As nations vie for supremacy in critical and emerging technologies, geopolitics and high tech innovations intersect to shape global dynamics. Technological advances, from artificial intelligence to space exploration, not only revolutionise industries but redefine global power and strategic alliances. This edition explores Starlink and the market dynamics of satellite internet in India; The China-West espionage war for strategic industrial secrets, personality, rights and performing arts in the AI age; crypto exchanges and the yet unresolved regulation challenge; China’s tech diplomacy optics; and building bridges with US tech leaders.
1. Starlink and the market dynamics of satellite internet in India
Starlink, a product of the privately-owned US company SpaceX and headed by Elon Musk, is, according to him “licensed in over 165 countries”. At its core, the network provider is able to offer these services thanks to a fleet of tens of thousands of satellites in Low Earth Orbit (LEO). However, despite becoming mainstream in the West, especially in the United States (US) by December 2022, and by hitting the milestone of 1 million end users, it didn’t as rapidly expand into the developing world or as it is now more fashionably called in international relations academic discourse, the Global South. While not all of the Global South is a monolith and the market dynamics or regulation blocking the company’s expansion in one country may not be the same in another, the root cause is the many inherent risks and the need to regulate those that come with the decentralised nature of satellite terminal internet provided by a foreign entity that a national government can’t directly control from its territory. Starlink, or versions of it such as Starshield, have been a feature of many modern battlefields, including the Russia-Ukraine conflict and US-Israeli war against Iran, in various capacities.
Elon Musk posted at least two personal statements on his own social media platform X that targeted Mukesh Ambani-led Reliance Industries, accusing them of trying to preserve what he termed a monopoly on India’s connectivity market. Reliance Industries replied without naming or mentioning Elon or his companies directly in a statement of their own on X, echoing the Government of India’s own take on the matter that the country “applies the same process to every applicant, Indian or foreign”. Reliance also clarified that Jio’s own satellite services await clearances”, thus refuting any implied accusations of favouritism benefitting them. The friction is starkly in contrast to how Jio had signed a distribution agreement with SpaceX in March 2025.
Jio’s main rival in India’s telecommunications market, Airtel, had also signed a similar agreement with SpaceX at the same time. While Jio or its parent Reliance Industries doesn’t have a fleet of satellites of its own, Airtel does due to its ownership of nearly a fifth of the European Satellite internet provider Eutelsat. Ideally, Airtel should have treated Starlink as a competitor in India as Eutelsat and its OneWeb platform are also seeking regulatory clearance to operate in India, as confirmed by Bharti Airtel Chairman Sunil Mittal during a telecom conference as cited in a Fortune India report. However, the distribution deal signals Airtel would rather share in the profits of Starlink operations in India than try to capture as much of the market share as possible for its OneWeb platform, which is the typical competitive model associated with the Indian telecom sector. While the regulatory process moves ahead based on Indian laws and procedures, it is clear that private sector competition in the age of satellite terminal internet is not going to play out in the same way it did for other subsectors of the telecom industry in previous decades.
2. Starlink and the market dynamics of satellite internet in India
According to a statement published on its website, British domestic and counter intelligence agency MI5 has warned that the China General Technology Research Institute (CGTRI) is a direct contributor to the Chinese Ministry of State Security (MSS), enabling Beijing to improve its “technical capability for espionage”. MI5 alleged that over “100 UK-linked academics have contributed to research projects funded by MSS via CGTRI”. However, MI5 did caveat the revelation with the fact that “in some cases, academics may not be aware that CGTRI is funding the Chinese research project they are contributing to”.
The reason for the British national security establishment to designate the CGTRI as an institution they shouldn’t be dealing with is likely an overt counter-espionage policy. The statement clearly states that in MI5’s assessment the “CGTRI has very strong ties to MSS in the public domain”, which would be an offence for any British entity under the UK’s National Security Act 2023. Particularly, the law’s Section 3 and Section 17 which pertain to “assisting a foreign intelligence service” and “obtaining a material benefit from a foreign intelligence service”. The notification however has an amnestic tone towards all previous dealings of British academic institutions with CGTRI, as indicative from the text’s in 30 September 2026 draft that British entities “will to date have engaged with CGTRI in good faith given CGTRI’s obfuscated links to MSS”.
While the exact text doesn’t say that no entity may be prosecuted for their collaboration with CGTRI before the date of the notification’s publication on 30 September, it may still be possible if the authorities deem the collaboration was deliberate and damaging enough to British national interest to prosecute.
China and its state security apparatus, including the MSS, have not only sought high-tech espionage capabilities but also industrial or scientific Intellectual Property (IP). While the entire West is a target, the US has perhaps the most consistent record of not only prosecuting espionage rackets involving Chinese nationals but also uncovering their ties to Chinese state institutions which have directly or indirectly benefited from the theft of IP from Western sources.
As an example, in a 2016 case the US Department of Justice uncovered a conspiracy where a Chinese national was nabbed and prosecuted for stealing Genetically Modified Organism (GMO) corn seeds to benefit a Chinese entity. The perpetrator was a permanent resident of the US but had retained his Chinese passport. Similar cases targeting companies in the petroleum and aerospace industries have also been the US Department of Justice’s purview in 2018 and 2022, respectively.
3. Personality rights and the concept of art and performance: A techno-legalistic perspective in the digital age
In the age of generative AI, cloning a person’s likeness, voice, image, or mannerisms has become relatively simple. By feeding existing footage of the person and a suitable prompt into an AI model optimised for this purpose, it is possible to generate entirely new frames featuring them, provided there is sufficient data to create a manipulatable digital replica. Just like many other functions traditionally associated with employment and value creation, the automation that AI can bring in the performing arts directly impacts people featuring in them. It is thus no surprise that almost every actor, writer, and musician has approached the courts in several jurisdictions across the globe to secure their rights to their likeness. The problem is not just losing potential employment and revenue from productions that may substitute the person with an AI generated replica, but also fringe deep-fake content which can depict the person doing anything without their knowledge or consent. The problem has been addressed legally in two ways – either with new legislation addressing specific generative AI use or extrapolating older privacy, copyright, and defamation laws. The European Union, for example, has Article 50 of its AI Act which mandates a ban on malicious generative AI content at the generation stage.
India takes a different approach to AI regulation of comparable depth and individual protections, and thus anyone approaching Indian courts to seek protection of their personality rights is doing it under legal protection for their fundamental rights as defined by the Indian constitution such as under Article 21 guaranteeing the Right to Privacy and Dignity, or specific laws governing various protections such as the Copyright Act, 1957; the Trademarks Act, 1999; and the IT Act, 2000; and its more recent amendments, among others.
Until Indian lawmakers can address the problem with specific legislation, nuances on what exactly is covered and how these rights can be interpreted in a specific context is a matter likely to be settled with case law which, put very simply, is a process where a plaintiff or defendant’s lawyer establishes legal precedent from past judgments from both domestic and foreign jurisdictions in their attempt to convince the court.
4. Crypto exchanges and the unresolved regulation challenge
The concept of crypto currency and distributed ledger technology has, since its inception, been popular among entities seeking to break away from centralised regulation and oversight. However, this creates an inherent crisis for the conventional social order as nation states and international financial institutions have not only defined how, when, and under what conditions any financial transactions can take place but also what medium can be used for the exchange.
While central banks have tried to repurpose the digital convenience of new-age currencies with Central Bank Digital Currencies (CBDC), they have even more control and oversight over transactions with these than fiat currencies. However, as of 2026, despite their introduction in certain countries, CBDCs have virtually no penetration in any substantive commerce anywhere in the world.
Traditional, decentralised crypto currencies like Bitcoin however have seen increasing popularity; however, this is not to say their path has been without obstacles. The biggest direct target for governments and regulators has been exchanges that convert traditional decentralised crypto currencies into fiat currencies. The latest exchange to close its door is Hong Kong-based CoinEx. While the announcement on the exchange’s website says that they are ceasing operations due to “prolonged downturn in the crypto currency market, the significant contraction in overall industry trading volume and liquidity” alongside what is likely to be the real reason, “rising regulatory requirements across major jurisdictions, as well as compliance costs and operational uncertainties that have exceeded reasonable boundaries”.
While compliance costs hurt the bottom line of any financial institution, especially when its overheads on other operational costs also leave little room for turning a profit, the problem becomes exacerbated, especially for medium sized outfits like CoinEx. The picture is starkly different for large players like Binance, which has not only inculcated a brand and trust associated with it, but also has a fairly streamlined relationship with most major countries and their financial institutions and regulatory authorities.
5. Building bridges with AI leadership
Nvidia’s CEO Jensen Huang and his AMD counterpart Lisa Su have joined the advisory board of the Tsinghua University School of Economics and Management (Tsinghua SEM, according to a report by Chinese state owned news outlet CGTN. The board already includes former CEO and incumbent Chairman of the Board of Apple, Tim Cook. The appointment of these Western tech leaders is not only a public relations victory for Beijing, but it is also a back channel for high-tech diplomacy and cooperation with Washington.
While some in the West may see the rivalry between Washington and Beijing in AI and chip manufacturing as a zero sum game, it is more often than not, a delicate game of posturing and negotiations as well as coercion and cooperation depending on the national and economic interest of both countries and their industries. The onboarding of Western AI leaders significantly strengthens China’s hand in depicting itself as the cooperative party and Washington as the one that excludes Chinese corporate leaders and academics from its institutions with legislation such as the Wolf Amendment, as well as the CHIPS and Pax Silica initiatives.
Check these out
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Wu, H. (2026, September 26). China and U.S. agree to establish AI safety channel and continue trade and military talks. Associated Press / PBS News. https://www.pbs.org/newshour/world/china-and-u-s-agree-to-establish-ai-safety-channel-and-continue-trade-and-military-talks
Collins, C. and Mehta, M. (2026, September 21). The State of AI Global Governance and Its Implications for the U.S.-China Summit. Center for International & Strategic Studies. https://www.csis.org/analysis/state-ai-global-governance-and-its-implications-us-china-summit
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Suess, J. (2024, April 25). Space Sector Capture: How to Make Allies and Influence States. RUSI, War in Space podcast, Episode 39]. https://www.rusi.org/podcasts/war-in-space/episode-39-space-sector-capture-how-make-allies-and-influence-states
