Border Build-Up: What Next For India-China Ties
In a Trumpian world, as Moscow and Islamabad increasingly align with Beijing, a deep dive into the status of India’s relations with China amid a border-infra push accompanied by diplomatic jostling
Akankshya Ray
After meeting Modi on Feb 13 in Washington, President Trump called the India-Middle East-Europe Economic Corridor (IMEC) “one of the greatest trade routes” that’ll run from Israel to Italy and onward to US. He added that “friendship between the US and India is the strongest it has ever been.”
IMEC, a railway, ship-rail and road transit network, will connect India to the Gulf and a Northern Corridor will connect the Gulf region to Europe. Trump’s support for IMEC is a boost for India hoping shore up the alternate route to China’s BRI, which is one of several Chinese projects in India’s neighbourhood, both trade and military.
In December 2024, China announced two new counties, He’an and Hekang, in Xinjiang Uygur Autonomous Region, encompassing parts of Aksai Chin region claimed by India. China’s state news agency Xinhua said, “Establishment of the counties, both administered by Hotan Prefecture, has been approved by the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China and the State Council.”
Hongliu and Xeyidula townships have been declared as the “county seats” (administrative headquarters) of He’an and Hekang respectively. The report noted that He’an county encompasses a large part of the 38,000 sqkm of area that India accuses China of illegally occupying.
Beijing also announced plans to construct a massive hydropower dam on the Yarlung Tsangpo River, which flows into India as the Brahmaputra River. These developments continue China’s historical strategy of asserting claims over small, disputed territories along its border with India.
China and India have a long history of territorial disputes, primarily centred around the Line of Actual Control (LAC) and regions of Aksai Chin and Arunachal Pradesh. China’s approach is characterized by incremental advances and establishment of control over contested areas, a broader tactic in modern geopolitical conflicts.
India lodged strong protest through diplomatic channels, rejecting China’s territorial claims and emphasizing that such unilateral actions will not be recognized. India and China have restarted boundary negotiations after a five-year hiatus following the Galwan Valley clashes of 2020, with the latest round of talks held in December 2024.
Despite diplomatic engagements, the consistent nature of such territorial claims suggests that areas seized by China may remain under its control unless countered effectively by India. Beijing’s actions leave India with a range of unappealing options, from tolerating the status quo to military responses.
China’s strategy of making territorial claims is a deliberate component of its modern warfare approach, aiming to achieve geopolitical objectives with minimal risk of large-scale conflict. India, on the other hand, is stuck with limited options and a dilemma: whether to confront China more aggressively or prioritize economic interests.
Understanding China’s strategy is crucial in order to formulate effective responses and maintain regional stability. This paper will briefly examine various aspects of China’s approach and how New Delhi has responded to Beijing’s assertions over border areas by adopting a strategy different from direct confrontation. It will explore the possibility of the dispute escalating into war, and options for both countries to move forward.
Behind China’s Moves
The incremental claims are in keeping with Beijing’s historical strategy. Its recent moves at LAC have critical military implications. Two points.
First, strategy of fait accompli | China’s ‘salami-slicing’ tactics have become a cornerstone of its approach to border disputes and territorial expansion. Beijing’s small, steady steps to change status quo avoids full-scale conflict while progressively achieving strategic goals. It takes advantage of uncertainty and frequently avoids redlines, putting the defence in a situation where responses are either too expensive or inadequate.
Historically, this has been a hallmark of China’s border management. It has disputes with more than six of its neighbours, ranging from Japan in the East China Sea to Vietnam and the Philippines in South China Sea. China’s actions include constructing artificial islands, militarising disputed territories, and exploiting economic dependencies to assert dominance. Its salami slicing at land boundaries has impacted not only Bhutan and Nepal, but also Russia. It produces new realities that often go unchallenged given material and political limitations.
The rationale behind grabbing these often-uninhabitable regions is a broader strategic calculus. Areas like Pangong Lake, Galwan Valley, and Aksai Chin may lack substantial economic or demographic value, but their proximity to India’s critical infrastructure, such as the Daulat Beg Oldie Road, makes them a strategic imperative.
China’s reliance on fait accompli strategy thrives on defender’s hesitation, either due to incremental nature of the encroachments or the speed at which they occur.
Second, military logistics | Rationale behind creation of two new counties goes beyond assertion of territorial sovereignty — the idea to sustain military and logistical operations in the region. Hotan Prefecture that will administer the two new counties is Aksai Chin, a high-altitude desert at the junction of China, Pakistan and India. Claimed by India, it is at present under Chinese administration and a key area of dispute between the two nations.
Geographically, Aksai Chin is part of the Tibetan Plateau and Changtang region. The Sino-Indian War of 1962 when India discovered China had built a road through Aksai Chin. This road, China National Highway 219 (G219), links Lhasa (Tibet) with Xinjiang, making the region strategically vital for China.
The Changtang Plateau is a vast, high-altitude region in Tibet and eastern Ladakh. In reassigning the administration of this region to Xinjiang, Beijing’s signalled a major shift in governance and military strategy. These counties, located along the G219 highway, are crucial for maintaining logistics, communication, and troop movements in the region.
China’s military deployments in eastern Ladakh rely heavily on logistics from Xinjiang rather than Tibet because:
- Route via Lhasa: Troops have to take a longer route at high altitude from Lhasa, a road under constant Indian surveillance. From locations like Charding La (north of Demchok), India has a clear view of the Mansarovar region, making Chinese supply routes vulnerable.
- Route via Xinjiang: The alternative route through Hotan and Kashgar in Xinjiang is significantly shorter and strategically less exposed. In 2020, during the Galwan Valley standoff, China mobilised its forces and logistics primarily through this route. Hotan, located at a lower altitude of 3,000-4,000 feet, is a hub for Chinese air and ground operations in the region.
Administration of Aksai Chin is integrated into Xinjiang, assuring China of uninterrupted logistical support for its forces in eastern Ladakh. This is also a part of its broader civil-military strategy, where civilian infrastructure supports military objectives. The new counties will contribute to the People’s Liberation Army’s ability to sustain operations, especially in a defensive scenario.
This administrative restructuring also reflects China’s concerns over possible instability in Tibet. Logistics from Lhasa can be affected if the Tibetan government faces any problems. In strengthening Xinjiang’s charge over Aksai Chin, China is now less dependent on Tibet to maintain control over the region.
Xinjiang is also becoming a hub for semiconductor manufacturing (zinc reserves), because of its access to clean water, thus making it important for China.
Carving out two new counties has been a strategic shift in China’s operational readiness. By relying on Xinjiang as the primary base for logistics and operations, Beijing achieves twin objectives: (a) in case of conflict with India, logistical movement via Xinjiang is more viable and secure; (b) by reducing reliance on Tibet, China minimizes risks associated with potential instability in the region.
What Is India’s Response
India’s response is a balanced approach, combining diplomacy, strategic alliances, and infrastructure development with countermeasures to safeguard national interests and maintain regional peace and stability.
Fait accompli strategies are often coercive in nature. By claiming territories and performing provocative acts, China wants to force India to reassess its crucial policies, such as building roads in disputed territories or administrative actions in Ladakh (Kashmir Reorganisation Act 2019).
But history tells us such coercion is unlikely to work. Countries are more likely to consolidate resources than give in to external pressure. For India, the response has been to redouble efforts at strengthening border infrastructure and military response, signalling resilience rather than retreat. However, it remains to be seen to what extent India’s approach will disrupt China’s pattern.
A turning point came in 2024, when India decided to push back China and engage in border negotiations that was followed by the disengagement process. New Delhi is balancing diplomacy with military micro-aggression before such incremental moves turn into irreversible strategic losses. While Beijing’s strategy has seen initial successes, its long-term implications are uncertain. The Galwan Valley clash in 2020 was the most significant escalation since 1962 with both nations suffering casualties.
Diplomatic measures | For India, a diplomatic solution is the most desirable option to resolve border tensions. The Prime Minister has prioritised this path, aiming for disengagement and de-escalation along LAC. However, there are not enough cases from history where diplomacy alone has persuaded the occupying force to withdraw. India continues to propose negotiations and push for restoring status quo and does not support any unilateral claims that China is raising over disputed territory.
India has repeatedly voiced strong protests to China’s actions to rename areas in Arunachal Pradesh, categorically rejecting these claims as baseless and arbitrary. New Delhi sends a clear message to Beijing and the international community that Arunachal Pradesh is an integral part of India. India’s formal responses to China’s “standard map” continuously rejects any provocative moves and violates previous agreements.
Post 2020, India went on to showcase economic resilience and sovereignty by putting severe restrictions on Chinese visas as well as banning hundreds of Chinese apps. In addition, regulations on Chinese investments were tightened in sensitive sectors like telecommunications, e-commerce, and infrastructure. This was not just practical but symbolic, signalling that India will not hesitate to counter China’s influence beyond the battlefield.
Military options | India recognises limitations of a military confrontation. A full-scale offensive is risky especially in high-altitude regions with volatile conditions. India could adopt a strategy like China by advancing elsewhere along the disputed border. This approach could force China into a defensive position and potentially create grounds for mutual withdrawal agreements. But such assertion might also be counter-productive to India’s economic ties with China and thus make India vulnerable to Chinese expansionism.
Nevertheless, India is prepared for direct confrontation with China if the conflict further escalates. India has redistributed its forces and resources to sensitive areas along the LAC and increased surveillance and preparedness in these areas. Investments in modern weaponry, surveillance systems, and recruitment of special mountain troops show India’s readiness for high-altitude warfare.
Expanding infra | India has dramatically improved its border infrastructure as a deterrent against China. The Border Roads Organisation (BRO) has completed 90 projects worth Rs. 2,941cr, including roads and bridges in Arunachal Pradesh, Ladakh, and J&K. Projects such as the Darbuk-Shyok-Daulat Beg Oldie (DSDBO) road improve connectivity for troops and logistics.
Rail projects underway will enhance connectivity to borders for speedy troop and equipment deployment. India has also encouraged settlement in border villages to serve as outposts, deterring Chinese incursions. Army Chief General Upendra Dwivedi described these ‘model villages’ as a core component of national security, acting as deterrent to the adversary. He said, “It basically discredits adversary claims or who otherwise claim this is theirs or taken away. People are there on ground to confirm what is correct and what is not.”
In 2020, India’s Defence Minister Rajnath Singh had virtually laid the foundation stone for a tunnel at Nechiphu in Arunachal’s West Kameng district. The 500m-long tunnel is on the Ballipara-Charduar-Tawang (BCT) road. It reduces the travel time to the border area by 20 minutes and distance by 6km.
The BRO constructed an all-weather tunnel at Sela Pass in Arunachal Pradesh, which now connects Tawang with the rest of Arunachal and Guwahati. Tawang is an area in northwestern Arunachal Pradesh, bordering Bhutan at its north and west.
In the past, China proposed a land swap offering to exchange Tawang for Aksai Chin. Tawang has strategic significance for China because it’s a potential entry point into India’s Brahmaputra Valley and the northeastern states. Arunachal also provides a security buffer for Bhutan on its entire eastern front. Losing Tawang would pose a severe threat to India’s security.
China’s obsession with the Tawang region is purely strategic, and India remains steadfast in its refusal to give up this territory. Recognizing the region’s importance, the central government has approved the construction of infrastructure that will improve troop mobility.
In 2019, the Indian Air Force inaugurated a runway at Vijaynagar, India’s easternmost village, located in Changlang district of Arunachal Pradesh. This initiative aims to establish military transport aircraft connectivity in India’s easternmost region. The runway will facilitate IAF and Army in launching strategic operations to protect the country’s borders against China and Myanmar.
BRO has also constructed the Daporijo Bridge over the Subansiri River in Arunachal in a record 27 days. This bridge connects roads leading to India’s border with China. Another critical project, the Bogibeel Bridge which is India’s longest road and rail bridge was inaugurated in 2018. It connects Dibrugarh in Assam to Pasighat in Arunachal, facilitating transport of troops and equipment to border areas during military standoffs.
Both countries are focused on building extensive infrastructure near border areas to secure their interests. All this, however, has been at a significant ecological cost.
Role Of Global Strategic Alliances
India has deepened partnerships with like-minded nations to counterbalance China’s influence, particularly in the Indo-Pacific region.
QUAD | The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue allows India to strengthen cooperation with the US, Japan, and Australia, focusing on maritime security, technology sharing, and countering China’s aggressive stance in the Indo-Pacific.
I2U2 | Collaborating with Israel, UAE, and the US strengthens India’s geopolitical position and provides alternatives to China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI).
IMEC | The India-MiddleEast-Europe Economic Corridor, which Trump mentioned, enhances trade and connectivity while offering a viable alternative to BRI projects.
INSTC | The International North-South Transport Corridor, supported by India, Iran, and Russia, provides strategic connectivity from the Indian Ocean to Europe, reducing dependence on China-led routes.
Countering the ‘String of Pearls’ | India has adopted the ‘Necklace of Diamonds’ strategy to counter China’s ‘String of Pearls’ encirclement. It offers partnerships to nations like Vietnam, Japan, and Seychelles to counter Chinese naval encroachments. Other key projects such as the Chabahar Port in Iran and increased naval cooperation with Sri Lanka and Maldives are vital components of India’s strategy.
For India, Neighbourhood First
India has proactively engaged with neighbouring countries to counter China’s growing influence. High-profile visits of Maldivian Foreign Minister and Sri Lankan President to India show New Delhi’s commitment to future collaborations. While tensions with Pakistan remain perennially high, political turmoil in Bangladesh has complicated matters for India, especially with the prospect of growing cooperation Bangladesh with Pakistan and China.
India’s relations with Nepal are significant with cooperation on security, development, and disaster management. However, there is a trust deficit that is a constant challenge. Afghanistan is another strategic priority for India. New Delhi continues to invest in infrastructure development and seeks to engage with the Taliban government. In a major development, India’s Foreign Secretary Vikram Misri held talks with Afghanistan’s Acting Foreign Minister Amir Khan Muttaqi in Dubai on January 8, the first high-level contact since 2021. The stakes are high due to the highly volatile geopolitical climate, where Taliban in Kabul is at odds with Islamabad.
New Delhi’s Act East Policy aims to counterbalance Beijing’s influence, while strengthening ties with Southeast Asian nations. Maintaining proactive diplomacy and strategic outreach, India can secure its national interests and reassert its leadership role in the region.
Will There Be Escalation?
Although the probability of all-out war remains low, border disputes create a constant tension that may escalate the conflict. India’s strategic restraint and focus on diplomatic, economic, and regional measures show it prefers peace. However, it remains prepared to counter China’s aggression.
At the Army Day press conference recently, General Dwivedi said, “The situation is stable but sensitive. There have been several meetings, including one between the PM and the Chinese head.” He added, “When it comes to verification patrolling, two rounds have already been completed, and both sides are quite satisfied with the process. For the grazing ground issue, they’ve now reached a mutual agreement.”
Speaking on the concept of a buffer zone, the army chief clarified, “There’s nothing called a buffer zone. Where there’s a potential for high violence and tensions can escalate quickly, some distance is maintained. During negotiations, some areas were declared as temporary moratorium zones. This means both sides will stay back and avoid those common areas because meeting there might lead to an escalation in violence.”
General Dwivedi emphasized the need for a new approach to trust-building. “We need to redefine trust levels. There’s a need for both sides to sit together, reach a broader understanding, and work on calming the situation and restoring trust.”
India and China have adhered to a 1996 agreement to avoid gunfire within 2km of the LAC and instead rely on non-lethal tactics like physical confrontations. While this approach minimises the risk of war, violent clashes such as the 2020 Galwan Valley incident are a reminder of the volatile nature of border standoffs.
The Way Forward
India and China completed disengagement at Depsang and Demchok in eastern Ladakh last October. As part of this process, both the Indian and Chinese armies withdrew their forward-deployed troops and equipment from the two flashpoints along the contested LAC. Temporary structures made during the military standoff, which began in May 2020, were also dismantled.
Disengagement refers to both countries stepping back to their respective positions as they were in 2020. Disengagement is just the first step. Initially, the situation is de-escalated, troops are disengaged and then forces are reduced to create a more peaceful environment where trust can be built gradually.
Earlier, troops from both the countries were present at the disputed areas along the border, especially at a bottleneck where their claimed lines cross over. However, this is difficult to achieve as Chinese authorities continue to issue new maps and construct infrastructure like dams, contributing to a tense situation.
Following disengagement, troops are no longer stationed at rifle distance from each other. This reduces chances of accidental firing, conflicts, or skirmishes that can snowball into violent clashes.
Although media reports suggest China is increasing its military strength, this has not been pursued aggressively at the border. Fact that China was diplomatically pressured into stepping back is a positive sign of India’s strategic approach to managing Chinese assertions.
Global Aspirations & Multilateralism
India has chosen to strengthen its regional and global position through various methods rather than rushing into an all-out war with China. It continues to strengthen economic ties while developing self-reliance. These cautious efforts are essential for maintaining India’s international image, which can be effectively leveraged in negotiations.
At a deeper level, India and China’s geopolitical aspirations are fundamentally at odds. India’s vision of itself as a leader in South Asia and a counterweight to Chinese influence clashes with China’s BRI and its strategic encirclement of India through projects like the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC).
Both countries emphasise on multilateralism in their foreign policy, but their approaches and strategies differ, reflecting national priorities. Beijing has consistently opposed New Delhi’s initiatives, such as membership in Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG) and reforms in the UNSC, to undermine India’s global standing. Additionally, it blocks India’s efforts to designate Pakistan-based terrorists as global threats.
Beijing’s dominance in global and regional organisations complicates New Delhi’s position. As a major contributor to UN peace and security initiatives, China wields significant financial and political influence. It leads platforms like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and plays a central role in BRICS and the Russia-India-China forum. These organisations often prioritise China’s interests, side-lining India and limiting its ability to shape the agenda. India’s participation is constrained by conflicting interests with other members, such as Pakistan and Russia who are increasingly aligned with Beijing.
The reliance on China-led organisations underscores India’s geopolitical limitations and highlights the need for independent, India-centric multilateral approach in organisations such as BIMSTEC.
Simultaneously, India should continue engaging with China-led organisations more as a strategic actor to safeguard its interests. India must push for reforms in global institutions, leveraging its growing economic capacity, while investing in defence to reduce dependence on foreign suppliers.
