LWhile it was no mean feat for US President Trump to effect the first phase of his 20-point peace plan for Gaza, most observers believe that the more difficult parts are yet to follow.
The following are annexed:
Annex 1: Indicative map of Israeli Defence Force’s withdrawal under Trump Peace Plan;
Annex 2: A Table providing the Vurrent Status Report on the plan and comments thereon. Despite the deep global geopolitical fissures, the Trump Plan has received near-universal endorsement, as evidenced by an impressive line-up of regional and Western leaders at the Sharm al-Sheikh Summit on October 10.
The congnascenti point out that the relative success of its first phase owed itself to several factors: war-weariness of the combatants and the various stakeholders; clever, wording of the Plan, which provided minimal lip-service to the ‘expectations’ of main stakeholders but skirted around the ‘no-go’ areas; front-loading of the short-term deliverables (ceasefire and swap of hotages/prisoners) while the contentious issues were backloaded and left deliberately vague and imprecise, in the hope that the positive initial momentum would break the longstanding impasse. President Trump’s well-known penchant for transactionalism and “truthful hyperbole” was also at full display. At the same time, lately, he has gone against his grain by being relatively taciturn as the plan has encountered resistance. This is a good sign.
Meanwhile, there is “business as usual” on the other West Asian axes threatening to derail further persuance of the Trump Plan: The sparring between the White House and Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu continues, Israel’s fractious domestic politics, suspended during the two years of war, has been reignited, the Knesset has “approved” first reading of a rightist MPs bill calling for annexation of the West Bank, IDF has been in action in both occupied territories and in south Lebanon. Moreover, the big regional issue of Iran and the West entanglement has further twisted with the snapback of the pre-2015 sanctions, further addling to the witches’ brew of Tehran’s nuclear programme. As if these were not enough, a range of global developments from the precipitous decline in oil prices to the intensified Ukraine crisis and the tariff war with China are demanding their fair share of White House attention.
The visits to the region this month by President Trump, Vice President Vance, Secretary of State Rubio, and Jared Kushner were all designed to claim that the Plan has made impressive progress and to reiterate the continued commitment to implement the Trump Plan for Peace in Gaza. These events were intended to dispel the popular impression that once the guns stopped blazing and the hostages were released, the Trump administration, with its confessed penchant for “transactional deals”, would simply turn the page over the two years of bloody carnage and would allow the region to return to the “normal” of a “hot peace.”
However, the grandstanding notwithstanding, the grinding and backsliding have been in evidence. Even the three-week-old phase 1 of the plan remains a work in progress, mired largely over the exchange of dead bodies of Israeli hostages, inadequacy of humanitarian assistance, imprecise lines of Israeli military withdrawal, score settling between Hamas and the independent militias and sporadic Israeli military actions. Hamas and its allied militias have been dragging their feet on being disarmed, setting various obdurate preconditions. While President Trump has threatened to do so by force, it is easier said than done, esp. as there is little appetite for Israel to resume the Gaza conflict. Israel, too, seems reluctant to fully withdraw its forces from Gaza, hinting at manning the Philadelphi Corridor between Gaza and Egypt. Separately, there are tough, interconnected issues, such as the formation of the International Stabilisation Force (ISF), and the Non-Political Transitional Authority to govern Gaza before a suitably reformed Palestine Authority can take over. Meanwhile, the humanitarian issues, such as restoration of the basic infrastructure of the war-ravaged territory, such as food, health, power, sanitation, education, etc., require urgent attention. While the UN expects it to take at least a decade and cost at least $60 billion to rehabilitate nearly 90% of the 2.4 million Gazans, the donors would be reluctant to chip in[1] unless there is lasting peace and stability. So it’s a chicken-and-egg situation between a pathway to Palestinian statehood and the regional peace and stability. While Israel has ruled out a Palestinian statehood and the US seems equivocal about it, even as several Western countries have recently recognised the Palestinian statehood.
[1] As it is lower oil prices and other war devastated regional claimants, such as the West Bank, Lebanon, Yemen, Syria, Sudan, Libya, Afghanistan and Iran, would make the oil rich Gulf Arabs having to spread their largasse quite thin. Further, Egypt and Jordan may each like to put a hefty price tag at their cooperation required for the Trump Plan to succeed.
President Trump has made no secret of his ambition to use his Gaza Plan to reconfigure the geopolitics of the West Asian region. Ideally, he would like to permanently resolve Israel’s problem with the Arab-Islamic world. To this end, he would first settle the Palestinian question by granting some sort of pseudo-autonomy to Gaza and the West Bank under a pliant administration that would meet the Israeli concerns and provide the credible “pathway to Palestinian statehood” that Saudi Arabia and some other Gulf Arab states need as a fig leaf for normalising their ties with the Jewish state.
At this early stage of the multi-act play, any prediction about the Trump Plan’s conclusion would be inadvised. However, broadly speaking, three possible scenarios can be envisaged. First likelihood is that, akin to the Madrid Conference and Oslo process, the Trump Plan would make limited progress but would eventually fail to penetrate the wall of stakeholders’ scepticism and distrust as well as mutual over-expectations. The second possibility is that sufficient ice would be broken to allow limited achievement of a political restructuring of, say, a one-and-a-half-state solution, allowing the Abraham Accord to expand to Saudi Arabia and a few more Arab-Muslim countries. This would create a dynamic situation at a slightly higher level of mutual acceptance. The third prospect is for the Trump Plan to achieve all its objectives, settle the entire century-old Israel-Arab imbroglio and sustainably reset the regional paradigms favouring peace, stability and security.
At this juncture, given the long and convoluted history of the Israel-Palestine conundrum and in the aftermath of bitter and bloody wars in Gaza, Lebanon, Yemen and Iran, it is difficult to be optimistic about an early and successful implementation of the Trump Plan. But, by the same token, achieving a ceasefire and hostage/prisoner exchange is in itself a significant breakthrough. The real challenge would be to sustain this feat and create an irreversible momentum towards a regional normalcy.
Annex 1: Indicative map of IDF’s withdrawal under Trump Peace Plan
Annex 2: 20-Point Trump Plan for Peace in Gaza – A Status Report
(N.B.:Trump Plan Text, in first column, is based on the official version from the White House)
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Point Number and Description |
Status |
Comment |
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1. Gaza will be a deradicalised, terror-free zone that does not pose a threat to its neighbours. |
After two years of fighting has enfeebled Hamas and allied militants have been enfeebled, but the threat remains. |
Aspirational Rhetoric. The death and destruction by the IDF could spin the vicious cycle of revenge. |
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2. Gaza will be redeveloped for the benefit of the people of Gaza, who have suffered more than enough. |
Without any action or concrete plans yet, this is only aspirational hot air. |
The potential donors would wait for peace, security and stability. |
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3. If both sides agree to this proposal, the war will immediately end. Israeli forces will withdraw to the agreed-upon line to prepare for a hostage release. During this time, all military operations, including aerial and artillery bombardment, will be suspended, and battle lines will remain frozen until conditions are met for the complete staged withdrawal. |
This has been partially achieved with the first IDF withdrawal and a fragile ceasefire in place. IDF has sporadically been active in taking out opponents, claiming that they were planning hostilities. |
Some unverified media reports suggest the US pressure on Israel not to start any major new military operation in Gaza. |
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4. Within 72 hours of Israel publicly accepting this agreement, all hostages, alive and deceased, will be returned. |
Hamas has handed over all 20 alive Israeli hostages and 15 of the 28 dead bodies. The search for rest continues. |
Hamas claims that it lacks the equipment to dig out bodies under the rubble. An Egyptian team arrived in Gaza on 25/X to help. |
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5. Once all hostages are released, Israel will release 250 life sentence prisoners plus 1,700 Gazans who were detained after 7 October 2023, including all women and children detained in that context. For every Israeli hostage whose remains are released, Israel will release the remains of 15 deceased Gazans. |
Although details are sketchy, this is reported to have taken place in a low-key manner with Palestinian prisoners being released to Gaza, the West Bank and exile. |
According to a Reuters report, even after the swap, the number of Palestinians in 23 Israeli prisons and detention centres stood at more than 9,100. |
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6. Once all hostages are returned, Hamas members who commit to peaceful co-existence and to decommission their weapons will be given amnesty. Members of Hamas who wish to leave Gaza will be provided safe passage to receiving countries. |
No report of any progress. Hamas has not committed to either disarmament or relocation, seeking to delay it until Palestinian deployment. |
This is likely to be a serious obstacle or even a deal breaker. Trump has been threatening to use force. |
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7. Upon acceptance of this agreement, full aid will be immediately sent into the Gaza Strip. At a minimum, aid quantities will be consistent with what was included in the 19 January 2025 agreement regarding humanitarian aid, including rehabilitation of infrastructure (water, electricity, sewage), rehabilitation of hospitals and bakeries, and entry of necessary equipment to remove rubble and open roads. |
The situation has improved, andhumanitarian supplies have resumed. These, however, are inadequate and need to be expanded. |
While mass starvation has been avoided, malnutrition and dismal healthcare remain serious problems. Rehabilitation of infrastructure, etc, is racing against the setting in of the cold weather accompanied by rains. |
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8. Entry of distribution and aid in the Gaza Strip will proceed without interference from the two parties through the United Nations and its agencies, and the Red Crescent, in addition to other international institutions not associated in any manner with either party. Opening the Rafah crossing in both directions will be subject to the same mechanism implemented under the 19 January 2025 agreement. |
The aid logistics are hobbled by Israeli restrictions, such as frequent closure of the Rafah crossing and a ban on UNRWA. The US has set up a Civil-Military Command Centre (CMCC) in southern Israel to manage such issues. |
It’s a work in progress, and performance would hopefully improve with greater mutual trust among the stakeholders. |
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9. Gaza will be governed under the temporary transitional governance of a technocratic, apolitical Palestinian committee, responsible for delivering the day-to-day running of public services and municipalities for the people in Gaza. This committee will be made up of qualified Palestinians and international experts, with oversight and supervision by a new international transitional body, the “Board of Peace,” which will be headed and chaired by President Donald J. Trump, with other members and heads of state to be announced, including Former Prime Minister Tony Blair. This body will set the framework and handle the funding for the redevelopment of Gaza until such time as the Palestinian Authority has completed its reform programme, as outlined in various proposals, including President Trump’s peace plan in 2020 and the Saudi-French proposal, and can securely and effectively take back control of Gaza. This body will call on best international standards to create modern and efficient governance that serves the people of Gaza and is conducive to attracting investment. |
No signs of any concrete progress yet. |
Setting up of “Board of Peace” chaired by President Trump himself for funding for redevelopment of Gaza would be watched carefully for being an alternate version of his infamous “Gaza Reviera” project. The composition of the apolitical technocratic Palestinian committee is important to ensure it is acceptable to both Israel and Hamas to deliver the needed quality of interim administration. Some Arab sources have expressed reservations about Mr Tony Blair’s acceptability due to his involvement as the UK PM in the 2001 attack on Iraq. |
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10. A Trump economic development plan to rebuild and energise Gaza will be created by convening a panel of experts who have helped birth some of the thriving modern miracle cities in the Middle East. Many thoughtful investment proposals and exciting development ideas have been crafted by well-meaning international groups, and will be considered to synthesize the security and governance frameworks to attract and facilitate these investments that will create jobs, opportunity, and hope for future Gaza. |
No signs of any concrete progress yet. |
This is more of a business pitch than a serious plan. Its identification with Trump is, however, indicative of the mindset with a thin line dividing official policy from Trump, Inc. |
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11. A special economic zone will be established with preferred tariff and access rates to be negotiated with participating countries. |
No signs of any concrete progress yet. |
Given Trump’s propensity to use tariffs for wider policy ends, it remains to be seen how this pans out. |
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12. No one will be forced to leave Gaza, and those who wish to leave will be free to do so and free to return. We will encourage people to stay and offer them the opportunity to build a better Gaza. |
No signs of any concrete progress yet. |
This is a complete reversal of the Gaza Riviera project that mooted the relocation of all Gazans. |
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13. Hamas and other factions agree not to have any role in the governance of Gaza, directly, indirectly, or in any form. All military, terror, and offensive infrastructure, including tunnels and weapon production facilities, will be destroyed and not rebuilt. There will be a process of demilitarisation of Gaza under the supervision of independent monitors, which will include placing weapons permanently beyond use through an agreed process of decommissioning, and supported by an internationally funded buy-back and reintegration programme, all verified by the independent monitors. New Gaza will be fully committed to building a prosperous economy and to peaceful coexistence with their neighbours. |
No signs of any concrete progress yet. |
This is easier said than done. Hamas, which claimed to have resisted the IDF for two years, is unlikely to disappear into the sunset. It has no incentive to do so. On the other hand, PM Netanyahu has insisted on these three conditions being met. This creates a piquant situation that could, unless handled deftly, sink the Trump Plan altogether. |
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. 14. A guarantee will be provided by regional partners to ensure that Hamas and the factions comply with their obligations and that New Gaza poses no threat to its neighbours or its people. |
No signs of any concrete progress yet. |
Of the regional countries, only Qatar, Egypt, and Turkey maintain ties with Hamas. However, whether they can guarantee Hamas’ good conduct is arguable. |
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15. The United States will work with Arab and international partners to develop a temporary International Stabilisation Force (ISF) to immediately deploy in Gaza. The ISF will train and provide support to vetted Palestinian police forces in Gaza, and will consult with Jordan and Egypt, who have extensive experience in this field. This force will be the long-term internal security solution. The ISF will work with Israel and Egypt to help secure border areas, along with newly trained Palestinian police forces. It is critical to prevent munitions from entering Gaza and to facilitate the rapid and secure flow of goods to rebuild and revitalize Gaza. A deconfliction mechanism will be agreed upon by the parties. |
No signs of any concrete progress yet, even as the US leaders have lately asserted that a number of countries have expressed interest in joining the ISF. They have also affirmed that Israel should be “comfortable” with the participating countries. While making the initial contribution of 200 troops to CMCC, the US has ruled out their presence in Gaza. |
The ISF is a crucial but problematic initiative, particularly if it has to forcibly disarm Hamas. No Arab or Muslim country would ordinarily have its army do so, as it would be seen as a proxy for the IDF. Moreover, countries like India are likely to contribute to ISF only after it gets a UN mandate, which is said to be in the works. |
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16. Israel will not occupy or annex Gaza. As the ISF establishes control and stability, the Israel Defense Forces (IDF) will withdraw based on standards, milestones, and timeframes linked to demilitarization that will be agreed upon between the IDF, ISF, the guarantors, and the United States, with the objective of a secure Gaza that no longer poses a threat to Israel, Egypt, or its citizens. Practically, the IDF will progressively hand over the Gaza territory it occupies to the ISF according to an agreement they will make with the transitional authority until they are withdrawn completely from Gaza, save for a security perimeter presence that will remain until Gaza is properly secure from any resurgent terror threat. |
No signs of any concrete progress yet, except that the partial IDF withdrawal, as envisaged in Phase 1, has taken place. |
There are too many prerequisites and interwoven conditionalities to be sanguine about this point. As it is, Israel is quite adept at finding reasons for non-compliance. |
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17. In the event Hamas delays or rejects this proposal, the above, including the scaled-up aid operation, will proceed in the terror-free areas handed over from the IDF to the ISF. |
No signs of any concrete progress yet. |
Too early to comment on this possibility of Hamas and ISF co-existing in their respective zones of Gaza. It may practically partition the territory and lead to friction. |
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18. An interfaith dialogue process will be established based on the values of tolerance and peaceful co-existence to try and change mindsets and narratives of Palestinians and Israelis by emphasizing the benefits that can be derived from peace. |
No signs of any concrete progress yet. |
The point should be relatively easy to implement, but whether it would lead to any societal perceptual change is open to question. |
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19. While Gaza re-development advances and when the PA reform programme is faithfully carried out, the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self-determination and statehood, which we recognise as the aspiration of the Palestinian people. |
No signs of any concrete progress yet. |
This point is an important sine qua non for the Kingdom to join the Abraham Accords. But the preconditions are pretty daunting. Further, the “pathway” does not specifically lead to a two-state solution. |
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20. The United States will establish a dialogue between Israel and the Palestinians to agree on a political horizon for peaceful and prosperous co-existence. |
No signs of any concrete progress yet. |
If this point is redeemed, the hiatus in negotiations between Israel and the PA would be resumed after nearly a quarter of a century. |
The previous issue of Abraham Accords @5: Stuck at Cross Roads are available here: LINK
