While the global attention is currently riveted on the war being waged by Israel and the United States against Iran, the Middle East is also facing an equally vicious, no-holds-barred conflict between the Israeli Defence Force (IDF) and the Hezbollah militia of Lebanon. While the second conflict is seen by some as a corollary of the first, it has its own drivers. It is, arguably, as consequential and even “existential” for both: Lebanon’s faltering socio-political recovery and Israel’s exit from nearly two and a half years of “endless wars” depend on its outcome. Israel and the US are physically removed from Iran, but Lebanon and Israel are neighbours with a 120 kms long common border. Moreover, for relatively small countries like Lebanon and Israel, the human and material costs of the conflict are proportionately higher than those of Iran, which is ten times more populous than Israel. Consequently, the hostilities between the IDF and the Hezbollah militia merit being studied in their own right.
- Brief Historic Context:
1.1 Lebanon has been a civilisational melting pot throughout its history. In ancient times, it acted as a point of transit for trade between Asia and the Roman Empire. In the medieval era, Lebanon was a battlefield during centuries of crusades between the armies of European Christian states and Muslims under the Ottoman Empire. After the First World War, Ottoman rule ended, and Lebanon and Syria were mandated to France. When Lebanon gained independence in 1943, its political structure was based on confessional lines, ensuring balanced and inclusive participation by all major ethnic groups. Thus, the President of the Republic was to be a Maronite Christian, the Prime Minister from Sunni Muslims and the Speaker of the National Assembly from the Shia community. However, the system was hobbled by inner contradictions. The arrival of a large number of Palestinian refugees from Israel, with southern Beirut serving as the headquarters of the Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) under redoubtable Chairman Yasser Arafat, created a state within the state. Moreover, the Syrian regimes and Israel next door continued to meddle in Lebanon. These led to a civil war in 1975, pitting the Phalangist Christian Forces against the Sunni Muslims, aided by the Palestinian militia. In 1982, Israel waded into the conflict, laying a siege on Beirut until the PLO and its Chairman Arafat were expelled from Lebanon to Tunisia. An agreement in Taif (Saudi Arabia) in 1989 facilitated the end of the civil war, even though the confessional arrangements of power sharing remained largely intact.
1.2 Taking advantage of the Israeli assault of 1982, Iran deployed its Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) to Lebanon to militarise Lebanon’s Shia community, mostly living in the southern part of the country, facing frequent Israeli aggression/retaliation across the common border. Despite being the largest ethnic group in the country due to their higher birth rate, they were on the political and economic margins. Thus, Hezbollah was born, initially as an ethnic service organisation, but with Iranian and Syrian assistance, quickly transformed into a potent militia with a muscular role in Lebanese civil strife, taking the space of the erstwhile Palestinian state within state. By the turn of the century, it had become the largest and most powerful militia in Lebanon, much bigger than the Lebanese army. In 2000, pained by men and material losses due to Hezbollah fighters’ guerrilla campaign, the IDF decided to withdraw from the buffer zone it had created in Lebanon. In 2006, Hezbollah had a 35-day-long and intense war with the IDF. While conflict remains inconclusive, tenacious Hezbollah fighters inflicted 160 deaths among Israelis, a soberingly high number for that country. 1191 Lebanese also died. Since then, Israel has counted Hezbollah as the most powerful militia on its border. Hezbollah gained confidence from having stood up to the mighty IDF and began organising itself along lines of a regular army with the IRGC’s guidance. Domestically, too, Hezbollah’s muscle power collectivised the Shia community’s political clout under its charismatic leader, Syed Hassan Nasrallah, leading to a greater role for the erstwhile neglected community. They progressively became a major determinant of the direction of national politics. During the Arab Spring, Hezbollah tried to “help” fellow Shia communities in Bahrain and Kuwait, alarming the Sunni-led Gulf monarchies, who increasingly saw the militia as an adversarial fifth column of Iran in the Arab world. They pressed the Lebanese authorities to rein in Hezbollah, but by then the latter was out of Beirut’s control. On the other hand, when Syria’s al-Alawi regime faced an existential crisis over the Arab Spring turning into a civil war during 2011-2024, Damascus depended on Hezbollah fighters for its survival.
1.3 After a relatively long pause, the politico-strategic stability of the Levant subregion was jolted on October 7 2023 by a Hamas attack on Israel, which unleashed a ferocious Israeli assault on Gaza. Hezbollah joined the fray by launching missile and artillery attacks on northern and central Israel. Both sides seem to have internalised the lessons of previous conflicts: while Hezbollah had augmented its strategic infrastructure, particularly its missile force, underground fortifications, etc., Israel focused on gathering better intelligence on its foe, which gave it an edge. It launched innovative operations through the exploding pagers and walkie-talkie networks, which Hezbollah relied upon, with devastating impact. Moreover, it conducted surgical airstrikes to decapitate Hezbollah leadership, including its iconic head Nasrallah. While Hezbollah missile and artillery attacks displaced a large number of Israelis from northern and central areas, the impact on Israel was relatively marginal. By the time a US-brokered ceasefire was put in place in November 2024, Hezbollah was largely on the defensive[i]. Its misery was compounded by the swift fall of the Bashar al-Assad regime in Syria, with which it had a symbiotic relationship. The coming of a Sunni-dominated regime in Damascus also broke the Syria-Iraq land bridge connecting Hezbollah with its mentors in Iran. Though the 12-day conflict between Iran and Israel, and the US in June 2025 was essentially inconclusive, it left Tehran licking its wounds and less willing or able to resurrect Hezbollah’s military machine. Significantly, Hezbollah did not activate any military action against Israel during this conflict.
1.4 Downsizing Hezbollah’s military muscle had a concomitant impact on the Lebanese political impasse, long dominated by the old guard politicians long beyond their shelf life. The popular agitation against currency meltdown and resulting cost-of-living crisis in 2019-21 had had some impact; the parliamentary elections held in 2022 introduced a large number of independent members to the Parliament, disrupting the cosy gerontocracy as well as the virtual veto that the political wing of Hezbollah and its cohorts enjoyed over major parliamentary decisions. While Hezbollah retained its seats, its coalition partners suffered setbacks. As an outcome, Lebanon was finally able to elect a President in January 2025 (after a gap of two years) and had a regular Prime Minister next month, replacing a caretaker PM. The growing political stability and growing Western pressure spurred the demand for disarmament of the various militias, with Hezbollah being the biggest among them. Hezbollah’s leadership sought to deflect this demand by proffering the usual ruse of the need to resist the Israeli military aggression, although the deaths and devastation suffered by the Lebanese in the IDF-Hezbollah conflict cut the argument both ways. Till now, Hezbollah has not shown a proclivity towards giving up arms, and the Lebanese armed forces do not have the requisite strength to force it to do so. Meanwhile, with Israel and the US menacing Tehran afresh, the Iranian IRGC sought to strengthen its coordination with Hezbollah to open a common front against the IDF.
- The Current IDF-Hezbollah Conflict:
Against this brief historic backdrop, Israel and the United States launched their second military campaign against Iran on February 28. Its first salvo was a targeted assassination of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, the Supreme Leader of Iran. Shocked by this act, Hezbollah commenced drone, missile and artillery attacks on Israel two days later, on March 2. IDF, in turn, retaliated by air and artillery attacks centred on Hezbollah positions in south Lebanon and the southern suburbs of Beirut. Subsequently, an infantry push into southern Lebanon was made with the declared aim of creating a buffer zone to prevent attacks on northern Israeli settlements. The Israeli Defence Minister has stated that this zone shall be maintained till peace for northern Israel can be guaranteed. Following his visit to the IDF Northern Command on March 29, Prime Minister Netanyahu ordered the expansion of military operations to thwart Hezbollah rocket attacks. This time IDF has ordered all Shia Lebanese living south of the Litani River to leave, even as Christians have been allowed to stay. IDF has blown up most of the bridges over the Litani River, creating a serious logistical problem. Some Israeli authorities have hinted that the buffer zone may be extended further north to the Zahrani River. Israel has called up an estimated 150,000 reservists, ostensibly for ground operations in southern Lebanon. IDF air raids have taken place mainly in the Hezbollah nerve centre of southern Beirut, but also elsewhere in Lebanon (please see the map below).
2.1 The Losses: Both Israel and Lebanon have suffered significant losses during the first four weeks of this conflict. Overall, till March 28, the hostilities have led to the death of over 1200 Lebanese citizens and the displacement of over 1.2 million or a fifth of Lebanon’s total population. Israel has acknowledged the killing of 4 soldiers and 7 civilians on its side. A large number of Israeli citizens living in the north have had to take shelter at alternative accommodation further south.
A Map of Lebanon with Major points of IDF attacks marked with Red Dots
- Comments and Prognosis:
The ongoing Hezbollah-IDF conflict needs to be studied in a binary fashion. Firstly, as a stand-alone issue in the subregional context. Secondly, as a subset of the wider Middle Eastern conflict between Israel and Iran. In particular, the following comments seem pertinent:
3.1 The recent history of the Israel-Lebanon fracas has been hijacked first by the PLO and later by Hezbollah, with Syria under al-Assad’s playing the role of a mentor. These actors have prevented Lebanon from normalising its ties with Israel, even as the two had no major bilateral border or political issue to resolve.
3.2 The Hezbollah militia progressively became a formidable military force and proved its mettle during the 35-day conflict in 2006 with Israel. It also used its Shia welfare agenda and anti-Israel profile as its call signs domestically, as well as to curry favour with the Iranian IRGC’s Quds Force.
3.3 Although Hezbollah’s performance in the 2023-24 conflict with the IDF was credible, Israel leveraged its superior intelligence to decapitate Hezbollah leadership and technological subterfuge to demoralise its cadres. These factors tilted the outcome of the conflict decisively in the IDF’s favour.
3.4 While Hezbollah suffered a serious military setback in the hands of the IDF in 2023-24 conflict, and its political fortunes have attenuated both in Lebanon and regionally, it seems to have used the intervening 15-month period since the last ceasefire to reorganise: the outfit has reverted to its guerrilla tactics of asymmetric warfare. It has adopted a lower profile, with a more secretive collective leadership post-Nasrallah. There seems to be greater autonomy granted to the field commanders. It has conserved its financial and material resources, made fresh recruitments for losses of up to 2000 deaths among its fighters and managed to retain its hardcore support base. While it still relies on missiles and artillery to intimidate citizens of northern Israel and create a diversion to the IDF campaign against Iran, its unfolding tactics are to ensnare the IDF in the buffer zone and raise the men and material costs over time through ambushes and low-intensity skirmishes – a strategy that succeeded in 2000 and 2006.
3.5 With Israeli parliamentary elections on the anvil and the ruling ultra-right coalition under pressure, Hezbollah apparently hopes that its continuing “resistance” would deepen the ruling coalition’s unpopularity and persuade the new, more moderate government in Jerusalem to cut its losses and effect a withdrawal from Lebanon. In that eventuality, the political pressure to disarm Hezbollah is likely to abate.
3.6 Hezbollah can expect to face multiple political challenges. The foreign pressure, particularly from major donors such as the US, the EU, the GCC countries and the Bretton Woods institutions, on the Lebanese authorities to rein in Hezbollah is, nevertheless, likely to be maintained. In the brittle domestic politico-security environment, the displacement of a fifth of the Lebanese population, mainly Shia, has further vitiated the delicate ethnic equilibrium of the multi-ethnic society. Given that many of the new refugees are an add-on to the earlier Shia refugees from the previous IDF-Hezbollah conflict, the host communities’ solidarity and forbearance are often running thin. There are growing murmurs in Beirut’s political corridors that this time, once again, Hezbollah and Shias have dragged Lebanon into a “War by Choice on Iran’s behest.” In an unprecedented statement, Lebanese Prime Minister Nawaf Salam has recently publicly blamed Hezbollah for bringing the Israel-Iran conflict to Lebanon. Under the circumstances, the possibility of the country being pushed across the abyss of a resumed civil war cannot be ruled out altogether.
3.7 Although Lebanon’s conflict with Israel predates the Iranian Islamic revolution of 1979, in recent decades the links between Iran and Hezbollah have become symbiotic. This is particularly true of the current conflict when Iran and Hezbollah are facing the IDF’s wrath. Both Hezbollah and Iran are under considerable pressure to loosen this linkage. Lebanon has recently declared the Iranian ambassador a “persona non grata”. Last year, the Lebanese foreign minister declined the Iranian invitation to hold bilateral talks to smooth bilateral relations, which remain edgy. On its part, Iran continues to see merit in its policy of promoting Hezbollah and other partners in the “Axis of Resistance” as it provides forward security against Israel at relatively lower cost to the Islamic Republic itself. In its five-point ceasefire plan presented last week, Tehran has included the need for inclusion of Hezbollah in any ceasefire arrangement with Israel and the US. Israel has publicly stated that irrespective of a ramp-off by Washington, it would pursue its goals in Lebanon.
3.8 Among the various probable scenarios, a regime change in Iran would be a very serious setback to Hezbollah. On the other hand, the sudden US withdrawal from the conflict may embolden Iran to project it as a victory. In such an eventuality, Israel may focus all of the IDF’s wrath on Hezbollah in an attempt to finish it off as a military as well as a political force. But, then again, after two years of no-holds-barred campaign against Hamas in Gaza, the IDF has not attained that objective. Most observers believe that Hezbollah is bigger and better prepared than Hamas ever was. It also has both the territorial control and support of the Shia masses in Lebanon and elsewhere in the Middle East. So, even as the fallout of Iran’s conflict with Israel and the US may have some bearing on the conflict in southern Lebanon, the former is not necessarily the only determinant of the latter.
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[i] At least 3,768 people have been killed in Lebanon and 15,699 wounded due to the 13-month IDF-Hezbollah conflict that began in October 2023 and ended in November 2024, according to Lebanon’s health ministry. Hezbollah strikes have killed 45 civilians in northern Israel and the Israeli-occupied Golan Heights. At least 73 Israeli soldiers have been killed in northern Israel. The conflict displaced 886,000 people within Lebanon, with an additional 540,000 taking refuge in Syria. Nearly 60,000 Israelis were also displaced. The World Bank gave a preliminary estimate of $8.5 billion in damage and losses to Lebanon. Lebanon’s real GDP is projected to contract by 5.7% in 2024, compared to a pre-conflict growth estimate of 0.9%. While Israeli economic losses from the 13-month-long war with Hezbollah have not been separately quantified, its budget deficit has surged to approximately 8% of GDP, prompting all three major credit rating agencies to downgrade Israel’s rating this year.
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