IA) Political Developments: Pan-Regional and Global Issues
There was no positive movement towards a ceasefire in the Gaza conflict between Hamas militia and Israel Defence Force (IDF) and the sporadic fighting continued during the month with no let up in civilian casualties. Much of the military action was focused on the northern part of Gaza. During a visit to Gaza on Nov 19, Israeli Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu categorically ruled out Hamas ever ruling Gaza after the (ongoing) war. He also announced a $5 mn reward for information leading to the rescue of one of the Israeli hostages with Hamas, thought to be numbering around 101. On the other hand, Khaled al-Hayya, the acting leader of Hamas in Gaza declared the next day that there would be no exchange of hostages with Palestinians in Israeli jails unless the war ends. At the same time, the New York Times hinted on Nov 28 that Hamas may allow the IDF to temporarily stay on the Philadelphi Corridor along the border with Egypt which the government of Israel has vowed to not withdraw from. On the same day, the Guardian quoted an Israeli minister as saying that Israel would stay in Gaza for years and that several military structures were being created for that purpose. These included the east-west corridor in the middle belt of Gaza.
Gazans were particularly gloomy after Hezbollah agreed to a separate ceasefire with IDF in the Lebanon sector from Nov 27 as they feared this would allow IDF to deploy more resources in Gaza. By Nov 30, the number of deaths in Gaza during the hostilities rose to 44, 382. There was growing concern among the UN agencies as well as humanitarian NGOs about supplies of foodstuff and critical healthcare facilities and inputs during the highly unstable and insecure conditions.
A controversy arose in Gaza’s Islamic clergy as its top and most respected cleric Dr Salman al-Dayah issued a Fatwa on Nov 9 condemning the Hamas-PIJ attack on Oct 7 2023 as “violating Islamic principles governing jihad”. Later, on Nov 18, “a group of clerics” in Gaza defended the assault as a “legitimate act and a fulfilment of the duty of jihad, with no doubt about its legitimacy.” While appreciating Dr al-Dayah’s opinion they criticised its timing as “such consideration and placing of blame are not appropriate during the war; they should come afterwards, as it serves no purpose now and rather harms.”
For developments in the West Bank: Please see Palestine Authority and West Bank.
For details on the flare-up between Iran and Israel: Please see Iran.
For details on the Israel-Hezbollah tensions: Please see Lebanon.
For the Houthi missile attacks on Israel and the Red Sea area: Please see Yemen.
WANA and Multilateral Diplomacy:
Several WANA regional issues evoked multilateral diplomacy during the month, including the following:
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Israeli ban of UNRWA: Following the passage of a law in Knesset banning the UN Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA) from late January 2025, the Israeli government ended cooperation with it from Nov 4. On Nov 6, the UNRWA Chief conveyed to the UN General Assembly that the move would have “disastrous consequences” for the beneficiaries for which Israel alone would be responsible. He also held a “strategic meeting” with major donors on Nov 18.
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ICC’s Warrants against 2 Israeli and One Hamas high officials: Following nearly six months of suspended animation, the International Criminal Court decided on Nov 21 to issue arrest warrants against Israeli PM Benyamin Netanyahu, ex-Defence Minister Yoav Gallant and Hamas Military Chief Mohammed Misri for human rights violations during the Gaza conflict. Israel’s right-wing government described the decision as an antisemitic act and dismissed it out of hand. The development presented the Western world with a serious quandary: while the US sided with Israel, the UK and the EU were ambiguous and the G7 struggled to adopt a consensual position on the issue. The Arab and Islamic world welcomed it with Iran’s Supreme Leader saying that the Israeli PM should receive a death sentence instead. (Comment: Although Israel is not a signatory to the covenant establishing ICC, its statute applies universally. Palestine Authority is a signatory.)
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IAEA’s Fracas with Iran over the Nuclear Enrichment: Iran’s long-simmering contestation with the International Atomic Energy Agency over its violation of undertakings under the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) edged closer to boil. On Nov 21 the agency’s 35-member board of governors passed a resolution on Nov 21 by a 19-3 majority with 12 abstentions ordering Iran to urgently improve cooperation with the agency and requesting a “comprehensive” report aimed at pressuring Iran into fresh nuclear talks. This was the fourth time that IAEA BoG has censured Iran. In a move to avoid the adversarial resolution, Iran offered at the last minute to cap its amount of 60% enriched uranium but was rebuffed by the board. In retaliation to the IAEA censure, Iran announced on Nov 29 that it would induct 6000 new centrifuges into its enrichment programme. The showdown followed a visit to Iran by IAEA Director General Rafael Grossi visited Iran on Nov 14-15 to discuss the resolution of a multi-pronged standoff regarding the course of the Iranian nuclear programme. Among the contentious points are Iran’s uranium enrichment programme which has been producing 60% U235 – far above the limit of under 4% under the suspended JCPOA signed in 2015, but suspended by US President Trump in 2019. Iran has also not satisfactorily explained some aspects of its nuclear programme. Iranian Foreign Minister told the IAEA Chief that Iran was “willing to negotiate based on our national interest and inalienable rights, but not ready to negotiate under pressure and intimidation.” Grossi also visited two of Iran’s nuclear sites at Natanz and Fordow. (Comment: The logic of the developing stalemate predicates a strong possibility of snap-back of the economic sanctions on Iran in place before the signing of the JCPOA in 2015 early in Trump 2.0.)
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Allegations about IDF actions against UNIFIL Units: During Israel’s ground invasion of southern Lebanon, the UN authorities have repeatedly alleged IDF transgressing, even attacking the UNIFIL units deployed in the area putting the contingent’s troops in danger calling these “a violation of the international law.” Israel, in turn, has demanded the withdrawal of the UNIFIL from the combat zone. Some soldiers of the Lebanese army, non-belligerent in the ongoing combat, have also been fired upon and by Nov 20, 41 of its soldiers had been killed, mostly by IDF attacks.
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The US vetoed a UN Security Council draft resolution on Nov 20 as it did not specifically call for the release of the Israeli hostages. Following instances of looting of nearly 100 aid trucks in Gaza, on Nov 18 the UNSC issued a statement calling for a surge in assistance.
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It was disclosed on Nov 25 that out of 281 humanitarian workers killed during 2024 till date, 178 had been killed in Palestine and 25 in Sudan.
WANA and the United States:
The victory of Donald Trump in the US presidential election and the Republican Party’s strong performance in the Congressional elections on Nov 5 was received by WANA stakeholders along with their set proclivities of his previous term. While there was jubilation in Israel, GCC capitals, Egypt and Morocco, Iran, subject to “maximum pressure” in Trump 1.0, sought to project a stiff upper lip. Turkish President Erdogan promptly invited Trump for a visit to reset the bilateral relations. (Comment: President Trump’s monochromatic views on Israel and Iran and his transactional approach towards the GCC countries had an inherent contradiction with his isolationist rhetoric. A disastrous deal with the Taliban in his previous term is a case in point. He may also discover that the wars in Gaza and Lebanon have disrupted the Abraham Accord consensus crafted during Trump 1.0. Yet the appointments of pro-Israel personalities as Secretary of State, NSA, and Envoys to Israel and the Middle East hinted at continuity; Further Reading: “TRUMP2.0: Doubling Down or Back to Zero?” by Mahesh Sachdev, NDTV, October 21, 2024.)
Following a joint letter by the US Secretary of State and Defence to Israeli counterparts about the need for Israel to improve humanitarian access to the Gazans or face consequences, the State Department declared on Nov 13 that “Israel was not impeding assistance to Gaza”, thus letting the Jewish state off the hook.
On Nov 8, the US asked Qatar to expel the Hamas leadership present on its soil as they had not accepted the truce proposal to facilitate the release of Israeli hostages. On Nov 18, the US warned Turkey not to host the Hamas leadership and Ankara denied that Hamas political office had shifted from Qatar to Turkey.
A media report on Nov 27 said that the Biden administration was advancing the sale of $680 mn of arms sales to Israel apparently as a reward for a ceasefire with Hezbollah.
On Nov 1 the Defence Department announced deployment of B-52 bombers and warships in the WANA region as a part of redeployment in response to the Israel-Hamas war.
On Nov 8, the US authorities charged an Iranian national for plotting to assassinate Donald Trump. The Iranian government denied any involvement.
On Nov 2, a US court awarded $42 mn in damages to three Iraqi nationals for human rights abuses by a US military contractor at Abu Gharib detention centre in Iraq during the US occupation.
WANA and the European Union:
The EU Foreign Affairs Council session on Nov 18 turned down a European Commission proposal to suspend the political dialogue with Israel over possible human rights violations in the war in Gaza.
WANA and Russia:
In an interview with the Turkish daily Hurriyat on Nov 1, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov expressed unhappiness at Ankara’s arms supplies to Ukraine.
On Nov 18, Russia vetoed a resolution calling for a ceasefire in Sudan accusing the sponsors of double standards with the Gaza conflict.
IB) Political Developments
Israel:
Israel agreed to a 60-day conditional ceasefire with Hezbollah from Nov 27 brokered by the US and France on its northern front across Lebanon. The following excerpts from the speech to the nation by Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu on Nov 26 provide some perspective on the three reasons for this move:
“The first reason is to focus on the Iranian threat, and I won’t expand on that.
The second reason is to give our forces a breather and replenish stocks. And I say it openly, it is no secret that there have been big delays in weapons and munitions deliveries. These delays will be resolved soon. We will receive supplies of advanced weaponry that will keep our soldiers safe and give us more strike force to complete our mission.
And the third reason for having a ceasefire is to separate the fronts and isolate Hamas. From day two of the war, Hamas was counting on Hezbollah to fight by its side. With Hezbollah out of the picture, Hamas is left on its own. We will increase our pressure on Hamas and that will help us in our sacred mission of releasing our hostages.
Citizens of Israel,
In the past year, we turned the tables. We were attacked from seven fronts and we fought back with might. We are changing the face of the Middle East. We are doing all this thanks to our brave soldiers, thanks to your tenacity and thanks to the resolute and smart management of the war.
I have said many times: a good deal is a deal that is enforced, and we will enforce it.”
PM Netanyahu and the ruling coalition in Israel were unabashedly euphoric about the victory of Donald Trump in the US presidential elections on Nov 4 who was seen as pro-Israel even by the lopsided standards of US politics. Israeli PM lost no time in dismissing the very next day Defence Minister Yoav Gallant, citing a “crisis of trust.” Gallant, a popular and decorated general from within the Likud party, had been a thorn in Netanyahu’s side but enjoyed the support of the Biden administration. He was replaced by Israel Katz. Gideon Saar took Katz’s place as the new Foreign Minister.
PM Netanyahu’s legal troubles stacked up during the month. On Nov 21 the International Criminal Court issues an arrest warrant against him for crimes against humanity in Gaza. In addition, the domestic trial on three corruption charges was set to commence in early December, after being held up due to war-related preoccupations of the PM. On Nov 16, Pope added to these pressures by publicly calling for an international study into possible (Israeli) genocide in Gaza.
On Nov 9, Israel passed a law to deport relatives, including Israeli citizens, of attackers from the country. (Comment: It was intended mainly as a deterrent for non-Jewish Israeli citizens.)
On Nov 10, Israel announced that it would commence deploying the Arrow-3 anti-air missile system in Germany as a part of a $3.5 bn arms export deal, Israel’s biggest so far.
Israel signed a $5.2 bn deal with Boeing for 25 F-15 aircraft.
Security agencies discovered 9 cases of espionage for Iran involving 23 suspects, almost all of them Jews. Separately 5 persons from Israeli PMO and Defence Ministry were arrested on Nov 6 in connection with an alleged leak of classified documents from his office. These Hamas documents were leaked by the suspects to foreign papers to absolve PM Netanyahu from being blamed for the failure of the negotiations for a ceasefire paving to the release of Israeli hostages.
Palestine Authority and West Bank:
On Nov 28, Palestine Authority President Mahmoud Abbas, 89, named Rawhi Fattouh, 75-year old Chairman of the Palestine National Council, as his interim successor with the responsibility to hold election for the post within 90 days. Mr Abbas, who is also head of the Palestine Liberation Organisation and Fatah, has already announced Hussein al-Sheikh, current PLO Secretary General andMahmoud al-Aloul to succeed him in these capacities. (Comment: President Mahmoud Abbas has been in power since 2005, having succeeded Yassir Arafat. There have not been any elections for the PA since then. In a recent unofficial opinion poll, 89% of the Palestinians wanted him to resign holding him responsible for widespread corruption, misgovernance and submission to Israeli dictates. However, many regional and foreign stakeholders prefer him as the lesser evil to a Hamas takeover.)
On Nov 2, Egypt hosted a meeting in Cairo between representatives of Fatah and Hamas to discuss forming a committee to manage Gaza’s post-war governance.
Lebanon:
Following a two-month-long Israeli multi-pronged and no-holds-barred onslaught against Lebanon’s Hezbollah militia, a 60-day ceasefire brokered by the US and France took effect from 0400 hrs local time on Nov 27 across the blue line and in accordance with UNSCR 1701 of 2006. Over the next 60 days, the IDF would gradually withdraw to the international border while the Lebanese army and the UNIFIL would be deployed between the border and the Litany River roughly 30 kms up north. Hezbollah would vacate its position in the area and would not reoccupy it. One of the contentious points of the ceasefire deal was Israel’s insistence that the IDF would continue to strike Hezbollah if it identified threats to its security, including transfers of weapons and military equipment to the group. This was rejected by the Lebanese government as a violation of its sovereignty. A pre-existing tripartite ceasefire monitoring mechanism between the UNIFIL, the Lebanese army and the Israeli army would be expanded to include the US and France, with the US chairing the group. On Nov 29, in his first comment after the ceasefire, Hezbollah chief Naim Qassem said that the militia would coordinate with the Lebanese army to implement to truce.
The hostilities escalated in the run-up to the ceasefire as IDF sought to destroy Hezbollah’s war-waging capacity and supply logistics via Syria. Hezbollah, in turn, retaliated by firing missiles at Israeli targets. In the penultimate hours before the ceasefire, the IDF attacked 3 Lebanon-Syria border crossings in the north as well as Hezbollah’s strategic missile-making and storage facility straddling the border. On Nov 29, IDF warned the Lebanese against early return of residents to 60 villages in the border zone. (Comment: Although both Hezbollah and IDF were economic about their precise losses, observers believe that 14-month-long hostilities caused serious harm to both sides. Hezbollah is thought to have suffered 4000 deaths among its fighters (10 times the 2006 losses), including several top-flight commanders assassinated, mostly after pager blasts on September 17. It also suffered huge infrastructure damage from extensive air and rocket attacks on its strongholds in Beirut’s Dahiya suburb and Baalbek. Israel, on the other hand, had 76 soldiers killed, of which 45 died in Lebanon and the rest in Israel. It also lost 45 civilians. Over 60,000 Israelis and 1.1 mn Lebanese living in border areas were displaced. While it may be too early to analyse this round of the Hezbollah-Israel war, among the short-term takeaways was IDF being able to re-establish its element of surprise, technological superiority and theatre dominance to prevent Hezbollah from deploying its full war-making capacity. While initially insisting upon a simultaneous ceasefire in Gaza, pulverised Hezbollah had to give up that condition. Most observers believe that Hezbollah’s post-war recovery would need time as its energies would be also devoted to resettling its sympathisers and war victims.)
Lebanese officially counted 3961 as killed and 16520 injured by Israeli actions as of Nov 29. In a report published on Nov 14, the World Bank put the losses for Lebanon from the ongoing conflict between Israel and Hezbollah at $8.5 bn in damage and losses. The analysis projects Lebanon’s real GDP will contract by at least 5.7% in 2024 due to the conflict compared to a 0.9% growth in a scenario without the conflict. Housing is the sector with the most reported damage, estimated at $2.8 bn, with over 99,000 housing units partially or fully damaged. Relevant to add that the Lebanese economy has already been facing strong headwinds since 2019.
Ali Larijani, a senior Iranian official visited Beirut on Nov 15 to meet Lebanese PM Najib Mikati and other officials as well as Hezbollah leadership. He articulated Iran’s support for an early end to Israel-Hezbollah fighting saying “We support in all circumstances the Lebanese government.” (Comment: Larijani’s visit seems aimed at putting a brave front at Iran and Hezbollah’s recent setbacks and claim continuing relevance in Lebanon’s evolving politico-strategic space.)
On Nov 6, Lebanon officially filed a complaint against Israel at the International Labour Organisation (ILO) over pager attacks in September. It chose ILO as a forum for such action as the victims were harmed during the usage of the devices while working.
Iran:
The Iranian leadership projected an image of strength and nonchalance in the face of an ever-expanding string of adversities such as the re-election of hardline Donald Trump as the next US president, passage of an anti-Iran resolution in IAEA, defeat of proxies such as Hamas and Hezbollah and tottering of al-Assad regime in Syria. Thus, in a speech to the Council of Experts on Nov 7, Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei claimed that the continued resistance by Hamas and Hezbollah meant a defeat for Israel. After the leadership initially minimised the significance of Trump’s victory, President Masoud Pezeshkian admitted on Nov 12 that Iran would have to deal with Washington under the Trump Presidency. On Nov 14, the New York Times claimed that the Iranian ambassador to the UN had met Elon Musk, the world’s richest man and a right-hand man to the President-elect. This meeting was officially denied by the Iranian Foreign Minister.
Similarly, following the second Israeli air attack on Iran, Kamal Kharrazi, an adviser to Iran’s supreme leader, said on Nov 1 that Tehran is likely to increase the range of its ballistic missiles and possibly review its nuclear doctrine.
The Director General of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) Rafael Grossi visited Iran on Nov 14-15 to discuss the resolution of a multi-pronged standoff regarding the course of the Iranian nuclear programme. Among the contentious points are Iran’s uranium enrichment programme which has been producing 60% U235 – far above the limit of under 4% under the suspended JCPOA signed in 2015, but suspended by US President Trump in 2019. Iranian Foreign Minister told the IAEA Chief that Iran was “willing to negotiate based on our national interest and in alienable rights, but not ready to negotiate under pressure and intimidation. “Grossi also visited two of Iran’s nuclear sites at Natanz and Fordow. Based on his report, the 35-member IAEA Board of Governors passed a resolution on Nov 21 by a 19-3 majority with 12 abstentions ordering Iran to urgently improve cooperation with the agency and requesting a “comprehensive” report aimed at pressuring Iran into fresh nuclear talks. In a move to avoid the fourth censure by the IAEA, Iran offered at the last minute to cap its amount of 60% enriched uranium but was rebuffed by the board. In retaliation to the IAEA censure, Iran announced on Nov 29 that it would induct 6000 new centrifuges into its enrichment programme. (Comment: The logic of the developing stalemate predicates a strong possibility of snap-back of the economic sanctions on Iran in place before the signing of the JCPOA in 2015early in Trump 2.0.)
On Nov 19 Iran strongly criticised the EU and the UK for imposing maritime and airline-related sanctions on Iran for supplying UAVs and missiles to Russia –an act Tehran denies calling them “fake claims.” On Nov 28, Iran also called a similar accusation by G7 as “baseless.”
On Nov 10, the chief of staff of Saudi Arabia’s armed forces visited Tehran to meet with his Iranian counterpart and discuss bilateral defence ties. (Comment: Through this unprecedented move, Riyadh hope to avoid being sucked into any future conflagration involving Iran on one hand and Israel and Trump administration on the other.)
Three persons were sentenced to death on Nov 6 for their involvement in the assassination of Iranian nuclear scientist Mohsen Fakhrizadeh in Nov 2020.
Yemen:
On Nov 10 the US and Britain launched 9 air raids on the Yemeni capital Sanaa, the Amran governorate and other areas. Two days later on Nov 12, al-Houthis claimed to have retaliated by targeting two US warships which American sources said were thwarted without any harm being inflicted.
According to a UN report published on Nov 02, Yemen’s al-Houthi rebels are transforming themselves into a “powerful military organization” due to “unprecedented” military support from outside sources, particularly Iran and Hezbollah. The report says the Houthis have carried out a vast recruitment project, resulting in a force that numbered 350,000 in mid-2024, as compared with 220,000 in 2022.
Turkey:
On Nov 2-3, a meeting of the foreign ministers of Turkey and 14 African countries took place in Djibouti to discuss boosting the bilateral ties. (Comment: Turkey has been moving energetically to boost its ties with African countries a drive spearheaded by President Erdogan himself who has visited more than 31 countries in the black continent. It has opened embassies in 44 out of 54 African countries and established joint Business Councils with 45 African countries. Over $77 bn worth of civil construction contracts have so far been executed by Turkish companies in Africa and the annual bilateral trade has risen to $36 bn. Turkish Airlines flies to 39 destinations in Africa and over 15000 African students have studied in Turkey. Turkey has also been willing to supply military equipment, such as drones, to African countries.)
On Nov 8 Foreign Ministers of Turkey and Greece met in Athens to discuss ways to improve bilateral ties which have often been contentious, mainly due to the Cyprus divide and the Aegean Sea demarcation of their common border.
Turkish Trade Minister disclosed on Nov 14 that the BRICS organisation had offered Partner Country Status to Turkey, which would be the first for a NATO member.
On Nov 1, the federal government dismissed pro-Kurdish mayors in three southeastern cities.
Sudan:
A report by the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine’s Sudan Research Group released on Nov 13 estimated that more than 60,000 people had died in the Khartoum region alone during the first 14 months of the Sudanese war. Of the victims, 26,000 people died as a direct result of the violence and the rest fell to starvation and disease. (Comment: If correct, these estimates would scale up the total human losses far higher than the otherwise estimated 20,000 deaths for the entire country by the UN. Relevant to note that sporadic but sketchy reports of mass killings in the Darfur region have appeared frequently during the war period.)
On Nov 9, the UN Security Council sanctioned two generals of the Rapid Support Force with travel bans and asset freeze. They were accused of destabilising the country through violence and human rights abuses.
Syria:
Hours after the IDF-Hezbollah ceasefire took effect on Nov 27, a rebel militia coalition led by Hi’yat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS, or Syria Liberation Organisation) launched “Operation Repelling the Aggression”, a concerted attack from their Idlib exclusion zone against the government forces defending Aleppo, Syria’s second-largest city. The attack took the defenders by surprise and despite air raids by Syrian and Russian planes, the attackers were able to occupy Aleppo by Nov 30 and threaten Hama, a city on the road to the capital Damascus. The lightening rebel attack shattered the Syrian ceasefire since May 2020 leading to a sudden collapse of the government forces which had expelled rebels from Aleppo 8 years ago. Unconfirmed reports spoke of President Bashar al-Assad making an unannounced air dash to Moscow to seek Russian intervention. On Nov 29, the Iranian foreign minister described the rebel offensive as “part of an Israeli-US plot to destabilise the region.” Jordan and the UAE also reportedly expressed solidarity with the Syrian government. (Comment: The rebel militias’ success was mainly due to the forces of external backers of the al-Assad regime, viz. Russia, Iran and Hezbollah are preoccupied in their respective engagements. Moreover, while the conscripted Syrian forces were more numerous, these were hollowed out by rampant corruption and overconfidence. Moreover, these were also fatigued after 13 years of civil war. On the other hand, HTS had tried to re-invent itself away from its former Avatar of Jabhat al-Nusra, formally allied with al-Qaeda and Islamic State. Further Reading: “An Endgame in Syria” Mahesh Sachdev, Dec 7, NDTV; and “Syrian rebels’ advance breaks war’s fragile stalemate” FT, Nov 30.)
Israeli air and missile attacks on Syria targeting Hezbollah and Iranian military and logistics assets continued during the month. The main attacks were: in Palmyra (Nov 20, 36 dead), Sayeda Zainab suburb of Damascus (Nov 10, 7 killed) and Homs-Damascus highway disrupted on Nov 11. In addition, Israelis also attacked Syria-Lebanon border crossings in the north hours before the ceasefire was put into effect on Nov 27.
Iraq:
A national census was conducted on Nov 20 in Iraq, the first such exercise since 1987. Preliminary results announced on Nov 25 put the country’s population at 45.4 mn.
On Nov 6 Iraqi National Security Council denied Israel-linked media reports about Iran using Iraqi territory to launch an attack on Israel.
On Nov 17, Islamic State took responsibility for a bomb attack that killed 3 Iraqi soldiers north of Baghdad.
Iraq and the UK signed an agreement on Nov 28 aimed at curbing people smuggling.
Saudi Arabia:
The Kingdom hosted the second Arab League – Organisation of Islamic Cooperation summit in Riyadh on Nov 11-13. In his inaugural speech, Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman condemned the Israeli massacre of Palestinians and Lebanese people urged Israel “to refrain from any further act of aggression” and called on countries around the world to recognise Palestinian statehood. The head of state-level participation this time was much smaller than the first summit a year ago with the Presidents of Palestine, Turkey and Nigeria, the VP of Iran and the PMs of Lebanon and Pakistan as prominent participants. The Summit’s closing statement “condemns in the strongest terms” the Israeli army’s actions “in the context of the crime of genocide … especially in the northern Gaza Strip during the past weeks”, citing torture, executions, disappearances and “ethnic cleansing”. It also condemned attempts to cement Israel’s grip on Israeli-occupied East Jerusalem, calling it the “eternal capital” of the Palestinian territories, and called for the unification of the Israeli-occupied West Bank, the Gaza Strip and east Jerusalem under a Palestinian state. Nigerian media reported that during his bilateral meeting with MbS, President Tinubu sought a $5bn Saudi deposit as a trade facility to help tidy over an acute forex crisis.
Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman cancelled his participation in the G20 summit at Rio de Janeiro due to his ear condition that prevents him from travelling long distances by air.
World Investment Conference was held in Riyadh on Nov 25 to help Saudi Arabia garner $100 bn in FDI for its Vision 2030 programme.
The Western media indicated that Saudi Arabia had abandoned the pursuit of a defence treaty with the United States opting instead for a more modest military pact. (Comment: Following Chinese brokered rapprochement between Iran and Saudi Arabia in 2023, the Biden Administration had proposed a counter-strategy centred on revitalising Riyadh-Washington ties through an ambitious bilateral defence treaty in return for Saudi recognition of Israel. However, the Oct 7 Hamas attack on Israel and resultant bloodletting in Gaza paid to this move as Riyadh insisted on a two-state solution to the Palestine issue as a predecessor to its recognition of the Jewish state. Further, as Biden stepped out of his second term bid, he lost interest in the pursuit of such a grand bargain to showcase his foreign policy success. Further Reading: Saudi Arabia abandons pursuit of US defence treaty over Israel stalemate, Reuters, Nov 29; and “How Saudi Leader Mohammed bin Salman is Becoming More Strategic”, Bloomberg, Nov 22.)
Media reports indicated that Saudi Arabia led a group of oil-producing countries at Baku CoP29 to successfully avoid reiterating “the commitment to transition away from fossil fuels” adopted at the preceding gathering in the UAE.
As part of the Saudi drive to attract major sporting events, the players’ auctions for the Indian Professional League for T20 cricket were held in Jeddah on Nov 24-25 for the first time. Saudi Aramco and Visit Saudi were the main official sponsors for the event. The top two players at the auctions were Rishabh Pant and Shreyas Iyer with bids of $3.2 mn and $3.17 mn respectively. (Comment: Saudi IPL foray seems motivated more as a concerted drive to use petro dollars to become the centre of the world’s most popular sports and sportwashed re-branding of the Kingdom. While cricket is relatively unknown among Saudis, there are 13 mn South Asian expatriates in the Kingdom many of whom are devoted to the game.)
On Nov 27, Vedanta Group of NRI tycoon Anil Agrawal announced its decision to invest $2 bn in copper smelting and refining projects in Saudi Arabia with an annual capacity of 400,000 tons.
The United Arab Emirates:
On Nov 24, the UAE police announced the arrest of three Uzbeks suspected of killing a Jewish Rabbi of Israel-Moldavian nationality in Dubai. They were held in Turkey and were extradited to the UAE. (Comment: The incident forced attention to the two concealed undercurrents: the presence of a significant Israeli community in the UAE estimated to number several thousand, and popular anger at Israeli aggression in Gaza and Lebanon.)
On Nov 7 the UAE pledged to cut its 2019 level of emissions by 47% by 2035. (Comment: The Nationally Determined Contribution made through this declaration during the last week of the UAE’s Cop28 Presidency was largely a “greenwashing” exercise as it did not take into account the $17 bn worth of projects awarded to increase the export of hydrocarbons. Besides, the UAE has very high per capita annual CO2 emission, over 22 tons, as compared to less than 2 tons for an Indian.)
On Nov 22, Dubai made hotel booking and return air ticket mandatory prerequisites for a tourist visa.
Jordan:
On Nov 18, King Abdullah bin Hussein inaugurated the first session of the new parliament following elections held in September resulting in a much larger Islamist presence in the House.
On Nov 24, police shot dead a lone gunman near the Israeli embassy in Amman. Three policemen were injured in the encounter.
Algeria:
On Nov 13, the Algerian parliament approved the national budget for 2025 providing for, inter alia, a 16% increase in the country’s defence budget to $25.1 bn, among the highest in the Arab world. (Comment: Algerian armed forces have traditionally been the source of political power in the country. The budgetary hike was partly a quid pro quo for the armed forces role in getting President Tebboune re-elected and partly because Algeria currently faces several geo-strategic challenges such as rivalry with Morocco over Western Sahara, Islamic militancy both at home and in Maghreb and Sahel, unrest in Tunisia, Libya and Sudan.)
Qatar:
On Nov 12, Emir Tamim bin Hamad Al-Thani reshuffled the top echelons of his government. Among the notable new appointees were Deputy PM and Defence Minister, Ministers of commerce and industry, education and health. He also appointed a new head of Qatar Investment Authority, a $510 bn SWF.
On Nov 6, a national referendum was approved by 90.6% of the voters. Counterintuitively, it was meant to seek popular endorsement for all members of the Majlis al-Shoura to be appointed by the Emir. (Comment: In 2021, Qatar’s first legislative elections to elect two-thirds of Majlis al-Shoura members proved to be controversial with members of a prominent Bedouin tribe al-Murrah finding themselves ineligible to vote in the poll. This referendum restores the status quo ante and provides for all members of the Majlis to be nominated by the Emir. The Majlis has legislative authority and approves general state policies and the budget, but has no say in the setting of defence, security, economic and investment policy, which remain the prerogative of the executive led by the Emir.)
On Nov 9, Qatar announced that it was “stalling” its mediation for a ceasefire in Gaza until Hamas and Israel showed “willingness and seriousness.” On Nov 19, the foreign ministry cryptically stated that the Hamas office in Qatar “has not been permanently closed” as pressed by Israel and the US.
On Nov 30, A FIFA Sub-Committee on Human Rights & Social Responsibility reported on Qatar’s 2022 World Cup legacy. It said soccer’s world governing body has a responsibility to compensate migrant workers but the organisation has not acted on a recommendation to do that by using its $50 mn legacy fund for this purpose.
II) Economic Developments
Oil & Gas Related Developments:
Global Issues:
The Brent for December delivery on Nov 29 was at $72.95/barrel having declined 0.2% during the month. Its range-bound performance during the month was contributed by several factors of which the main were: (i) Slight oversupply in the global market despite OPEC+ further postponing, on Nov 3, its proposal to gradually unwind voluntary production cuts by 8 member countries to the beginning of 2025. (ii) Improved geo-political stability in the WANA region as the conflicts in Gaza and Lebanon de-escalated and Israeli air-attacks on Iran excluded oil installations; (iii) Continued decline of oil demand for the seventh month running in China, the world’s largest importer, due to economic woes, despite economic stimulus, and consumer preference for the EVs, comprising of over half of the total cars sold since July 2024. In the same vein, Norway, Western Europe’s largest oil producer, announced on Nov 28 that by the end of 2025, all cars sold in the country would be EVs.
Most observers, nevertheless saw oil prices under pressure for the foreseeable future: IEA monthly bulletin issued on Nov 14 predicted that the global oil market would be oversupplied by 1 mbpd in 2025, even without OPEC+ unwinding its voluntary production cuts. It assessed that the growth in China’s crude demand in 2024 would be only a tenth of growth in 2023. In its monthly bulletin a day earlier, the OPEC, too, cut its assessment of growth in global oil demand: accordingly, it now expects the world’s oil demand to grow by 1.82 mbpd in 2024 and 1.54 mbpd in 2025. These were the fourth consecutive monthly reductions by OPEC, which has long predicted robust growth in oil demand and dismissed the concept of peak demand.
One of the main reasons for the oil glut was overproduction by several OPEC+countries including Iraq, UAE (which has pushed for higher quotas) and Iran (whose production and exports are shrouded in secrecy). More ominously, Several OPEC+ countries, such as Iraq, Iran, the UAE and Kazakhstan, each have multi-billion dollar projects to boost their respective crude capacity which is scheduled to come online over the next few years. There demand for greater market access would collide with the need for greater discipline in light of stagnant global demand. Non-OPEC+ production has been rising significantly in the US (which reached a new record of 13.4 mbpd in Oct 2024) Brazil, Guyana, etc.)
Country Specific Developments:
Saudi crude exports to China fell 10.8% to 59.52 million metric tons (1.58 million barrels per day) in the first nine months this year from the same period a year ago, Chinese customs data showed. The decline is likely to continue at least till December 2024 despite Saudi Aramco having reduced its oil price for the Asian market on Nov 11. Saudi Arabia is the world’s largest exporter of crude and China is the world’s largest importer so their crude trade dynamic has a global significance.
On Nov 5, the Iraqi government asked the Kurdistan Regional Government to transfer all its oil output to the State Organisation for Marketing Oil (SOMO). As a quid pro quo, the Iraqi cabinet approved a budget measure to compensate the Kurdish government for production and transport costs and set a $16 per barrel rate for foreign oil companies operating in Iraqi Kurdistan. The move was presented as a necessary pre-requisite for restarting the crude export from Iraqi Kurdistan by a Turkish pipeline shut for nearly two years following an international arbitration court decision. It was however unclear if KRG and the concerned foreign oil companies would comply with Baghdad’s order.
On Nov 4 Iran approved a plan to increase oil production by 250,000 bpd. Iran’s current production and exports are estimated at 3.2 mbpd and 1.5 mbpd respectively. Most Iranian crude exports head to China, but are camouflaged to avoid running afoul of the US sanctions on Iranian oil exports. (Further Reading: “Inside China, Iran’s Illicit Oil Trade Hub Off Malaysia, Singapore Coasts”, Bloomberg, Nov 20.)
On Nov 11, Adnoc Gas Plc, a unit of ADNOC, decided to raise its capex plan to about $15 bn over the next five years from about $13 bn earlier. It’s expanding processing capacity at home by taking control of a coastal LNG plant from its parent company once construction is completed to augment export capacity. On Nov 6, ADNOC signed a deal with a German company to supply 1 mn MT of LNG annually for 15 years. On Nov 7, ADNOC Logistics & Services signed contracts worth $4.4 bn with Korean and Chinese companies to build 23supertankers for ethane, ammonia and LNG. (Comment: The UAE, which is currently a gas importer, has launched a vigorous plan to boost its gas production and become an exporter of the commodity, regarded as a cleaner fuel without any climatic or OPEC-related restrictions.)
Following economy-related development took place in WANA countries:
Regional Economic Developments
The WANA economic circles reacted to the news of Donald Trump’s victory in the US presidential elections on Nov 5 in a mixed manner. While they rejoiced at the prospects of peace in the region boosting economies, they were also scared by his “drill, baby, drill” slogan permitting the American oil industry, already the world’s biggest hydrocarbon producer, to inundate a stagnating market and depress the price.
Economic Developments in Individual WANA Countries:
On Nov 26, the Saudi Finance Minister announced the national budget for 2025. It provided for a total expenditure of 1.285 tr riyals, Total revenue is forecast at 1.184 tr riyals leaving a fiscal deficit of SR 101 bn or 2.3% of the GDP. The kingdom’s total public debt is projected to reach 1.3 tr riyals in 2025, staying just below 30% of GDP. The economy is expected to return to growth (~1.3%) this year after contracting in 2023, with the government projecting GDP growth of 0.8% in 2024 before accelerating sharply next year to 4.6% due to healthy performance of the non-hydrocarbon sector which is now over half of the GDP. While overall revenue next year is forecast to decline about 4% from 2024 estimates, some non-official estimates project that 2025 oil revenue could be about 10% lower than in 2024. Saudi authorities have increasingly indicated that spending on some of the ambitious giga-projects in Vision 2030 would be curbed because of the reduced oil revenues. To mitigate the reduction of revenue, the Public Investment Fund, the Kingdom’s SWF, would increasingly invest in the domestic economy and reduce its foreign portfolio from 30% of the corpus to 18%. It would co-invest in domestic projects together with foreign investors. In a significant move, the head of the $500 bn NEOM project was replaced on Nov 12 partly because some performance goals were not met. Moody’s upgraded Saudi Arabia’s rating to”Aa3″ from “A1” on Nov 22, citing the country’s efforts to diversify beyond its oil economy. This was the first upgrade of the Saudi rating by the agency since 2016. Paradoxically, however, it also revised the country’s outlook downwards to stable from positive, citing uncertainty regarding global economic conditions and oil market developments. The month witnessed an IPO boom in Saudi Arabia and the UAE. For instance, on Nov 12 investors put in $34.8 bn of bids for the initial public offering of a Saudi Arabian financial services firm covering the original offer132 times.
The total market capitalisation of the UAE bourses exceeded $1 tr for the first time on Nov 17. While the Talabat $1.5 bn IPO sold out within minutes, the LuLu mall’s IPO lost ground by 2.5% on its debut on Nov 14.
After its monthly meeting on Nov 21, Turkey’s Central Bank decided to continue with the existing bank rate of 50% because the annual inflation declined only marginally to 48.6% in the last month. TCB revised its expectation of inflation remaining at 44% by the year’s end, ruling out any rate cut. On Nov 1, Standard and Poor’s rating agency raised Turkey’s long-term sovereign credit ratings to “BB-” from “B+”. It also revised Turkey’s outlook to “stable” from “positive”. It was the second upgrade this year for the Turkish economy by the agency. However, most observers expected the Turkish economy to enter recession, for the first time since the pandemic with GDP declining by an annual rate of 0.2% during each of Q2/24 and Q3/24. (Comment: Rating upgrades for an economy technically in a recession, shows that the rating agencies have often a logic at odds with common sense!)
On Nov 5, the IMF began a review of Egypt’s $8 bn loan programme, a process that could unlock further funding of $1.2 bn. On Nov 20, the IMF said it made “substantial progress” in discussions with Egypt on the latest review, although further talks were needed. On Nov 1 Fitch upgraded Egypt to B from B-. It also put Egypt’s economic outlook as stable. It was the first upgrade for Egypt by the agency since 2019.
On Nov 14, Kuwait suddenly replaced the head of the Kuwait Investment Authority a year before his four-year term was to end. The sacking indicated dissatisfaction at the performance of the trillion-dollar SWF, the world’s first and still among the largest, as it has underperformed its southern Gulf peers.
III) Bilateral Developments
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On Nov 18, the President of India Smt Droupadi Murmu received the credentials of Mr Yousef Mustafa Ali Abdel Ghani, Ambassador of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and Mr Kamel Zayed Kamel Galal, Ambassador of the Arab Republic of Egypt.
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On Nov 9, Minister of Petroleum and Natural Gas Shri H. S. Puri said that without oil imports from Russia, by India, the world’s third-largest importer, the crude prices would have rocketed.
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Minister of State for Health Smt Anupriya Singh Patel visited Jeddah on Nov 16 for a global conference on antimicrobial resistance.
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A report on Nov 27 in Economic Times mentioned that the Ratnagiri Refinery projected, mooted as the world’s largest but facing local resistance on land acquisition, is likely to be replaced by two refineries of 10-15 mn MT each located near the coast in Gujarat and Andhra Pradesh with ONGC and BPCL as the main promoters. Saudi Aramco would partner with both, the report indicated.
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Indian-origin UAE-based billionaire Yousuf Ali’s LuLu Group’s $1.7 bn IPO was offered on Nov 9 and was fully subscribed. With assets estimated at $7.1 bn, Yousuf Ali is the UAE’s second richest private individual. However, the debut of the shares in the market was somewhat disappointing as these quickly lost value.
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According to the state-level bankers’ committee report, the size of NRI deposits to Kerala grew 11% year-on-year at the end of June to Rs 2.74 lakh crore from Rs 2.47 lakh crore a year back. Every household in the state, on average, received an estimated Rs 2.2 lakh a year. This huge inflow results in scrimmage among the commercial banks for the NRI deposits.
