Ananta Insights | China-Central Asia Relations: An Expanding Partnership by Ambassador Ashok Sajjanhar | April 2025

Introduction

Relations of China with the five Central Asian states—Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan—have witnessed impressive growth over the thirty-four years since Central Asia attained independence from the Soviet Union in 1991. 

Historically China and the Central Asian region enjoyed close relations with exchange of goods, ideas, thoughts and culture, particularly during the Silk Road period from 3^rd century BCE to 15^th century CE. During the Soviet period, borders of Kazakh, Kyrgyz and Tajik Soviet Socialist Republics with China were unsettled and caused tense relations between Beijing and Moscow. 

Soon after the disintegration of the Soviet Union and the independence of Central Asian states in 1991, China moved quickly to settle its borders with the three Central Asian states viz. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan with which it shared common borders, as also with the Russian Federation. The “Shanghai Five’’ was established in 1996 after the borders were demarcated to promote greater cooperation between these countries. This was transformed to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) with the induction of Uzbekistan in 2001. 

A significant reason for China’s eagerness to demarcate its borders with the Central Asian countries was to ensure peace in East Turkistan, christened by it as Xinjiang (New Territory). This region was annexed by China with the help of the Soviet Union in 1949 when the People’s Republic of China was established. 

In addition to maintaining law and order in East Turkistan, China was also keen to import fossil fuels including oil, gas and uranium, and other minerals and metals from Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan. Several oil and gas pipelines have been established over the last two decades to meet the insatiable thirst of China for energy. The launch of the One Belt One Road (OBOR) project which was later designated as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has further enhanced the significance of Central Asia for China by connecting it with Europe and the Middle East. Kazakhstan, Central Asia’s largest and most prosperous economy, has enthusiastically embraced its partnership with China, projecting itself as the “buckle” in the BRI project to economically and financially benefit from the new investment and connectivity opportunities provided by Beijing. 

The last few years have, however, witnessed increased tension at the level of citizens of some of these countries (if not by the governments and elites) with China. It is possible that going forward, governments of countries like Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan could be forced to push-back against the growing dominance of China. The growing footprint of China—politically, economically, militarily and in security terms—in Central Asia, a region which has traditionally been considered by Russia to be its backyard, could result in contestation between the two for influence in the coming years. Although outwardly both China and Russia appear to be collaborating, particularly to keep the US and the West out of the region, without many friction points thus far, the coming years could see this change.

Evolution of China-Central Asia Relations

Growth of relations between China and Central Asia over the last 3 decades plus can be divided into three phases viz. the first phase from 1991-2001 in which security on the borders between China and Central Asia was assured; the second phase from 2001-2013 when the scope of relations was expanded to include trade and economic partnership; and the third from 2013 till date during which, under the stewardship of Chinese President Xi Jinping, relations expanded to a more comprehensive and institutional framework. 

The 1st Phase: 1991-2001: Collapse of the Soviet Union and subsequent independence of Central Asian countries provided a valuable opportunity to China to settle its borders with these countries and Russia. Politically and militarily, China was in a much stronger position to get the borders resolved on its terms. The imperative for China at this stage was to ensure secure borders so that peace and stability in Xinjiang could be ensured by restricting any cross-border support for the Uyghur separatists. At the same time, it considered it essential to establish a strong foot hold in the region to advance its trade and economic interests in the region.

The 2^nd Phase: 2001-2013: This period was utilized by China to establish the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) by incorporating Uzbekistan within the “Shanghai Five” Grouping and enhancing its influence in the region. By using the SCO to counter the “three evils” of separatism, terrorism and extremism, and expanding economic relations with Central Asia, China sought to expand its dominance and control over the region.

The 3^rd Phase: 2013-Till date: This has been the most productive and fruitful period of growth of relations between China and Central Asia. Under the decisive leadership of Xi Jinping, relations in all spheres including political, security, economic, energy, social and cultural have grown. Expansion of these ties has been helped by the Russian conflict with Ukraine since February, 2022 which has significantly constrained Russia in focusing on its ties with Central Asia. China has sought to provide an institutional framework to its relations with the Central Asian states. Over the past decade since the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) was launched by Xi Jinping in Kazakhstan in 2013, the two countries have successfully implemented dozens of important cooperation projects which have contributed to the development of the two countries. The relevance and utility of the BRI has increased significantly after the imposition of severe sanctions by Europe and the West on Russia following its aggression against Ukraine.

China’s growing control of mineral resources of the region

Growing domestic energy demand, predicated on its robust economy, and expanding external markets for finished goods are critical reasons for China to increase its presence in the region. China’s thirst for energy has grown steeply after the 1990s. Its daily consumption of oil saw a rise from 4.2 million barrels in 1998 to 13.5 million barrels in 2018. Its consumption of natural gas is projected to increase by nearly 190 percent from 2020 to 2050. Central Asian countries, with abundant reserves of hydrocarbon fuels and minerals, have emerged as vitally important for diversifying China’s domestic energy mix as also its transportation route. With proven oil reserves estimated at 40 billion barrels and natural gas reserves in excess of 500 trillion cubic feet (with Turkmenistan accounting for 350 trillion cubic feet), the Central Asian Republics can help China reduce its dependence on West Asia for its energy needs. Central Asia is also richly endowed with uranium deposits as well as rare earth minerals and metals. Kazakhstan has the world’s second largest reserves, after Australia, of uranium. In recent years it has emerged as the largest producer of this ore. Uzbekistan also has significant deposits of uranium. Central Asia is hence, vital for China’s energy security. Central Asian states need financial investments for technological and infrastructure buildup of their energy sectors. China, holding over US $4 trillion foreign exchange reserves in addition to having the technological expertise, has emerged as a significant source of foreign direct investment. The recent rivalry witnessed in the South China Sea with Malaysia, Vietnam, Indonesia and the Philippines, as also with the USA, has increased the significance of oil and gas resources of Central Asia as they do not suffer from anything akin to the “Malacca Dilemma’’ in their transportation to China. More than fifty percent of China’s supplies that come from West Asia are vulnerable to geopolitical threats. Central Asian resources are more proximate and easier to transport to the Western regions of China than from countries in the Middle East.

Maintaining security in Xinjiang (East Turkistan)

Uyghurs, members of the Turkic-speaking ethnic community living in the western region of China, launched anti-China agitations in 1980, 1981, 1985 and 1987. Prior to these agitations, their aspirations for independence, which they declared in 1924 and 1944, were brutally suppressed. Beginning 2017, China established concentration camps which it euphemistically termed as “education centers” to brainwash, torture and homogenize the Uyghur population to adopt the ideology of the Chinese Communist Party. Several ethnic Kazakh and Kyrgyz origin people, who were long-term residents of East Turkistan, were also incarcerated in these concentration camps. Tales of systematic torture, forced sterilizations, and forced labour to which they are subjected have reached these countries through relatives of people imprisoned in Xinjiang or through others who managed to escape these camps. While large-scale public protests and demonstrations have been held periodically in these countries exhorting their governments to take up the matter forcefully with China, they have had little impact on the Central Asian governments.

Anti-China protests

Anti-Chinese protests in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan have been witnessed in the past. Back in 2009 and 2016, there were large-scale protests focused on reports that the Kazakh government was about to permit China to lease out large swathes of land for agricultural purposes. In 2011, brawls erupted between oil workers and the Kazakh law-enforcement authorities in Zhanaozen, leading to a number of casualties. A Chinese company CITIC was among the investors and was under the scanner for discriminatory pay to the Kazakh workers. More recently in 2020, the Chinese embassy in Nur-Sultan engaged in a public squabble on the alleged appearance of a more virulent strain of COVID-19 in several cities of Kazakhstan. This was apparently done to shift the blame for the Wuhan virus to some other country except China. This report by the Chinese embassy was immediately and strongly rejected by the Kazakh health minister. 

Similar demonstrations have taken place periodically in Kyrgyzstan. Most recently, Chinese businesses in the country were threatened by protesters in the aftermath of the subsequently annulled Parliamentary election on 4 October 2020. China came in for sustained criticism in Kyrgyzstan in early 2018 when a thermal power plant renovated by it at a cost of US$ 386 million suddenly stopped working during the extremely low winter temperatures. Several questions were raised including corrupt and pollutive behavior of Chinese companies working in the region. 

Central Asian citizens have watched from the side-lines as Chinese finances, goods, workers, and authority have transformed the regional economic geography with the enthusiastic support and encouragement of their governments. There appears to be widespread anxiety with respect to China’s rapidly expanding footprint in the economic, social, political, strategic, cultural and military fields of these countries. Such protests and demonstrations hardly make any difference to Beijing. Uzbekistan, which was once closed to Chinese investment and influence under Islam Karimov is the most visible evidence of this. After the advent of Shavkat Mirziyoyev as President in 2016, inflow of Chinese investment has been openly welcomed.

Chinese foray in security sector in Central Asia

China pays increasing attention to expanding its security footprint in the region. Accounts of growing Chinese security presence appear in conjunction with more open exhibition of power through construction of bases, conduct of joint training exercises and supply of military equipment for Tajik forces along the Chinese border with Afghanistan. In 2019, there were reports of joint training exercises with Tajik, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek forces. China today accounts for about 18 percent of the total military purchases by Central Asia as compared to about 1 percent at the beginning of the last decade. In Tajikistan, which shares a 1,300-km southern border with Afghanistan, Beijing has a small but growing security presence. Several reports appeared in 2019 to suggest that Beijing has obtained rights “to refurbish or build up to 30 to 40 guard posts on the Tajik side of the country’s border with Afghanistan.” 

The C+C5 Summit in Xian, May, 2023

The first in-person China-Central Asia (C+C5) Summit was held in the north-western Chinese city of Xi’an in May, 2023. China had organized a virtual C+C5 Summit on 25th January, 2022, two days before India hosted its first India+C5 Summit on 27^th January, 2022. In expounding on how to build a China-Central Asia community with a shared future, Chinese President Xi stressed the need for mutual support, common development, and upholding universal security and everlasting friendship. He urged that in addition to traditional areas of cooperation, China and Central Asia should also forge new drivers of growth in finance, agriculture, poverty reduction, green and low-carbon development, medical service, health and digital innovation. He added that it is important that “we act on the Global Security Initiative, and stand firm against external attempts to interfere in domestic affairs of regional countries or instigate color revolutions.’’

During their meetings and talks with Xi, the leaders of the 5 Central Asian Republics expressed confidence and determination to boost cooperation with China, voicing their support for the China-proposed Initiatives on Global Development, Security and Civilization. The summit resulted in a staggering 54 agreements, 19 new cooperation mechanisms and platforms, and nine multilateral documents, including the Xi’an Declaration. 

According to UN statistics the volume of trade in goods between China and the five countries of the region rose from US$460 million three decades ago to more than US$70 billion in 2022 – a 150-fold increase -and its investments in Central Asia from 2005 to 2023 totaled $70 billion. In 2023, China’s trade with Central Asian countries is reported at $89.4 billion, up 27 percent year-on-year. More than $60bn of the total trade comprised of Chinese exports. Trade rose with every Central Asian country except Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan traded $41bn with China, an increase of almost one-third in 2022, while Tajikistan saw a 50% uptick to $3.9bn. Due to the fast growth of China-Europe freight train services, railway cargo volume between China and Kazakhstan in 2023 surged by 22 percent year-on-year to 28 million tons.

The format of China-Central Asia Summits was institutionalized in Xi’an whereby the two sides will take turns to host the Summits. The next Summit will take place in Kazakhstan in 2025. This Summit assumed a special significance as earlier cooperation was bilateral or multilateral under the auspices of the SCO, but now it has been brought under a new mini-lateral involving China and the region.

China announced a $3.7 billion aid package designed “to strengthen cooperation and development of Central Asia.’’ The Xi’an Summit is a clear demonstration of China’s intent to enhance its influence in Central Asia and supplant Russian sway following the Ukraine conflict. 

Commenting on the C+C5 Summit, Russian Foreign Ministry said that Central Asian countries are well aware that “neither the West nor anyone else” will be able or willing to compensate their losses if they choose to break ties with Russia. This demonstrates the deep sense of anxiety that Russia harbours on account of the growing closeness between China and Central Asia. 

Benefits of Chinese presence

There are, of course, some positive aspects of China’s growing influence in the region. Local people might freely air conspiracy theories about China’s long-term projections in the region, but they also acknowledge that the Chinese-built infrastructure has changed their lives for the better. Chinese companies are often seen to be more credible and reliable than local builders and contractors. Also, while Confucius Institutes are often criticized in the public domain as agencies to brainwash the local youth, several young people visit them regularly to take advantage of the opportunities that the growing economy of China offers. China’s rapid advance into Central Asia through the Belt and Road-linked investment projects has made Central Asia emerge as a new vanguard for global trade and connectivity.

Russia and China in Central Asia

The Russia-Ukraine conflict seeks to significantly transform the relative equation between Russia and China in Central Asia. This had started becoming evident even after 2014 with the annexation of Crimea by Russia. The ensuing sanctions by the West resulted in pushing Russia increasingly into the embrace of China with Russia emerging as a subordinate partner to China. This has become even more pronounced after Russia’s “Special Military Operation’’ against Ukraine from 24 February, 2022. Russia has traditionally seen Central Asia as its ‘near abroad’ and part of its sphere of influence, but Beijing’s emergence as the pre-eminent economic power has significantly altered the equations in the region, giving rise to a new era of recalibration. China’s rapidly growing presence in the area has been watched with wariness and mistrust by the Kremlin, despite a broad convergence of positions between Russia and China. Moscow had initially responded to Beijing’s expanding pre-eminence with a pushback, trying to maintain its perceived role as the region’s main economic power through new energy projects, diminishing Chinese-led initiatives, and establishment of its own economic bloc: The Eurasian Economic Union. But ever piling sanctions and the growing chasm between it and the West hit the brakes on the Eurasian Economic Union and compelled Moscow to seek a more realistic relationship with Beijing. 2014 can be considered to be the turning point in Sino-Russian bilateral ties. While China could be the leading economic force, Russia will try to shape the region through its political, security and military ties, such as through the Collective Security Treaty Organization.

India and Central Asia

In the midst of the growing geo-political turbulence, Central Asia is looking for partners other than Russia and China to engage with. Sensing the vacuum in Central Asia because of declining Russian influence, many countries and regions are actively reaching out to strengthen their presence in the region. Some of the important ones from which high level visits and interactions have taken place in recent months are USA (President Biden held a first-ever meeting with the five Presidents of Central Asian countries on the side-lines of the UN General Assembly session in New York in September, 2023), France, Germany, UK, GCC, Qatar, Turkiye (which shares historical, cultural, linguistic, religious and civilizational ties with all of them, except Tajikistan), Iran (which became a member of the SCO at the New Delhi Summit in July, 2023), South Korea, EU, Japan and several more.

India is eminently suited to enhance its multi-faceted partnership with Central Asia as these countries do not fear any threat from India as they do from China. The Central Asian countries constitute a part of India’s extended neighbourhood. India has millennia old historical and civilizational relations with these countries. India has not been able to leverage its age-old connections with this region because of the absence of geographical contiguity and lack of connectivity with these countries. India has significantly accelerated its engagement with the region over the last decade starting with the historic visit by Prime Minister Narendra Modi to all the five countries in July, 2015. Recent months and years have witnessed a significant uptick in the intensity of bilateral ties. To overcome the obstacle of absence of contiguous borders, several initiatives have recently been fast-tracked. Two crucial ones are the International North South Transport Corridor (INSTC) and the Chabahar port.

One of the most significant initiatives in recent years was the convening of a virtual Central Asia + India Summit by Prime Minister Modi on 27th January, 2022. The Summit would have been held in person in New Delhi in the context of celebration of India’s Republic Day except that it was changed to a virtual format because of the preoccupation of the Kazakh President with the unprecedented violent protests and clashes in his country in early January, 2022. The Leaders discussed the next steps in taking India-Central Asia relations to new heights. In a historic decision, the Leaders agreed to institutionalize the Summit mechanism by deciding to hold it every 2 years. On connectivity, the leaders agreed to utilize the services of the Chabahar Port for facilitating trade between the landlocked Central Asian countries and India.  The Leaders discussed far-reaching proposals to further cooperation in areas of trade and connectivity, development cooperation, defence and security and, in particular, in cultural and people to people contacts.

There is considerable identity of views and position on most regional and global issues between India and Central Asia. Some of these include peace and stability in Afghanistan; rapidly promoting connectivity (INSTC and Chabahar); counter-terrorism; climate change; trade and investment, security and defence etc. India can share its expertise in the areas of IT, digital payment infrastructure, health, education, startups, space industry, textiles, leather and footwear industry, gems and jewellery, tourism, pharmaceuticals, anti-radicalization and much more with the Central Asian countries. 

Conclusion

While China is keen to expand its political, economic, security and social presence in Central Asia, the feeling is not necessarily shared by all countries in the region. A 2020 study by Central Asia Barometer suggested that Central Asians are increasingly becoming uncomfortable with Chinese presence in the region. In Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, where tensions over Chinese investors have been building for some time, only seven and nine per cent of populations respectively, expressed “strong support” for Chinese energy and infrastructure projects in their countries. In Uzbekistan, which – unlike Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan—does not directly border China, locals have a somewhat more enthusiastic outlook towards Chinese investments, but even there, skepticism has been growing. While 65 percent of Uzbeks expressed “strong support” for Chinese investment in 2019, the number come down dramatically to 48 percent in 2020. 

Common citizens of Central Asia do not appear to be overly concerned about the broader strategic and security challenges posed by the growing Chinese presence in their countries. Instead, they are keen to navigate their way through the challenges of daily existence and partake of the economic boom that they hope will be ushered in. China’s natural borders with Central Asia imply that it will always have a dominant interest and influence in this region.

The previous issues of India-Central Asia Connectivity and the Role of INSTC (Central Asia Digest) are available here: LINK