The Makkah Joint Defence Agreement was signed among Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan on August 7, less than a year after Saudi Arabia and Pakistan entered into a similar agreement.
The Backdrop
The agreement is said to have been under consideration for almost a year.
Israel’s aggressive display of its military power since October 2023, together with the US-Israel-Iran war, has thrown the US led security architecture of West Asia into flux. A badly battered, but undefeated and emboldened Iran remains capable of posing threat, along with its proxies, to the countries of the region and Israel remains incontestably the most potent military presence with nuclear weapons. The US security umbrella was found seriously wanting by the Gulf monarchies against Iranian attacks. While not about to jettison their security linkages with the US, they seem keen to explore and build additional options.
The specific motivations of the three parties are different. For Saudi Arabia, it is the immediate threat from Iran and its proxies and the Israeli threat in the long run. For Turkey, it is wider security linkages and influence in the region, opportunities for its armaments industry and an eye on Israel as a potent military power and a potential strategic competitor. Turkey-Israel tensions, fueled initially by the Israeli war in Gaza, have increasingly acquired a strategic dimension with Turkey regarding the Israeli actions in Syria and Lebanon as a threat to its security interests. For Pakistan, it means a financial lifeline to Saudi Arabia, access to Turkish military technology and geopolitical relevance that it had lacked until only two years ago. Pakistan, as usual, seeks to rent its military capacity backed by the illusory lure of its nuclear umbrella.
What does the Makkah Agreement entail
The full text of the agreement not having been made public, all that is known about it is based on the statements of the parties to it.
Like the earlier Saudi-Pak agreement, it is said to contain a mutual defence clause: an armed attack against any of the parties to be regarded as an attack against them all.
The Turkish Defence Ministry has stated that the agreement’s fundamental goal is to put military and defence ties among the parties on a more institutional and sustainable footing. Political and military co-ordination mechanisms, involving Defence Ministers, Foreign Ministers and armed forces commanders, are planned to be established. Joint exercises involving land, naval and air forces will be conducted. Defence industry co-operation is proposed to be deepened not only in terms of product and system supply, but also joint development and production, technology cooperation and sustainable maintenance and logistics support. Unmanned and autonomous systems, electronic warfare and artificial intelligence would be prioritized. This is clearly a very ambitious agenda. Only time will tell how far it can be realized.
Future Expansion
The three parties have stated that they would welcome other countries joining the pact. However, expansion of the grouping is not a foregone conclusion.
Since early 2026, Egypt is part of R4 grouping, along with Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Turkey, which holds consultations on regional issues. It has of late also strengthened its military ties with Turkey. Turkish Foreign Minister Hakan Fidan described Egypt as a natural partner for the Makkah Agreement and visited Egypt after its signing. However, the Egyptian Foreign Minister Badr Abdelatty stated at a press conference alongside the visiting Turkish Minister that some legal, constitutional and technical issues needed to be examined carefully before a decision was taken. It seems that Cairo is cautious about a binding military commitment to countries with varied interests and the implications of it joining the Makkah agreement for its peace treaty with Israel.
There have been aspirational proposals from time to time regarding all countries in the region joining hands for regional security. Thus, in a recent article in Le Monde, Foreign Minister Badr Albusaidi of Oman states that since 1979, the security of the Gulf had been organized on the basis of containment of the existential Iranian threat against the Arab Gulf and Western interests therein. However, the recent war has revealed that containment was a myth. The gravest threats to the Gulf come not from within but from decisions and actions taken outside it, above all in Tel Aviv. He concludes that eight states around the Gulf littoral — Oman and its five GCC partners, Iraq and Iran — must, therefore, be included in any process leading to a new security arrangement. Reacting to the Makkah Agreement, the Spokesman of the Iranian Foreign Ministry described it as evidence that regional countries were increasingly relying on their own capabilities rather than outside powers. He added that any plan that is based on geopolitical and historical realities of the region, is comprehensive and inclusive, and correctly identifies the enemy and the threat, has a chance of helping in strengthening security and preventing instability and abuses by the “Zionist enemy and its allies”.
Further, some commentaries on the Makkah Agreement have described it as potentially a precursor to an “Islamic NATO”. The Pakistani Defence Minister, Khwaja Asif has advocated a NATO-like defence arrangement among Muslim countries.
Both the above propositions require a careful appraisal.
First, Makkah Agreement is not the result of religious considerations, even though the three parties to it happen to be Sunni majority countries. It is motivated by geopolitical, strategic and security considerations. Second, the nature of trigger for joint defence and the extent of involvement of parties in the event of an armed attack against one of them is far from clear. Equally uncertain is development of the institutional framework and integration of armed forces to ensure joint defence. Third, the much aspired for unity in the Muslim world, the Arab world and in the Gulf has remained a chimera. The Muslim world has a major Shia-Sunni faultline running through it and further divisions due to varied interests. Diverse national interests have also divided the Arab world and countries in the Gulf. Muslim countries and the Gulf have not lacked defence agreements (the Joint Defence Treaty of the Arab League of 1950 and mutual defence clauses in the GCC Joint Defence Agreement are examples), but shared political and strategic goals. Consequently, the idea of an Islamic NATO is far-fetched. Equally, the path to an inclusive security architecture of all countries of the Gulf littoral, invoked by the Omani Foreign Minister, is strewn with formidable hurdles.
President Donald Trump has expressed his happiness at the Makkah Agreement as it “shows how the Middle East is coming together, and how countries will finally be able to defend themselves in a more meaningful way.” This is in keeping with his argument that countries of the region should assume greater responsibility and bear a larger share of burden for their own security. However, the US, committed to Israel’s qualitative military edge in the region, would be concerned if the Makkah Agreement is ever seen as evolving into an explicitly anti-Israel military alliance. In spite of recent differences with Israel over the war against Iran, the Americans are clearly not about to abandon Israel. In fact, Trump has made the US-Saudi civil nuclear agreement subject to Saudi Arabia joining Abraham Accords.
Bangladesh has recently emerged as an unexpected potential candidate for adherence to the Makkah Agreement. The Foreign Affairs Adviser to the Bangladesh Prime Minister has said that it would not be unusual for Bangladesh to join such a security pact, adding that the matter is being viewed positively. One has to wait and see whether the statement is driven by serious intent or the ongoing tensions in the India-Bangladesh ties.
Implications for India and possible Indian approach
Developments in West Asia, India’s extended neighbourhood, including the evolution of its security architecture, are naturally of critical interest to India.
India has given a measured reaction to the Makkah agreement, stating that its implications for India’s security and regional stability would be examined and necessary steps taken to safeguard national interests.
Certain apprehensions concerning the accord expressed in India’s public discourse need examination.
First, the scenario of Saudi Arabia and Turkey getting physically involved with their armed forces in an Indo-Pak conflict is far-fetched. The three parties have diverse threat perceptions and only a common threat to the security of all of them could result in joint action.
Second, as for military backing to Pakistan during such a conflict, Turkey already has an arms supply relationship with Pakistan — naval platforms, drones, UAVs, avionics and munitions etc. Pakistan’s aeronautical engineers are said to be embedded at Turkish facilities working on its fifth-generation stealth fighter programme. This relationship was set to grow even in the absence of the Makkah agreement. The Saudis are incapable of rendering any military help of note to Pakistan, but could finance some of the arms purchases by it from Turkey. In any case, military backing by Turkey and Saudi Arabia would not add significantly to the solid backing of China already available to Pakistan, which was amply evident during Operation Sindoor.
Third, would the strategic dimension added by the Makkah Agreement result in stronger diplomatic support of Turkey and Saudi Arabia to Pakistan on Indo-Pak issues? Turkey’s diplomatic support to Pakistan on these issues has already been as strong as it can get. The Saudi positions have become more nuanced as India’s relationship with them has strengthened. Given the multifaceted relationship between India and Saudi Arabia, this should not change significantly.
However, India will have to watch out for the following:
- Any expansion of the Makkah accord.
- Any boost to Pakistan’s military industrial complex by way of joint development and production of weapon systems with the help of Saudi money and Turkish technology.
- Progress or lack of it in the development of coordination mechanisms and other areas of cooperation listed by the Turkish Defence Ministry; attempts at building inter-operability among the armed forces; and intelligence support etc.
Going beyond the military dimension, let us also look at a geopolitical dimension that should be of concern to India. The geopolitical fortunes of Pakistan, regarded for over two decades after turn of the century as an internally consumed hub of terrorism, have seen a turnaround over the last year or so as a result of Field Marshal Asim Munir’s cozy relationship with the White House and Pakistan’s role as a mediator between US and Iran. Development of security linkages by Pakistan in West Asia, especially the Makkah Agreement, add to that trend. However, on the flip side, in its desperation to develop such linkages, Pakistan risks getting sucked into the faultlines of the region, while continuing to face serious problems at home. Asim Munir seems willing to tread the ground that his predecessors had feared to tread. Thus, in 2015, Pakistan had declined to contribute combat forces to the Saudi led intervention to counter the Houthis in Yemen, in order not to alienate Iran as well as its large Shia minority. In contrast, according to media reports, Pakistan deployed 8000 troops, a squadron of JF-17 aircraft, two squadrons of drones and a Chinese air defence system in Saudi Arabia earlier this year.
Some media reports have sought to link Prime Minister Netanyahu’s phone call with PM Modi on August 6 with the Makkah agreement signed a day later. The Indian read out of the call says that the two sides reviewed sustained progress in the India-Israel Special Strategic Partnership, reaffirmed their commitment to further strengthening bilateral cooperation and exchanged views on the recent developments in West Asia. India and Israel have close defence cooperation and it may strengthen further in the normal course. However, it is not the answer for protection of Indian interests in the face of the ongoing churn in the security architecture of West Asia.
India will need to leverage its significant equities in the region as provider of the much needed and productive manpower, energy importer, trade partner and a lucrative investment destination to safeguard its interests. India will also need to activate and strengthen its existing defence ties, besides building new linkages, with the West Asian countries other than Israel. However, in doing so, India should, unlike Pakistan, avoid getting sucked into the faultlines and quagmires of the region. This would in turn require a balanced approach towards countries of the region without any pronounced tilts.
The views expressed above are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily reflect the views or position of the Ananta Centre.
