Introduction
For a start, it suffices to say that Ali Hosseini Khamenei was either the President of Iran (1981-89) or its Supreme Leader (1989-2026) for 45 years of 47 years of its existence as the Islamic Republic. Thus, contemporary Iran bears his hallmarks all over: as a theocracy, a politico-social ecosystem, an economy under siege and an asymmetric but effective military power. While Imam Ruhollah Khomeini, Iran’s first Supreme Leader (Rahbar Mua’azam), with his concept of Vilayat-e-Faqih (Rule by the Islamic Jurists), sparked the Islamic Revolution in Iran, it was Ali Khamenei who, through his innovation and guile, provided the brain and the brawn to the neophyte entity. Two no-holds-barred wars during the last year have proven the durability of the unique state architecture he created.
Historic Context
The Islamic Republic was an historic and geopolitical anachronism at its revolutionary birth in 1979. It was, and remains, the world’s first Shia theocracy, in a region largely populated by either Sunni Arab monarchies or military dictatorships. By violently overthrowing the US-supported Pahlavi dynasty, it earned itself the birthmark of anti-Americanism that it has worn with pride. The revolution did not have the luxury of a “honeymoon”; the domestic scene was turbulent: the monarchists, supported by the army and intelligence (SAVAK), were itching to return, and the leftists[i] and liberals wanted to steer the changes they had long fought for. The revolutionary students were a law unto themselves, as evinced by their highly provocative and definitional hostage-taking of the US embassy in Tehran. As if all this were not chaotic enough, some hotheads called for exporting the Islamic Revolution to the “corrupt” Arab states. A beginning was made with the Hezbollah Shia militia in Lebanon. Alarmed Gulf monarchies egged on Iraqi President Saddam Hussein to invade Iran, beginning an eight-year bloody war which ended inconclusively in 1988, legitimising and fortifying the Islamic Republic in its wake.
President Khamenei
While the Iranians responded to the mobilising call from Rahbar Khomeini, their first Supreme Leader (Mua’azam), to repel the Iraqi invasion, the second rung of theocrats, such as Ali Khamenei, annealed the pushback. Apart from transforming the war economy, they created, trained and equipped the Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps (“Pasdaran”) and Basij volunteer force. Simultaneously, they spearheaded the entire support system based on a new constitution with innovative socio-political pillars to ensure checks and balances. This organic growth within the first decade was a revolution within the Islamic Revolution that guided the emerging architecture of the Islamic Republic. While it was an improvement over the past Shah-era structures, it often deviated in form as well as practice from many global norms of liberal democratic order.
Nomination as Supreme Leader
Two events in 1988-89 shaped the succession of Ali Khamenei following the death of Ruhollah Khomeini on June 3 1989. Firstly, in July 1988, Imam Khomeini accepted a ceasefire with Iraq, bringing the eight-year-long war to a belated conclusion. This decision created the space for political normalcy, highlighting the role of the executive headed by Ali Khamenei, the President of the Islamic Republic. Secondly, shortly before his death, Imam Khomeini dismissed Ayatollah Montazeri as his long-designated successor, giving the position instead to Khamenei. This was a surprise as Khamenei was neither a Marja-e-Taqlid (“Source of Tradition”, the senior-most title in the Shia hierarchy) nor even an Ayatollah, and there were several theologically better-qualified Shia clerics. Although the departed Imam’s decision raised eyebrows, Ali Khaneinei’s robust and comprehensive network eventually prevailed; the constitution was amended, and after some demurral, the Council of Experts overwhelmingly endorsed his candidature as the new Supreme Leader.
Regional Context
The ascendence of Ali Khamenei as Rahbar-e-Mua’azam coincided with significant regional and global turbulence. Regionally, Saddam Hussein’s invasion of Kuwait in August 1990 and his defeat the next year at the hands of the US-led military coalition was a vicarious revenge for Iran. Various sanctions imposed on Iraq provided Tehran with opportunities for socio-political and economic inroads into the country – a process that expanded after the second US invasion of Iraq in 2003 to destroy its alleged WMD capabilities and its subsequent occupation. Similarly, robust Iranian support to the region’s friendly governments (such as Syria under the Al-Assads) and non-state actors (Hezbollah in Lebanon, Hamas in Gaza and Ansar Allah or al-Houthis in Yemen) began during the early years of Ali Khamenei’s leadership to intensify later.
Global Context
The international context was less sanguine for Iran as the fall of the Berlin Wall and the Tiananmen Square incident heralded a unipolar world with an unchallenged United States, free to pursue its anti-Iran agenda that waxed and waned depending on the proclivities of the White House occupant. The twists and turns included the signing of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) on Iran’s nuclear programme in 2015 and its termination three years later, the two Wars of Choice by the US and Israel in June 2025 and the second began on February 28 this year with the assassination of Rahbar Ali Khamenei and several top political and military aides.
An Assessment of Ali Khamenei as Rahbar Mua’azam
Against this turbulent backdrop, the 37-year tenure of Ayatollah Ali Khamenei as Iran’s spiritual and political leader was marked by several initiatives which define today’s Iran. The following aspects of his rule are worth mentioning:
1. Role Expansion
Unlike his predecessor, Ali Khamenei lacked charisma and religious authority. He made up for these lacunae by progressively expanding his power base in both organic and inorganic ways. On his transition from the Presidency to the Supreme Leader, he carried along many of the former administrative and political powers to his new position. Further, he leveraged frequent policy disputes or inter-departmental competition by arbitrating their solution, amassing more authority for the Bait Rahbari (Supreme Leader’s office). His Fatwas (theological edicts) on religious, social and political issues reinforced his moral authority. Moreover, several Bonyads (Charitable Foundations) were created under his control to benefit the theocracy. He maintained his intimate links with the Pasdaran (IRGC) and vastly expanded them by making them directly accountable to him. Pasdaran’s ambit was expanded to include economic activities and foreign trade. Rahbar Khamenei acquired unquestioned authority to nominate or appoint, dismiss or instruct the concerned officials or organs, and overrule the decisions taken by executive, legislative and judiciary. While there were unconfirmed reports of Bait Rahbari officials engaging in intrigues and misuse of power, Ali Khamenei and his family largely managed to stay above the scams, largely shunning ostentation and indiscretion despite his omnipotence.
2. Domestic Politics
Under Iran’s unique constitution, the power is criss-crossed in multiple ways, often without precise separation of authority between the clergy, judiciary, legislative and executive pillars. Moreover, each of these verticals has its own inner, mutative divisions, loosely described as radicals and moderates. Personality clashes often accentuate this flux. As the Rahbar, Ali Khamenei played a crucial role in managing these contradictions and maintaining a balance between various wings[ii]. However, he was at times personally entangled in these controversies[iii]. While his conciliation frequently diffused the crisis, his occasional tendency to doublespeak and/or prevaricate was at times responsible for worsening the situation[iv]. His economic policies, though largely predicated on external factors such as sanctions, left the common Iranian struggling with high inflation and unemployment. They often blamed the authorities, including Rahbar Khomenei, for the institutionalised corruption, crony-capitalism and outsized financial commitments to the proxies, defence and nuclear projects
3. Nuclear Policy
Contrasting treatment meted out by the United States to Iraq and North Korea about their WMD policies is widely believed to have persuaded Iran, an NPT signatory, to pursue a uranium enrichment programme apparently designed to make Iran a threshold nuclear power[v]. Ayatollah Khamenei’s own policy on this issue seems to have evolved over the years as the Rahbar. In October 2003, Khamenei issued an oral fatwa that forbade the production and use of any form of weapon of mass destruction. Two years later, in August 2005, the fatwa was cited in an official statement by the Iranian government at a meeting of the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in Vienna. It stated that the production, stockpiling and use of nuclear weapons were forbidden under Islam. After repeatedly voicing his scepticism about the reliability of the US commitments, Khamenei formally granted his conditional endorsement to the JCPOA in a letter to then-President Hassan Rouhani sent on October 21, 2015[vi]. Khamenei reiterated his scepticism about the US’s reliability following President Trump’s decision to terminate the JCPOA in 2018, a view he held on to as Biden Presidency unsuccessfully tried to renegotiate a new deal. While Khamenei did not make any specific statements on this matter during the months before his assassination, some senior officials of Bait Rahbari hinted at the possible revision of Iranian nuclear policy in case of a US-Israeli attack. Following US-Israel air attacks on three nuclear sites, Iran’s Parliament (the Majles) passed a resolution on June 25, 2025, to suspend the country’s cooperation with the IAEA.
4. Foreign Policy
During his long tenure as Supreme Leader, Ali Khamenei’s foreign policy was largely anchored by the Islamic Republic’s traditional hostility towards the United States, Israel, and their allies, stressing the “Neither West, Nor East” dictum. Except for a relatively warmer period during Obama’s presidency (when JCPOA was signed), the relations remain frosty. Trump 1.0 and ongoing Trump 2.0 terms saw increasing animus and war. Under Khamenei, the Iranian foreign policy sought to outflank Western moves to contain it with limited success. While Tehran’s ties with each of Moscow and Beijing got warmer[vii], these were mostly tactical and transactional, despite grandiose posturing in public. Russia and China also used their respective relations with Iran as a card in their respective ties with the United States. Iran, an Islamic theocracy, sought to cultivate ties with the Islamic Ummah, but being Shia and “revolutionary”, it had a narrower bandwidth than the affluent Sunni Saudi Arabia.
5. Increased Geo-strategic Focus
By Khamenei’s second decade as Rahbar, a more aggressively nationalistic foreign policy began taking shape. Iran forged strategic alliances with like-minded countries and entities in its periphery[viii]. It revved up its campaign towards greater self-reliance, particularly in missiles and nuclear programmes[ix]. Ties with Saudi Arabia were severed in 2016 following the execution of some Shia theologians. Although Iran denied involvement, a coordinated drone and missile strike in September 2019 seriously damaged the Abqaiq–Khurais oil facility in Saudi Arabia[x]. The bilateral ties were re-established in 2023 following a Chinese mediation. Iran’s ties with the UAE remained edgy, but highly transactional, with Dubai being leveraged for sanction-busting and informal trade estimated at up to $18 billion annually. Iran’s relations with Oman and Qatar were relatively cordial. Although it sought to cultivate ties with South Asia, home to nearly half of the world’s Shia population, these overtures elicited a limited response. The official ties with South Asian countries remained mostly formal and range-bound. India had thriving trade ties with Iran until the US sanctions intervened in 2018.
Rahbar Khamenei’s Legacy
Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s time as Rahbar was akin to a Rodeo contest where a cowboy rides bareback on an unruly horse, violently jerking to unseat him, while the rider desperately tries to hold on with a single hand on the rigging around the wildly jumping animal. The 37-year stint as Supreme Leader began with the end of an 8-year war with Iraq and ended with the beginning of the second war with the US and Israel. Even by Iran’s long and turbulent history, this was a restive era. Yet, literally like a one-armed cowboy, Khamenei rode it out with a firm hand, providing his brand of political leadership and socio-religious guidance. These were not perfect, but by riding this wild animal for so long, he managed to tame the system, giving it greater balance, stability, resilience and endurance. From a tentative state that he inherited at the onset in 1989, he made the choices that coagulated the contemporary Iranian system. In retrospect, he could have been more statesman-like. Domestically, greater liberalism and inclusiveness in his choices of policies and personalities could have helped calm the turbulence. Foreign policy-wise, too, there was scope for Iran under Rahbar Khamenei to handle the challenges with greater realpolitik instead of harping on the self-fulfilling contradictions. While the American adversarial posture was a constant challenge, the maturity, dignity and proportionality shown lately by Iran in the face of Trump’s wayward behaviour, if adopted earlier, could have better served the national interests. Similarly, why did Khamenei’s Iran fail to discover and leverage the geostrategic value of the Strait of Hormuz? The Khamenei-era foreign policy approach was, at times, doctrinaire and abrasive, playing to the domestic gallery. It left potential friends confounded and united the enemies, instead of the other way round[xi]. On the positive side, the political and security architectures he fostered have defied the vicious US-Israel decapitation campaign, but these are still tentative, divisive and personality-driven[xii]. But then, it can well be asked whether, instead of Ali Khamenei’s 37-year stint, various domestic and foreign stakeholders would have been better off with Bait Rahbari under the control of one or more alternative theocrat (s) during this period. There can be no easy or definitive answer, as many of the decisions taken in Tehran were reactions to external stimuli. Ironically, one of the legacies of Rahbar Khamenei was that his successors successfully operationalised their powers, from domestic mobilisation to the orderly transition, waging asymmetric warfare and sustaining the second-strike capability. This comprehensive and credible deterrence capability may be what Ayatollah Ali Khamenei’s term as Rahbar Mua’azam would be best remembered for.
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[i] Furqan, a leftist group, tried to assassinate Ali Khamenei in early 1981 with a rigged tape recorder. Although he survived the attack, he was seriously injured and lost use of his right hand.
[ii] Bait Rahbari chose Masoud Pezeshkian, a cardiologist and former Health Minister, as the Presidential candidate in 2024 in an apparent bid to contain the growing influence of hardliners in the legislature and clergy.
[iii] For instance, Bait Rahbari was dragged in cases involving Mr Rafsanjani’s presidential candidacy in 2005 and 2013 and Mr Ahmadinejad’s re-election in 2009.
[iv] In retrospect, instances where Bait Rahbari’s timely intervention could have saved the situation include social unrest concerning Gen-Z aspirations, Agitation by Tehran Bazaarghanis, Niqab enforcement, protest against petrol price hike, etc.
[v] According to reliable estimates, Iran has cumulatively invested over $100 bn in its nuclear programme; if the economic losses due to resultant sanctions are factored in, the total costs to the nation rise manifold.
[vi] His approval included the following key mandates: (a) Sanctions: The US and the EU to provide written guarantees that economic sanctions would be lifted. (b) Reversibility: The agreement would become void if any new sanctions were imposed on Iran under any pretext (such as human rights or terrorism). (c) Snap-back: Iran would stop its commitments under the JCPOA if world powers violated the terms.
[vii] Iran and China signed an agreement on a 25-year-long Comprehensive Strategic Partnership in March 2021. While its contents have not been made public, some reports indicate it provides for $400 billion in Chinese investment in Iranian hydrocarbon and infrastructure domains in return for discounted Iranian oil sales to China. In January 2025, the Presidents of Iran and Russia signed a 20-year treaty on a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership. Western media reports sporadically alleged that Tehran had a discreet defence supply chain relationship, and China’s teapot refineries defied the US sanctions to obtain over 80% of Iranian oil exports.
[viii] Such countries included Iraq, Syria under al-Assads, Libya under Gaddafi, Algeria and the PLO. Tehran also lavished assistance on the non-state actors such as Hezbollah, al-Houthis and Hamas, as well as some Shia militias in Iraq.
[ix] In retrospect, these campaigns paid Iran good dividends during the sanctions and Wars in the last decade.
[x] Abqaiq houses the world’s largest crude oil stabilisation plant, making it a critical choke point for global energy. Khurais contains one of the country’s largest oil fields. While Yemen’s Ansar Allah militia (al-Houthis) claimed responsibility for the attack, the missiles and drones used were thought to be of Iranian origin.
[xi] For instance, Rahbar Khamenei personally issued statements criticising India in 2017, 2019, 2020 and 2024 for New Delhi’s policies in Kashmir and the Muslim minority. In a measured response to the 2024 statement, India’s Ministry of External Affairs deplored the remarks, pointing out that countries commenting on minority issues should review their own records.
[xii] An international media report in early June 2026 claimed that President Masoud Pezeshkian sought to step down in protest over the IRGC’s unchecked dominance in Tehran’s wartime decision-making. Similarly, there were allegations about Iranian negotiators having conceded too much to the US side. Both reports were officially denied.
