India-Vietnam Relations: A Strategic Gateway to ASEAN and the Indo-Pacific

Abstract

Following the political transition in Vietnam, and the recent visit of the Vietnamese President To Lam to India and the elevation of bilateral ties to an ‘Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’, India has a significant strategic opportunity to transform its partnership with Vietnam into a broader Indo-Pacific balancing mechanism. The article highlights the recent political shift in Vietnam and Vietnam as a key pillar of India’s Act East Policy and a strategic gateway to ASEAN and the Indo-Pacific in general. It further analyses how growing India-Vietnam cooperation contributes to a rules-based, multipolar regional order while balancing China’s expanding influence in the South China Sea and the wider Indo-Pacific region. The article concludes that the partnership increasingly serves as a broader strategic balancing mechanism promoting regional stability, strategic autonomy, and resilient connectivity.

Keywords

ASEAN, Act East Policy, Indo-Pacific Vision, South China Sea, Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, MAHASAGAR Vision

Introduction

Amid rising geopolitical uncertainty and intensifying strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific region and with the recent political transition in Vietnam, India-Vietnam relations have undergone a remarkable transformation, emerging as one of the most significant strategic partnerships in Southeast Asia. The recent elevation of bilateral ties to an ‘Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership‘ (2026) marks the third major upgrade in less than two decades, following the establishment of a Strategic Partnership in 2007 and a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2016. This institutional progression reflects the growing strategic convergence between the two countries and highlights the expanding scope of cooperation in areas such as defence, maritime security, critical minerals, digital connectivity, trade, technology, and supply-chain resilience. More importantly, it positions Vietnam as a key pillar of India’s engagement with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and the broader Indo-Pacific region in general.

Shortly after Vietnam’s 14th National Party Congress and the consolidation of leadership under the 16th National Assembly, the country’s determination to deepen bilateral ties and highlights India’s growing importance in realising Vietnam’s foreign policy. This visit assumes considerable significance amid changing regional dynamics. The visit occurred at a time when China continues to expand its political, economic, and military influence in the Indo-Pacific, particularly through its increasing assertiveness in the South China Sea. Simultaneously, India’s Act East Policy (AEP) has evolved beyond economic engagement into a broader strategic framework encompassing maritime security, defence cooperation, and regional connectivity (Pant & Basu, 2026). Against this backdrop, the visit reinforced the growing strategic convergence between India and Vietnam and highlighted the increasing importance of their partnership in addressing emerging regional security and economic challenges.

More significantly, the visit reflects India’s broader strategic ambition to utilise its partnership with Vietnam not merely within a bilateral framework but also as part of a larger Indo-Pacific strategy. Through enhanced maritime cooperation, defence collaboration, resilient critical mineral supply chains, and stronger ASEAN connectivity, India seeks to expand its regional footprint while contributing to a rules-based and multipolar regional order. In this context, India-Vietnam relations increasingly function not merely as a bilateral partnership but also as a strategic balancing mechanism that can moderate unilateral dominance and strengthen regional stability. The visit further underscores India’s growing role as a credible strategic and security partner in Southeast Asia and demonstrates the expanding strategic relevance of India’s Act East Policy within the evolving Indo-Pacific architecture.

Vietnam's Political Transition: Foreign Policy Shift under President To Lam

Vietnam has entered a significant political transition with the Communist Party unanimously electing its general secretary, To Lam, as President for a five-year term on April 7, 2026, consolidating his control over both the party and the State. This marks a major shift from Vietnam’s long-standing traditional ‘four pillars‘ model of collective power sharing (The Business Times, 2026). This move has been made to strengthen policy coherence and decision-making while preserving the core priorities of political stability, economic modernisation, anti-corruption reform, and party legitimacy. This shift could also enable faster decision-making and a more flexible posture for a nation once seen as diplomatically reticent and cautious, given its collective leadership (Torode, 2026). On the other hand, it increases the risk of authoritarianism as well as the risks related to governance, accountability, and long-term stability.

Despite this leadership change, Vietnam’s foreign policy has adhered to the concept commonly referred to as ‘bamboo diplomacy‘, a strategic doctrine emphasising flexibility, resilience, and balance. This doctrine ensures strategic autonomy, based on ‘Four Nos’—’No military alliances’, ‘No foreign bases’, ‘No siding with one power against another’, and ‘No use or threat of force’. Vietnam has steadily expanded its diplomatic engagement over the past decade, strengthened strategic partnerships with multiple actors, and enhanced its visibility within multilateral institutions. As of 2025, Vietnam has established Comprehensive Strategic Partnerships (CSP) with 14 countries, including all five permanent members of the UN Security Council: the United States (US), China, Russia, France, and the United Kingdom (UK) (Trang, 2025). This marks a diplomatic milestone, and it allows Vietnam to deepen ties with India, the US, Japan, Australia, and the EU, while maintaining a workable relationship with China.

In his recent article, ‘Promotion of Comprehensive Foreign Affairs at New Height‘, To Lam expressed the need to build strong foreign affairs with greater confidence, autonomy, self-reliance and self-resilience; contributing more effectively to the country’s strategic goals; and demonstrating a greater sense of responsibility toward peace and development in the world (Lam, 2026). To build strong diplomatic relations, To Lam visited India shortly after Vietnam’s 14th National Party Congress and the consolidation of leadership under the 16th National Assembly underscored the country’s determination to deepen bilateral ties and highlight India’s growing importance in realising Vietnam’s foreign policy (Vietnam+, 2026). The visit underscored Vietnam’s commitment to deepening its time-tested friendship, while opening up a new chapter of practical and future-oriented cooperation and deepening cooperation with India in defence, digital transformation, semiconductors, artificial intelligence, critical minerals, and maritime security.

Vietnam as a Key Pillar in India's Act East Policy and Indo-Pacific Vision

Following the establishment of diplomatic relations between India and Vietnam in 1972, bilateral ties gained substantial momentum after India’s economic reforms and the launch of its ‘Look East Policy’ in the early 1990s. Relations entered a new strategic phase in 2007 when both countries signed the Joint Declaration establishing a Strategic Partnership. Since then, bilateral relations have steadily expanded and are characterised by regular high-level political exchanges and multifaceted cooperation across several sectors (Sarma, 2017). Importantly, Vietnam became India’s first Strategic Partner in ASEAN.

The relationship was further elevated to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in 2016 (MEA, 2016). Both countries expressed satisfaction with the significant progress achieved in defence cooperation, including high-level exchanges, annual strategic dialogues, service-to-service cooperation, naval ship visits, military training, capacity-building programmes, defence equipment procurement, technology transfer, and cooperation within regional mechanisms such as the ASEAN Defence Ministers’ Meeting-Plus (ADMM-Plus). Defence and security cooperation have since emerged as one of the principal pillars of the India–Vietnam Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. This cooperation framework is guided by the Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Cooperation of 2009 and the Joint Vision Statement on Defence Cooperation, 2015. During the Indian Defence Minister’s visit to Vietnam in June 2022, both countries further adopted a ‘Joint Vision Statement on India-Vietnam Defence Partnership towards 2030‘ (PIB, 2022).

India’s defence engagement with Vietnam has also deepened substantially in recent years. In July 2023, India transferred the indigenously built missile corvette INS Kirpan to Vietnam. Defence-industrial collaboration has emerged as another important area of engagement, particularly through the delivery of 12 high-speed guard boats constructed by Larsen & Toubro under a US$ 100 million Line of Credit extended by India. Furthermore, additional Lines of Credit totalling US$ 120 million and US$ 180 million were exchanged between the EXIM Bank of India and Vietnam’s Ministry of Finance during the Vietnamese Prime Minister’s visit to India on August 1, 2024, and are currently being implemented. Other notable defence projects include the establishment of the Army Software Park at Telecommunications University in Nha Trang under a US$ 5 million Indian grant, the creation of a foreign language training laboratory at the Air Force Officers’ College in Nha Trang, and the provision of training aids to Vietnamese military institutions. Vietnam has also regularly participated in India-led defence exhibitions such as Aero India (MEA, 2026).

With President To Lam’s recent visit, the leaders of the two countries reaffirmed that the strong foundation of bilateral relations is built on mutual trust, respect, understanding, a shared vision, and effective cooperation across multiple fields. Both countries are pursuing new development goals toward the centenary of their independence, with an emphasis on balancing economic growth and social progress. India’s ‘Viksit Bharat 2047‘ vision aims to transform India into a developed nation on the occasion of the 100th anniversary of its independence through a balanced approach combining economic growth, social progress, environmental sustainability, effective governance, and technological advancement. Along the same lines as India, Vietnam has set targets of becoming a developing country with modern industry and upper-middle income by 2030 and a high-income developed nation by 2045 (The Star, 2026).

Against this backdrop, the two leaders agreed to elevate their relationship to an ‘Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership‘ (ECSP) based on the spirit of a shared vision, strategic convergence and substantive cooperation (MEA, 2026). This upgraded framework opens new avenues for cooperation in defence, maritime security, critical minerals, digital payments, trade, connectivity, and emerging technologies. The visit also demonstrated a strong alignment between the two countries regarding maritime governance and the Indo-Pacific vision (Pradhan, 2026). Vietnam’s participation in the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) represents an important development, reflecting both countries’ shared commitment to freedom of navigation, resilient supply chains, regional stability, and a rules-based international order grounded in international law. As part of the broader economic agenda, both countries also agreed to raise bilateral trade to US$ 25 billion by 2030.

Act East Policy and MAHASAGAR Vision

For India, Vietnam occupies a central position within both the Act East Policy and the broader Vision MAHASAGAR. Prime Minister Narendra Modi has repeatedly described Vietnam as a ‘key pillar’ of India’s engagement with the Mekong subregion, ASEAN, and the Indo-Pacific. Both countries have consistently reaffirmed their support for a free, open, inclusive, and rules-based Indo-Pacific region. Vietnam has also appreciated India’s continued support for ASEAN unity and ASEAN centrality within the evolving regional architecture for peace, stability, and prosperity. Simultaneously, both countries have emphasised the importance of strengthening the ASEAN-India Comprehensive Strategic Partnership, which complements India’s bilateral engagements with individual ASEAN member states (PIB, 2026).

India’s Act East Policy increasingly converges with Vietnam’s broader strategy of multilateralism and ‘great power balancing’. Vietnam seeks to preserve its strategic autonomy while engaging with multiple major powers to avoid excessive dependence on any single actor, particularly China. In this context, India emerges as a suitable strategic partner because of its growing influence in Asia, its absence of territorial disputes with Vietnam, and its support for ASEAN centrality. At the same time, India seeks to utilise partnerships with countries such as Vietnam to strengthen its strategic footprint in Southeast Asia and counterbalance China’s growing influence in the Indo-Pacific. Consequently, India and Vietnam are increasingly aligning their foreign policy and strategic interests (Jyoti & Singh, 2025).

Over the past decade, India’s maritime strategy has evolved from the SAGAR (Security and Growth for All in the Region) framework to the broader MAHASAGAR (Mutual and Holistic Advancement for Security and Growth Across Regions) vision. Introduced in 2015, SAGAR focused on maritime security cooperation, trade integration, disaster management, sustainable development, and connectivity. However, the launch of MAHASAGAR in 2025 reflected India’s ambition to expand its strategic influence across the Indo-Pacific and the Global South through greater emphasis on trade, maritime security, regional governance, and sustainable development (Durai, 2025). This strategic shift also reflects India’s response to China’s expanding regional influence in the Indo-Pacific and the Indian Ocean Region.

Thus, President To Lam’s visit further highlighted the growing strategic convergence between India and Vietnam on maritime issues and the Indo-Pacific vision. Vietnam’s participation in the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative (IPOI) reflects a shared commitment to regional stability, freedom of navigation, supply-chain resilience, and adherence to international law.

Vietnam as India's Gateway to ASEAN and the Indo-Pacific

Vietnam serves as an important bridge for India’s connectivity and diplomatic outreach within ASEAN. Its strategic geographic location and growing regional influence provide India with opportunities to strengthen trade connectivity, build resilient supply chains, and deepen economic integration with Southeast Asia. As ASEAN continues to emerge as one of the world’s most influential economic and strategic blocs, Vietnam offers India an important platform for long-term regional engagement.

Vietnam is also among the few ASEAN countries that have consistently adopted a firm position regarding maritime sovereignty and freedom of navigation in the South China Sea. India’s growing strategic alignment with Vietnam therefore strengthens support for a rules-based regional order grounded in international law, particularly the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).

Vietnam is strategically significant for India because it provides a critical foothold in the South China Sea, hosts important energy projects, and enables India to strengthen its security and economic presence in Southeast Asia. The expanding India-Vietnam partnership is driven by several converging strategic interests. Both countries support freedom of navigation, maritime security, and a rules-based Indo-Pacific order. Economically, bilateral trade and investment cooperation have expanded steadily in sectors such as energy, technology, infrastructure, manufacturing, and digital connectivity. Defence cooperation has also deepened considerably through naval exchanges, maritime collaboration, defence training, and defence-industrial partnerships.

From ASEAN’s perspective, stronger India-Vietnam relations contribute to a more balanced and multipolar regional order, thereby preventing excessive concentration of power within the Indo-Pacific strategic landscape (Jyoti & Singh, 2026). The recent visit further strengthened cooperation in emerging areas such as semiconductor supply chains, digital infrastructure, critical minerals, and resilient connectivity, sectors in which many countries increasingly seek alternatives to overreliance on China.

India-Vietnam Partnership as a Strategic Balancing Mechanism in the Indo-Pacific

China's Growing Assertiveness in the Indo-Pacific Region

One of the primary drivers of President To Lam’s visit is the growing geopolitical contestation in the South China Sea. Nearly one-third of global maritime trade passes through these waters annually, making the region one of the world’s most strategically sensitive maritime corridors. Overlapping territorial disputes and intensifying major-power rivalry have transformed the South China Sea into a major geopolitical flashpoint. Although geographically distant, the region is no longer strategically remote for India.

Vietnam occupies a central position within this maritime contestation. For decades, Hanoi has resisted China’s expanding influence and military assertiveness in disputed waters. India, meanwhile, has emerged as a maritime power consistently advocating freedom of navigation and adherence to international law. Both countries repeatedly emphasise support for a ‘rules-based maritime order,’ generally interpreted as support for UNCLOS and opposition to coercive maritime claims (Chakraborty, 2026).

Since removing Vietnamese forces from the Paracel Islands in 1974, China has steadily consolidated its military presence in the region through infrastructure development, artificial islands, military installations, and expanded naval deployments. Tensions escalated sharply in 2014 when China deployed the Haiyang Shiyou-981 oil rig in disputed waters near the Paracel Islands, triggering major protests in Vietnam. The crisis significantly reinforced Vietnam’s determination to diversify its strategic partnerships, including with India (Chakraborty, 2026). Similarly, China’s deployment of J-10 fighter jets to the island in 2019 further signalled its military intentions (Lendon, 2019). More recently, reports from 2025-2026 indicate increasing volatility in the South China Sea, including intensified coast guard deployments and harassment of Vietnamese fishing vessels (OMMCOM News, 2026).

Against this backdrop, President To Lam’s visit assumes exceptional strategic significance for India. The visit goes beyond routine diplomatic engagement and offers India an opportunity to deepen ties with a strategically located Southeast Asian partner at a time when China continues to expand its military and economic influence across the Indo-Pacific.

BrahMos Diplomacy: A Response to China's Assertiveness?

Given the importance of the South China Sea and continuous Chinese assertiveness in the region, Vietnam wanted to establish strong defence cooperation with India. Following the recent visit of To Lam to India, one of the major focuses of the deliberations was to boost bilateral defence ties, and in that context Vietnam expressed interest in procuring BrahMos missiles from India. Negotiations, however, have remained confidential. The potential acquisition of BrahMos missiles would represent a major milestone in India’s defence diplomacy, as India has already delivered these to the Philippines in April 2024 (Singh, 2026).

At the Shangri-La Dialogue in May in Singapore, Defence Secretary R.K. Singh announced that India has signed an agreement to supply BrahMos supersonic cruise missiles to Vietnam (Singsit, 2026). It will significantly enhance Vietnam’s anti-access and coastal defence capabilities while strengthening maritime deterrence in the South China Sea.

For India, BrahMos exports demonstrate and give signals of the growing maturity of its indigenous defence industry under the ‘Make in India‘ initiative. Beyond its commercial value, defence exports have become an important instrument of India’s strategic outreach across the Indo-Pacific. At the regional level, BrahMos diplomacy signals India’s emergence as a credible security provider capable of supporting Southeast Asian countries in strengthening their maritime security capabilities while promoting a stable balance of power in the region. Furthermore, India is currently in talks with Indonesia for the sale of BrahMos missiles. Meanwhile, there is growing strategic discourse suggesting that if Vietnam, the Philippines, and Indonesia were to deploy the BrahMos supersonic cruise missile, their combined missile coverage could create a ‘ring-shaped deterrent’ around the principal geopolitical chokepoints of the South China Sea. Given Indonesia’s strategic position at the southern gateway of the South China Sea, alongside the locations of Vietnam and the Philippines, such deployments could significantly enhance maritime deterrence and complicate the operational freedom of potential adversaries in the region (Singh, 2026). According to some reports, other countries such as Cyprus, Egypt, Saudi Arabia, the UAE, and Qatar, have also shown interest in buying the BrahMos missile (Firstpost, 2026).

These closer strategic ties help balance China’s expanding influence, particularly in the South China Sea, where territorial disputes continue to shape regional geopolitics. Simultaneously, Vietnam serves as a major gateway for Indian investments and businesses in Southeast Asia, particularly in sectors such as the digital economy, renewable energy, infrastructure, pharmaceuticals, and manufacturing. Expanding trade, supply-chain cooperation, and connectivity initiatives also support India’s broader objective of reducing dependence on China-centric production networks while strengthening regional economic resilience.

Thus, President To Lam’s visit also carries considerable symbolic importance, signalling growing trust between India and Vietnam and reflecting the willingness of Asian middle powers to cooperate more closely in preserving a multipolar and balanced regional order.

Emerging Challenges, and a Way Forward in India-Vietnam Relations

Despite significant progress and the elevation of the relationship to an ‘Enhanced Comprehensive Strategic Partnership’, India-Vietnam relations face several strategic and practical challenges. Implementation gaps, particularly in trade, connectivity, and defence-industrial cooperation, persist despite the strong political and strategic alignment. For example, navigating scientific, financial, and geopolitical obstacles will be necessary to realise defence exports such as BrahMos (Pant & Basu 2026). Also, despite strong trade linkages, growing trade imbalances risk generating friction, with Vietnam recording a US$ 4.2 billion surplus with India in 2025. India’s investment in Vietnam, estimated around US$ 2 billion, remains modest relative to stated ambitions. Digital economy cooperation lacks the regulatory alignment needed to operate at scale (Manh Linh, 2026). The growing military presence and assertive actions of China in the South China Sea continue to complicate regional security dynamics and influence the strategic calculations of both India and Vietnam. Furthermore, geopolitical competition among major powers and evolving regional uncertainties have required India and Vietnam to carefully calibrate their cooperation while preserving ASEAN unity and regional stability.

A Way Forward

Looking ahead, both countries need to maintain the momentum of high-level engagement while further bolstering trade and investment. Defence cooperation is expected to remain a crucial pillar while emerging areas such as cybersecurity, artificial intelligence, and advanced technologies are likely to offer significant potential (Viet Nam News, 2026). Accelerating defence cooperation through joint exercises, defence industrial collaboration, and timely implementation of BrahMos-related initiatives would enhance regional deterrence and maritime security. While continuing to strengthen the traditional pillars of our partnership in an upward trajectory, focus will be on initiating cooperation in new domains, particularly in innovation, critical and emerging technologies, renewable energy, health care, space technology, digital public infrastructure, fintech and pharmaceuticals, among others (MEA, 2026). India should also continue supporting Vietnam through capacity-building initiatives under the Act East Policy and the Indo-Pacific Oceans Initiative. Together, these measures will reinforce India-Vietnam relations as a cornerstone of peace, prosperity, and strategic stability in the Indo-Pacific.

Conclusion

India-Vietnam relations have evolved into one of the most strategically significant partnerships in the Indo-Pacific. Vietnam’s role as a bridge between India and ASEAN strengthens India’s Indo-Pacific engagement while simultaneously contributing to a more balanced and multipolar regional order. As geopolitical competition intensifies across Asia, deeper India-Vietnam cooperation will remain essential for promoting regional stability, connectivity, maritime security, and rules-based governance.

Importantly, the partnership does not constitute a formal anti-China alliance. Rather, it reflects a pragmatic strategic convergence between two important Asian middle powers seeking to preserve regional autonomy, strengthen economic resilience, and support a stable Indo-Pacific order grounded in international law.

President To Lam’s visit therefore represents more than a routine diplomatic engagement; it offers India a significant strategic opportunity to transform its partnership with Vietnam into a broader Indo-Pacific balancing mechanism. Through enhanced maritime cooperation, defence collaboration, critical mineral partnerships, and ASEAN connectivity, India can strengthen its regional role while simultaneously contributing to a stable, resilient, and multipolar Indo-Pacific order.

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Leishangthem Bimolchand Singh
Dr. Leishangthem Bimolchand Singh is Programme Lead at the Ananta Aspen Centre, New Delhi, where he manages Ambassador Series, Ananta Insights, and international programmes. He holds a Ph.D. in International Relations from Jawaharlal Nehru University (JNU), specializing in ASEAN, the Indo-Pacific, and the South China Sea. His research focuses on Indo-Pacific geopolitics, maritime security, and regional strategic affairs. He has published in leading journals on ASEAN, China, and the South China Sea dispute and has presented his research at international conferences.

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