, the IAEA reports also mentioned that the safeguards monitoring equipment had been reinstalled only at some sites. (Further Reading: (i) “Iran puts its nuclear programme beyond the reach of American bombs”, The Economist, May 30;

(ii) “International Atomic Energy Agency reports seen by AP say Iran resolves 2 inquiries by inspectors”, Associated Press, May 31.)

On May 26, Iran’s foreign minister told his Iraqi counterpart that a reduction in gas exports to Iraq was a technical matter and Tehran had not decided on any cuts, as the two countries try to resolve Baghdad’s $11 bn unpaid bills for Iranian gas supplies. Iraqi state media had reported earlier that the gas supply from Iran, usually running at around 50 to 70 mcm had decreased by 20 mcm at the time affecting the power generation – during seasonally high demand in summer. While Iraq, OPEC’s second highest producer has a copious amount of forex reserves, it is constrained in making payments due to the US economic sanctions on Iran.

There was some forward movement on foreign nationals in Iranian jails. On May 26, a Belgian aid worker was released in exchange for a convicted Iranian consular official in Belgium. On May 12 Iran freed two French nationals. On May 6, Iran executed a Swedish-Iranian dissident convicted of leading an Arab separatist group accused of attacks including one on a military parade in 2018 that killed 25 people.

Iran expelled four Azeri diplomats on May 5 in a tit-for-tat move.  

On May 29 Ukrainian parliament approved a bill imposing sanctions on Iran in response to Tehran’s alleged weapons supplies to Russia at war with it. It would stop Iranian goods from transiting through Ukraine and use its airspace, as well as impose trade, financial and technology sanctions against Iran and its citizens. (Further Reading: “Russia and Iran are upgrading their transport links”, The Economist May 4.)

On May 22, the Iranian President appointed Ali Akbar Ahmadian, 62, a veteran commander with the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) as the country’s new secretary of the Supreme National Security Council (SNSC), the top security post. He replaced Ali Shamkhani. (Comment: The move was significant for two reasons: firstly, it expanded IRGC’s role to this top and sensitive domain; secondly, the outgoing Ali Shamkhani was the top-ranking Sunni Arab from the Iranian southern coastal province of Arabistan in the Iranian hierarchy and managed to stay in this capacity for close to a decade. Apart from engaging in regional diplomacy with Arab neighbours, he is also credited with the recent diplomatic breakthrough with Saudi Arabia.)

On May 25, Iran announced successfully test-launched a 2000 km range liquid fuel ballistic missile named Kheibar. It has a payload capacity of 1,500 kg warhead.

According to the UN Human Rights Council, as of May 9, Iran had executed over 209 persons in 2023 so far, averaging ten each week. The body described Iran’s record as “abominable” and called for the executions to be halted.

Saudi Arabia:

On May 31, Saudi Arabia revealed the official demographic statistics collected by the census held in 2022, the first in 12 years and described as the most comprehensive and accurate in the kingdom’s history. Accordingly, the population of Saudi Arabia was 32.2 mn, 42% of whom were foreign nationals numbering around 13.5 mn. The average annual population growth since 2010 has been 2.5% leading to the total population jumping 34.2% since that year. 63% of Saudis were under age 30 and the median age of the total population is 29. The foreign resident population peaked at 14.6 mn in 2016 after the government began to impose extra fees on relatives of foreign workers. In 2020, more than 1 million foreigners left the kingdom during the COVID-19 crisis.

The US National Security Advisor Jack Sullivan visited Saudi Arabia and was received by Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman on May 7. (Please also see the relevant item under Bilateral Ties.)

On May 15, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faisal bin Farhan Al Saud met his German counterpart, Annalena Baerbock, in Jeddah.

On May 24, Saudi Arabia and Canada decided to normalise their bilateral diplomatic ties. These were disrupted in 2018 with the Kingdom reacting sharply to a Canadian embassy tweet lamenting the lack of women’s rights in Saudi Arabia.

Two Saudi astronauts, Ali Alqarni, 31, a fighter pilot for the Royal Saudi Air Force and Rayyanah Barnawi, 34, a biomedical scientist in cancer stem-cell research, returned to earth after spending 8 days at the International Space Station. Ms Baranwi was the first Arab woman in space.

On May 29, Saudi Arabia executed two Bahraini nationals convicted of “joining a terrorist cell led by a man wanted in Bahrain.” There have been more than 40 executions in Saudi Arabia so far this year. In 2022, Saudi Arabia executed 147 people – including 81 on a single day – for “terrorism-related” offences.

Al-Hilal of Saudi Arabia lost 2-1 to Japan’s Urawa in the final of the Asian Football Club Champions League on May 6 in Tokyo. Al-Hilal was defending champion.

As a result of moving to Saudi Arabia’s al-Nasr club till 2025, Cristiano Ronaldo became the world’s highest-paid athlete. On May 3, Forbes estimated his annual playing salary at $75 mn in 2022.

Israel

On May 24, the Israeli Knesset ratified the 484 bn shekel ($131 bn) and 514 bn shekel 2023-2024 spending packages – reliving the country’s government of emergency budgetary provisions in places for the past few months of parliamentary semi-paralysis. Buoyed by this achievement of Knesset’s first approval of a national budget in two years, prime minister Benyamin Netanyahu sought to revive his controversial plan to “reform” the country’s judicial system and make it more subservient to the legislature disregarding the warnings about its likely adverse impact on the economy and constitutionalism. This attempt also rekindled the 20-week-old popular opposition to it.

Death of Khader Adnan, a senior member of the Gaza-based Palestine’s Islamic Jihad (PIJ) militant group in an Israeli jail awaiting trial, after 87 days on hunger strike on May 2 triggered hostilities. He had been in Israeli jails 12 times having spent nearly eight years in “administrative detention” without charges. He was the first Palestinian hunger striker to have died in an Israeli prison in more than 30 years.  In response to his death, the PIJ group launched at least 27 rockets at Israel which retaliated with airstrikes. An uneasy calm was broken again on May 9 when Israeli surprise pre-dawn airstrikes killed three senior PIJ commanders in Gaza. Some other military targets were also hit. While Israeli military spokesmen said the “pinpoint” operation involved 40 aircraft, several Palestinian civilians were killed in the strikes. These killings unleashed four days of intense hostilities, during which PIJ fired over 1000 rockets at Israeli targets. Most of these were neutralised in the air by Israeli air defences which included for the first-time a mid-range interception system called David’s Sling. Apart from Palestinian militants, at least 10 civilians were also killed in Gaza during the fighting, and two people were killed in Israel. A truce brokered by Egypt between Israel and the PIJ group officially came into effect late on May 13 ending the worst cross-border clashes since a 10-day war in 2021. (Comment: Three factors are germane to the recent recurrent surge in the Israeli iron hand against PIJ. Firstly, Jerusalem considers PIJ more dangerous than bigger Palestinian outfits due to its connections with Iran, its archenemy. So, it does not continence the emergence of another Hezbollah along its southern border with Gaza. Secondly, with al-Fateh increasingly moribund in the Occupied West Bank (OWB), PIJ and Hamas have been trying to replace it, particularly among the radicalised youth in the hotbeds of Jenin and Nablus. For several reasons including nearly half a million – and growing – Jewish settlers in the OWB, Israel is determined to staunch this attempt.  Thirdly, by picking up PIJ for its exclusive wrath, Israel hopes to avoid a larger conflagration with Hamas ruling Gaza, which is more powerful and has a more sophisticated arsenal of rockets. Hamas, too, seem to be unwilling to come to the defence of PIJ, its frenemy in Palestinian space. Further Reading: “The Palestinians need new leaders” The Economist May 11.)    

In his May 22 speech at the Herzliya Conference security forum, the Israeli defence minister accused the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps of turning six commercial ships into platforms for launching missiles, drones and commandos, aiming to spread Tehran’s clandestine naval clout well beyond the Gulf.

Nvidia Corp, the world’s most valuable listed chip company, said on May 29 that it was building Israel’s most powerful artificial intelligence (AI) supercomputer to meet soaring customer demand for related applications. Separately, the Defence Ministry director-general said on May 22 that Israel aims to parlay its technological prowess to become an artificial intelligence “superpower.”

Palestinian Issues:

Israeli forces raided Balata refugee camp in Nablus in the occupied West Bank on May 22 killing Three Palestinians.

On May 7, the World Food Programme (WFP) announced that a “severe” shortage of funds would compel it to suspend food aid to over 200,000 Palestinians from next month.

On May 31, the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine – General Command (PFLP-GC) blamed Israel for the killing of five of its members in a blast in eastern Lebanon, near the Syrian border.

The UAE:

In a terse statement, the UAE foreign ministry said on May 31, “As a result of our ongoing evaluation of effective security cooperation with all partners, two months ago, the UAE withdrew its participation in the Combined Maritime Forces.” (Comment: The UAE statement was in response to an exclusive report in Wall Street Journal the day before about the UAE’s dissatisfaction over the US navy’s lack of response to Iran’s seizure of two oil tankers, viz. Marshall Island-flagged Advantage Sweet and  Panama-flagged oil tanker Niovi which was plying between two UAE ports: from Dubai to Fujairah. WSJ has consistently reported on tensions between the UAE and the US over the latter’s perceived insensitivity to the former’s security requirements. Further Reading: “WSJ News Exclusive: U.S. Pressured to Secure Persian Gulf After Iran Seizes Tankers” WSJ, May 30.)

Another US-EU-UAE friction point emerged about Sultan al-Jaber, ADNOC CEO being the designated host of the forthcoming COP28 meeting on climate change in December 2023 in the UAE. On May 23 over 100 members of the U.S. Congress and European Parliament called for him to be removed as the designated head of the upcoming COP28 climate talks, saying the oil executive’s appointment threatened the integrity of negotiations. The matters were not helped by the May 9 statement by the UAE minister of climate change and environment that the world was not ready yet to ‘switch off’ fossil fuels and phasing out fossil fuels would hurt countries that depend on them for revenue or cannot easily replace them with renewable sources.

On May 7, the Emirates Nuclear Energy Corporation (ENEC) signed three memoranda of understanding with China’s Nuclear Power Operations Research Institute, the China National Nuclear Corporation Overseas, and the China Nuclear Energy Industry Corporation respectively. The three MoU cover cooperation in nuclear energy operations, high-temperature gas-cooled reactors and nuclear fuel supply and investment. (Comment: The UAE is the only Arab country with an operating nuclear power plant at Barakah with four reactors with 5.6 GW of total capacity being built by a South Korean consortium. Signing these three MoU could indicate a switch to China, an in-your-face move likely to further alarm the US. The two countries have already had disagreements about Huawei being licenced to provide 5G coverage in the UAE and reported building a Chinese naval outpost in Abu Dhabi port.)

On May 30, UAE Vice President and PM Mohammed bin Rashed (MBR) revealed a project to launch a spacecraft in 2028 to study the asteroid belt lying between Mars and Jupiter till 2034. “The remarkable journey will be 10 times the distance covered by the Hope Probe,” MBR said, referring to the UAE mission to Mars in February 2021. The proposed probe was aptly named MBR.

On May 9, a Reuters report quoting the Emirates Detainees Advocacy Center in Geneva stated that 51 people sentenced for plotting to overthrow the UAE government are being held months after their jail terms have ended. The dissidents are part of the so-called “UAE94” – a group of 94 lawyers, human rights defenders and academics tried in 2013 and whose jail terms began expiring in 2019.

A Reuters report on May 5, revealed that according to the official data in 2019, tourism contributed 11.6% to the UAE’s GDP, or about $49.13 bn. Following the Covid-19-related washout of tourists in 2020-21 and the Dubai Expo, the UAE launched a strategy in 2022 to boost the annual tourist income to $450 bn by 2031.

Following the creation of a joint venture between ADNOC and BP in March 2023 to focus on developing new gas resources in the East Mediterranean, BP CFO announced on May 2 that the company would transfer assets into a new entity which has made an offer to buy a 50% stake in Israeli offshore gas producer NewMed Energy for around $2 bn.

Syria:

Syria’s resumption of its seat at the Arab League during the month had precursors. On May 1, for the first time since Damascus was suspended from the league of Arab States in 2011, the foreign ministers of Syria, Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Jordan met in Amman to discuss how to normalise ties with Syria as part of a political settlement of its war. A final statement issued after the meeting said the officials had discussed pathways for the voluntary return of displaced Syrians and coordinated efforts to combat drug trafficking across Syria’s borders. It said that Damascus had agreed to “take the necessary steps to end smuggling on the borders with Jordan and Iraq.” On May 7, the Arab League General Secretariat in Cairo announced the reinstatement of Syria with immediate effect. However, the League Secretary General said that it did not mean “normalisation of relations between Arab countries and Syria. This is a sovereign decision for each country to make.” The League also formed a ministerial group comprising Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Iraq, Lebanon, Egypt and the Arab League’s Secretary General to liaise with the Syrian government and seek solutions to the crisis through reciprocal steps.

On May 10, Saudi King Salaman bin Abdul Aziz formally invited President Bashar al-Assad to the Arab League’s Jeddah Summit. On May 13, Syria extended by further three months the permission for the UN to use two additional border crossings for post-earthquake aid. It was intended to benefit parts of the opposition-held in the northwest. (Comment: While Syria’s return to the Arab fold after 11 years was a triumph of President Bashar al-Assad’s tenacity, the immediate bilateral “returns” were not commensurate with either the fanfare and public adulation at Jeddah Arab Summit or Damascus’ high expectations. Arab League and its members offered no tangible assistance to reconstruct the war-ravaged country and rehabilitate nearly half of its displaced population. The Summit host, MbS, reportedly, declined a bilateral meeting with the Syrian President and Qatari Emir pointedly left the gathering for Doha before al-Assad address. The mutual antipathy engendered over 11 years of bitter civil war, military involvement of Sunni Arab regimes including ISIS, Iran and Russia and the western countries’ pressure against quick normalisation may have been a factor in Arab countries’ demurral.  So, Damascus is still on an Arab parole and it may need to wait longer for the coveted Gulf petrodollars. That is likely to require specific bilateral arrangements involving national reconciliation, stoppage of supply of narcotics, return of Sunni refugees, attenuation of Iranian influence, etc. It is likely to be a long haul. Further Reading: “After 12 years of blood, Assad’s Syria rejoins the Arab League”, The Economist May 9.)

In the first such visit since 2010, Iranian President Ebrahim Raisi paid a two-day visit to Syria on May 3-4. He was accompanied by a large economic and political delegation comprising ministers of foreign affairs, defence, oil, roads and urban development and telecommunications as well as several businessmen. A least 15 bilateral documents covering several economic domains were signed during the visit. (Comment: President Raisi’s visit seemed timed to encash Iranian IOUs on securing the al-Assad regime through dark friendless initial days of insurrection before a full-fledged reconciliation with Sunni Arab states gathers steam. With Russia preoccupied in Ukraine, Syria’s motives in hosting the Iranian president may lie in the need to secure Iran as it softens its posture with Sunni Arabs, including Saudi Arabia.)

On May 10, the foreign ministers of Syria, Russia Turkey and Iran met in Moscow marking the highest-level talks so far on rebuilding ties between Ankara and Damascus after years of animosity. It yielded no tangible outcome. Syrian FM said after the meeting that “despite all the negatives of the past years, there is an opportunity” for Damascus and Ankara to work together. But the priority for Syria was ending the illegal presence of all foreign militaries including Turkey’s. Without progress in this matter, we will remain stagnant and will not reach any real results,” (Comments: Facing a tight re-election, President Erdogan has pressed Russia for forward movement on reconciliation with Syria to diffuse the acute electoral concern about 3.5 mn Syrian refugees in Turkey. Ironically, for the same reason, President al-Assad preferred to wait till the election outcome was clear.)

There was no let-up in unacknowledged Israeli air attacks on Syria aimed at impeding Iranian military entrenchment in the country. These included missile attacks at Aleppo airport (1/5) that put it out of service and an attack on the outskirts of Damascus (29/5).

Iraq:

On May 27, Iraq launched a $17 bn “Development Road” project to link Grand Faw Port, a major commodities port on Shatt al-Arab its southern coast, by rail and roads to the country’s northern border with Turkey and then onwards to Europe. (Comment: Apart from spurring north-south connectivity and the proposed project, due for completion in 2029 aims to link Iraq’s oil-rich south to Turkey, turning the country into a transit hub by shortening travel time between Asia and Europe in a bid to rival the Suez Canal. The contractor for the project was not announced.)

On May 14, ministers from the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan Party (PUK, led by the Talabani clan) returned to cabinet meetings of the Kurdistan Regional Government (KRG) for the first time since October 2022. The other dominant Kurdistan Democratic Party (KDP) had accused PUK of involvement in the assassination of an intelligence operative, leading to the boycott. The US diplomacy had persuaded the two sides to patch up.

On May 27 an Iraqi official disclosed that a 50 MW capacity electricity grid interconnection between Jordan and Iraq will begin supplies to Iraq on July 1. (Comment: Iraqi power generation has suffered due to its dependence on the supply of Iranian gas, which cannot be paid in cash due to the US economic sanctions. This has led to heavy “load-shedding” precisely when summer temperatures are soaring. The Jordanian power supply would alleviate the problem and reduce Iraq’s dependence on Iran.)    

Jordan:

Jordan carried out rare air strikes on southern Syria on May 8 destroying an abandoned narcotics factory and killing a smuggling linchpin allegedly behind big drug hauls across the bilateral border. Jordanian authorities remained tight-lipped about the air raids. (Comment: For years there have been unconfirmed but reliable reports about the manufacture of “Captagon” a synthetic narcotic drug, in Syria and its smuggling via Jordan to the Gulf countries. While both Syria and Hezbollah have always denied involvement in this billion-dollar racket, its dismantlement was one of the pre-requisites for Syria’s readmission to the Arab League. Thus, the Jordanian action possibly had Syria’s nod-and-wink and hinted at the dispensability of Hezbollah and Iran for Damascus as it pursued détente with Sunni Arab states.)

The wedding of Al Hussein bin Abdullah, Crown Prince of Jordan, and Rajwa Al Saif, a Saudi Architect finally took place in Amman on June 1. (Comment: In the run-up to the marriage eyebrows were raised about the political import of the bride being from the Sudairi clan, to which Saudi King Salman belongs from mother’s side. The current Hashemite ruling family of Jordan traces their lineage to Sharif Hussein, Grand Mufti of Makkah and Emir of Hijaz till 1925 when Ibn Saud ousted him. Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman was expected to attend the marriage festivities but failed to turn up.)

Egypt:

Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi visited Saudi Arabia on April 2 as Cairo continues to seek financial inflows to ease pressure on its currency and bolster a faltering economy. Oil-rich Saudi Arabia has long provided financial support to Egypt but recently signalled it would no longer provide such backing without strings attached. The trip also comes amid a major diplomatic realignment in the region, with moves by Saudi Arabia and Egypt to ease tensions with Syria, Iran and Turkey.

Lebanon:

On May 25, veteran Lebanese Druze leader Walid Jumblatt, 73, announced that he was stepping down as the leader of the Progressive Socialist Party (PSP) after 46 years. A party conference has been scheduled for June 25 to choose his successor. (Comment: Walid Jumblatt (WJ) and his PSP largely represent the Druze mystic sect on the margins of Islamic theology. PSP has 8 seats in the 128-member Lebanese parliament. While initially PSP was seen as a principled outfit that fought for secular governance and was one of the core left-wing groups supporting Palestinian resistance and Syrian military presence in Lebanon. However, later PSP got politically marginalised due to several reasons: WJ’s double-speaking, frequent shifting of positions in a struggle to stay relevant on domestic issues and ties with Syria. Moreover, the inner divisions within the Druze community, the mainstay of PSP’s base, also attenuated. He is widely seen as part of the discredited sectarian-led long-entrenched political elite that has let Lebanon down. He is unlikely to be missed. His son Taymour, 41, is expected to replace him.)

Lebanon’s long-serving Central Bank Governor Riyadh al-Salameh was also in the news during the month for financial fraud. After the French arrest warrant against him last month, Germany, too, issued an Interpol red alert notice against him on May 19. Earlier, on May 5 an EU prosecutor questioned the country’s finance minister about the allegation.

A Saudi national working executive with Saudia Airlines was kidnapped for ransom on May 28 in Beirut. Two days later, Lebanon’s army intelligence managed to free him unharmed and without payment of any ransom. Nine persons were arrested for the crime.

On May 16, Lebanon’s energy minister announced deals to secure more fuel supplies from Iraq to help produce more power. Baghdad has agreed to increase the volume of heavy fuel oil supplied under an existing deal by 50% to 1.5 mn MT this year. Iraq has also agreed to a commercial deal to provide 2 mn MT of crude per year to Lebanon.